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Abstract 
We study three topics on corruption that are of particular relevance to 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
Firstly, we address the question of why corruption is such an endemic 
problem in sub-Saharan Africa. Is it policy driven or "destiny"? We analyse 
indices of perceived corruption and test several theories regarding the causes of 
corruption. We find strong support for two arguments: Countries with a British 
heritage are perceived to be less corrupt, while those with a common law system 
are perceived to be more corrupt. We find weaker support for four further 
arguments: Countries with good quality institutions and a greater proportion of 
women in the labour force are perceived as less corrupt. Countries with greater 
natural resource abundance and with greater trade openness are perceived to be 
more corrupt. 
Secondly, we look at the supply side of bribery. Within the public 
procurement process, we study how a firm's uncertainty regarding the official's 
corruptibility and rival firms' costs influences the magnitude of the bribe it 
offers. Due to the illegal nature of bribery, we also explicitly consider different 
punishment mechanisms for corrupt firms. We find that secrecy leads to lower 
bribe levels, and that bribery can be completely deterred by either appropriate 
fixed fines or by firms being fined punitive damages. 
Thirdly, we investigate whether more corrupt governments receive less 
aid. We develop a theoretical framework that treats corruption as a tax on aid. 
Although we are unable to empirically test this model, we use it to motivate our 
empirical analysis of aid receipts using data on sub-Saharan Africa. We find a 
negative correlation between a country's perceived level of corruption and its 
aid receipts. However, we find no causal effect of perceived corruption on aid 
receipts. We revisit the results of an influential paper in the literature and find 
that their result of no evidence that countries perceived as more corrupt receive 
less aid is not robust to a sample of sub-Saharan African countries, although we 
find no evidence of a causal effect. We find no evidence that the impact of 
perceived corruption on aid receipts differs across sectors. 
xi 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
"Corruption in Aftica is a major concern, more so than on any 
other continent. " 
Transparency International 
"The issue ofgood governance and capacity- building is what we 
believe lies at the core of all ofAftica's problems. Until that is in 
place Aftica will be doomed to continue its economic 
stagnation. " 
Commission for Africa (2005) 
There is no completely clear-cut definition of corruption. A common 
definition of corruption is the misuse of public office for private gain [Johnston 
(1996)], where an official entrusted with carrying out a task engages in some 
sort of malfeasance for private enrichment. The essential aspects of corruption 
are, therefore, that the bribee must necessarily be in a position of power, created 
either by market imperfections or an institutional position that grants him 
discretionary authority, and that there is an illegal or unauthorised transfer of 
money or an in-kind substitute. Corruption is not exclusive to the public sector 
- it may also take place in the private sector. For example, payments to the 
manager of a financial institution in order to obtain a loan or secure more 
favourable terms on a transaction, or some form of gift exchange to get a job. 
Although corruption is difficult to define, it is generally accepted to be a 
bad thing. Corruption is believed to undermine economic performance, weaken 
democratic institutions and the rule of law, disrupt social order and destroy 
public trust. 
The early 1990s marked the awakening of policymakers to the problems 
of corruption. They had known it was there, but corruption, the C-word, was 
hardly specifically mentioned or acknowledged. There is now an overwhelming 
consensus that corruption is a significant impediment to economic and social 
development. In 1996, incoming World Bank President James Wolfensohn 
declared war on the "cancer of corruption". The World Bank has since 
engaged in a comprehensive fight against corruption, both internally and in the 
countries it works with. 
Specific actions have been taken in the international arena in an attempt 
to combat corruption. Two notable examples are the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (also known as 
the Anti-Bribery Convention) and the United Nations (UN) Convention Against 
Corruption. The Anti-Bribery Convention, which was signed in December 1997 
and came into force in February 1999, makes it a crime to offer, promise or give 
a bribe to a foreign public official in order to obtain or retain international 
business deals. The UN Convention, which was signed in October 2003 and 
entered into force in December 2005, provides powerful new capacities for 
mutual legal assistance among countries in the fight against corruption, in 
particular making it easier to return assets stolen by corrupt leaders. 
2 
Some form of corruption exists in every country of the world. However, 
corruption appears to be particularly rampant in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite 
the obvious difficulties in measuring corruption, some organisations attempt to 
measure some facets of corruption, and provide indicators of corruption. These 
indicators are typically based on polls of experts or surveys of entrepreneurs or 
citizens in general, and, as such, are subjective indices of perceptions of 
corruption. For example, the commercial firm, Political Risk Services (PRS) 
produces the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which includes a 
monthly index of perceived corruption (available for a large number of countries 
and for a long period, comparable over time). The ICRG corruption index 
varies from zero to six (it is a discrete score with half digits), with higher values 
denoting lower perceived corruption. Figure 1.1 shows annual averages of the 
ICRG corruption index computed for the different regions of the world from 
1982 to 1997.1 Sub-Saharan Africa is clearly one of the most corrupt regions of 
the world. 
To give a more recent picture of perceived corruption, for example, the 
ICRG corruption index for July 2007 shows that sub-Saharan Africa is the 
region perceived to be more corrupt, with an average corruption index of 1.9, 
followed by Eastern Europe and Central Asia with 2.1, Latin America and the 
Caribbean with 2.2, Middle East and North Africa with 2.3, South Asia with 2.4, 
1 Although the ICRG indicators are available until the current year, these data are sold at 
substantial prices to commercial subscribers. However, it is possible to obtain annual averages 
of a subset of ICRG indicators, including corruption, for the period 1982-1997 at a discounted 
price. Figure 1.1 is based on that data set. More detailed information on the ICRG corruption 
index is provided in Section 2.4.1. 
j 
East Asia and Pacific with 2.7, North America with 4.5, and Western Europe 
2 
with 4.6. 
Another source is Transparency International, a non-govemmental 
organisation devoted to combating corruption, which produces yearly indices of 
levels of perceived corruption. Sub-Saharan Affican countries consistently 
score very poorly. For example, in 2006, six of the ten most corrupt countries 
were sub-Saharan African, and it was the only region with more than one 
country in this "top" (or, more accurately, "bottom") ten. 
Several commentators believe that corruption in Africa takes on a more 
damaging form than elsewhere. Martin Wolf, a former economist at the World 
Bank who now writes for the Financial Times, believes that "in Aftica, the 
corrupt remove resource wealth andprovide nothing in return. In Asia, regimes 
like SuhartoS would take a cut on everything, but the service would be 
delivered While that extracts a price ftom the economy, it's far more 
beneficial. " Jeremy Pope, a founding member of Transparency International, 
defines Africa as a "lootocrac " and states that " ou don'tfind it anywhere else YY 
in the world. Even in Latin America, the leaders don't steal everything that 
moves and shift it offshore. ,3 
Sub-Saharan Africa faces serious development challenges. Not only is 
sub-Saharan Africa the poorest region in the world, but it was also the only 
major developing region with negative growth in income per capita in the past 
25 years. Almost one half of its 674 million people live on less than US $1 a 
2 These figures can be obtained as a free sample from the PRS website. Note. however. that 
these are monthly figures, and as such are likely to be noisier than annual averages of monthly 
fioures. 
I ' Both quotes are taken from Wrong 
4 
day. The region* s health conditions are the worst in the world - it is afflicted by W 
the HIV/AIDS pandernic and the resurgence of malaria. Life expectancy is a 
meagre 46 years and the under-five mortality rate is 171 deaths per 1,000 live 
births. 
All figures come from World Bank (2005a). 
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Our starting point is that corruption poses one of the biggest challenges 
throughout sub-Saharan Africa. We examine three different issues that can be 
considered independently of one another, and that help to explore different 
facets of corruption. As a whole, they help to understand some mechanisms of 
corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The first question we consider is one that arises naturally - Why are 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa so corrupt? Can the levels of corruption be 
traced to long-predetermined historical and cultural determinants, or are the 
policies undertaken by African leaders mostly responsible for fostering or 
deterring corrupt behaviour among government officials? In other words, is 
corruption "destiny" or policy driven? It is important to clarify what we mean 
by "destiny". We define "destiny" as those characteristics of a country that 
cannot be altered, and as such are an integral part of the fabric of a country, in a 
sense analogous to a person's DNA. These characteristics are related to long- 
predetermined historical, natural and cultural conditions, such as colonial 
heritage and ethnicity, which cannot be changed. This is an important question, 
as strategies for combating corruption can only be successfully devised after 
ascertaining the factors that contribute to corruption. There is plenty of 
anecdotal evidence on the causes of corruption. Typically, it is thought that the 
combination of abundant natural resources, a history of autocratic and 
unaccountable govenunent, as well as conflict and crisis throughout the region 
have posed particular challenges to governance and the fight against corruption 
in Africa. 
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Although anecdotal evidence can provide colourful examples of 
instances of corruption, a rigorous analysis is needed so that valid policy 
implications can be drawn. We conduct an empirical analysis using data on sub- 
Saharan African countries. Like previous studies, we use a measure of 
perceived levels of corruption. Unlike previous studies, we focus exclusively on 
sub-Saharan Africa and use a panel data set, covering 32 countries over 16 
years. By using multiple observations for each country, we are able to control 
for country heterogeneity. We also address Problems of reverse causality 
between corruption and several explanatory variables, namely, economic 
development, trade and aid flows. 
The second topic we consider is one that has been largely ignored by the 
literature. Most of the research on corruption has focused on the choice of 
whether or not to engage in corruption on the part of administrators or 
politicians. Frequently, the private sector's willingness to offer bribes is given 
less attention. However, it takes two parties to enter into a corrupt deal. The 
amount of money that changes hands in corrupt dealings is enormous. 
Extrapolating from firm and household survey data, the World Bank Institute 
estimates that total bribes in a year are about US $1 trillion, roughly 3% of 
world income in 2002 [Rose-Ackerman (2004)]. 
It is thus important to study the decision-making process of firms that 
offer bribes. We consider the case of corruption in government procurement, in 
particular when finns offer bribes to be selected as the winner. We are 
interested in examining the conditions that influence firms' decisions of the 
magnitude of bribes, and consequently, how the choices made by corrupt 
8 
officials based on these bribes affect allocation efficiency. We develop a simple 
theoretical model that looks at firms' bribes when there are information 
asymmetries regarding firm types and their ability to offer bribes and regarding 
whether the govermnent official is corrupt. Due to the illegal nature of bribery, 
we also explicitly consider different punishment mechanisms for firms that offer 
bribes. 
A study of firms' incentives to offer bribes in government procurement 
contracts is especially relevant in the sub-Saharan African context, where there 
are still significant infrastructure needs (for example, it has the lowest 
proportion of paved roads in the world, as only 13% of roads are paved). 
Furthermore, corruption in public procurement often leads to inferior quality 
construction and unnecessary purchases, which is particularly serious in 
countries with scarce funds and with limited capacity for on-going maintenance. 
The final question we address is whether more corrupt countries in sub- 
Saharan Africa receive less aid. This seems to be quite a relevant question, as 
sub-Saharan African countries have consistently been among the world's largest 
recipients of aid, receiving about one third of all aid disbursed [OECD (2005a)]. 
In addition, achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 
has given aid to Africa a new emphasis. The prospects for accomplishing the 
MDG targets in Africa are extremely pessimistic. Unless things improve, it will 
take sub-Saharan Africa until 2147 to halve extreme poverty and there is no 
forecast for the halving of people suffering from hunger (the two targets of the 
principal MDG) because of the worsening of the region's situation. The 
achievement of universal primary education is not forecasted until 2129, and it 
9 
will take until 2165 to cut child mortality by two-thirds [United Nations 
Development Programme (2003)]. Although primary responsibility to achieve 
the MDGs rests with developing countries, it is widely recognised that 
international support is critical, especially for the poorest countries. Aid from 
developed countries provides the main source of external financing for those 
countries, especially for sub-Saharan Africa. This has recently been reiterated at 
the G8 Gleneagles Summit in July 2005. 
Previous studies have found no evidence that countries perceived to be 
more corrupt receive less aid. This result is somewhat puzzling, begging the 
question of whether there are specific characteristics inherent to corruption and 
its interaction with aid that provide an economic rationale for this pattern of aid 
flows. In addition, we are interested in verifying whether this result holds for 
sub-Saharan Africa. We use a simple theoretical set-up that helps to explain this 
(lack of) relationship between corruption and aid. Although we are unable to 
empirically test our theoretical model, we use it to motivate our empirical 
analysis. We study empirically whether, in the specific case of sub-Saharan 
Africa, those countries that are perceived to be more corrupt have lower bilateral 
aggregate aid receipts. We also look at aid receipts across sectors, motivated by 
the focus of the MDGs. As in Chapter 2, we address issues of potential 
endogeneity. 
The topics addressed in this study are not meant to be exhaustive. There 
are many more relevant questions to be asked about corruption. However, we 
feel that they are a good starting point for thinking about corruption in sub- 
Saharan Africa. 
10 
Chapter 2 
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: "Destiny" or Policy Driven? An 
Empirical Study 
2.1 Introduction 
In recent years corruption has ceased to be a taboo subj ect in the 
policyrnaking arena. Several international institutions such as Transparency 
International and the World Bank have been actively involved in trying to 
combat corruption. However, in order to fight corruption effectively there must 
be an understanding of what causes corruption. Why are some countries more 
corrupt than others? The answer to this question is by no means clear-cut. 
Difficulties arise from the framework employed to study corruption to the 
measurement of corrupt activities. 
Corruption has been studied as a political, economic, cultural or moral 
problem, and in many cases as a combination of these. Indeed, from the early 
stages of the study of corruption Rose-Ackerman (1978) argued that one must 
"develop a set of analytic techniques that combine an economist's concern with 
modelling seýflinterested behaviour with a political scientist'S recognition that 
political and bureaucratic institutions provide incentive structures far different 
firom those presupposed by the competitive market paradigm. " 
Little is known with certainty about what causes corruption to be higher 
in one place than another. This lack of agreement on the nature and causes of 
corruption stems partly from the choice of analytical framework employed. 
Arnong others, this may vary between a rent-seeking approach, a multi-tiered 
II 
approach - in which corruption is a function of the lack of durable political 
institutions and political competition, a weak and undeveloped civil society - 
and a view of corruption as a means of maintaining existing power structures 
and systems of political control. 
Although the difficulty in measuring corruption directly has been an 
obstacle in the study of corruption, several indices that attempt to measure some 
facets of corruption have recently become available. These are indices of 
perceived corruption and they are based on polls of experts or surveys of 
entrepreneurs or citizens in general, who assign scores to countries in terms of 
the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and 
politicians and the degree to which business transactions involve corruption or 
"questionable" payments. These subjective indices are available from 
commercial agencies, non-governmental organisations and international 
organisations. 
The availability of these indices of perceived corruption has spurred the 
emergence of a body of work on cross-national comparative empirical research 
that investigates different theories on the detenninants of corruption. 5 However, 
a widely accepted benchmark equation specifying the causes of corruption does 
not yet exist. 
A study of the causes of corruption is particularly relevant to sub- 
Saharan Africa - is the region's corruption problem policy-driven or "destiny" 
(i. e., related to its long-predetennined historical, natural and cultural 
characteristics') which cannot be altered, such as colonial heritage)? Can the 
5 For example, Mauro (1995). La Porta et a]. (1997a, 1999), Easterly and Levine (1997) and 
Treisman (2000) have used perceived corruption indices. 
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levels of corruption be traced to long-predetermined historical and cultural 
determinants, or are the policies undertaken by African leaders mostly 
responsible for fostering or deterring corrupt behaviour among government 
officials? If corrupt behaviour prevails because of long-predetermined historical 
and cultural factors does this suggest that corruption is by and large inevitable? 
We believe not. Long-predetermined history and culture can explain only a 
certain fraction of the level of corruption, and there remains sufficient room for 
improvements of a country's integrity. It also means that African countries need 
to have good policies that more than compensate the detrimental effect of their 
long-predetermined historical and cultural heritages. 
Although anecdotal evidence on corruption in Africa is abundant, there 
are, to our knowledge, no empirical studies that explicitly analyse the causes of 
corruption in this continent. Existing empirical studies on the determinants of 
perceived corruption are based on worldwide comparisons, considering Africa 
as a homogeneous region. However, there seems to be gains in empirically 
exploiting the heterogeneity among the different states that constitute the 
African continent. Indeed, as the former President of Nigeria, Olusegun 
Obasanjo, stated, "... people tend to see Aftica as a homogeneous entity, which it 
is not... " 
We use an index of perceived corruption, from the International Country 
Risk Guide published by Political Risk Services, to assess the explanatory 
power of a number of hypotheses that the theoretical and empirical literature 
have found to be significant in explaining corruption levels in a country. We 
use data for the period 1982-1997 and for 32 sub-Saharan African countries. 
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We are interested in ascertaining whether perceived corruption in sub-Saharan 
Africa is mainly due to long-predetermined historical and cultural factors 
("destiny"), or whether it is primarily driven by governments' policy choices. 
We begin by running a baseline regression, consisting of the most 
"exogenous" group of variables, i. e., the long-predetermined historical, 
geographical, cultural and ethnic characteristics. We then sequentially add 
further groups of variables. First, we add a measure of economic development, 
then,, we add a group of variables characterising the level of democracy and 
political instability, followed by the quality of legal and political institutions. 
Finally, we include variables capturing public policy. 
As a starting point, we estimate our models using the country averages of 
perceived corruption over the period 1982-1997 (this could be interpreted as 
capturing the longer-term determinants of corruption). We then estimate our 
models using a pooled sample of observations; and finally, by explicitly taking 
into account the panel nature of the data set. We also attempt to determine the 
causal effect of some variables that we believe to not only contribute towards 
higher levels of corruption, but also to be affected by corruption. We perform 
instrumental variable estimation to address problems of endogeneity of income, 
trade and aid. However,, finding good instruments is difficult and the results 
obtained are typically very sensitive to the choice of instruments, so we 
complement our analysis by using lagged values for the potentially endogenous 
variables (instead of current values). On the basis that, insofar as lagged values 
of these potentially endogenous variables are predetermined with respect to 
current perceived corruption, then they are less susceptible to endogeneity bias, 
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we should be able to address the causality issue. Although instrumental variable 
estimation of the pooled model allows us to determine the causal effects of 
income, trade and aid, this is generally not robust either to estimating the other 
models or to using lagged values. The trade variable is the only potentially 
endogenous variable that appears to have a causal effect on perceived 
corruption. 
Nonetheless,, we make an important improvement in relation to the 
existing literature, by providing results from different treatments of the 
corruption variable. That is, although we present our main results under the 
assumption that there is an inherent cardinality to the corruption index, we 
complement our analysis by also presenting results derived by treating the 
corruption index explicitly as an ordinal variable (classifying it into bands). The 
results obtained when treating the corruption index as ordinal broadly support 
those obtained when assuming the corruption index has some cardinal value. 
We find strong support for two arguments: Countries with a British 
heritage are perceived as less corrupt, while those with a common law system 
are perceived to be more corrupt. We find weaker support for four further 
arguments: Countries with good quality institutions and a greater proportion of 
women in the labour force are perceived as less corrupt. Countries with greater 
natural resource abundance and with greater trade openness are perceived to be 
more corrupt. 
Our findings suggest why fighting corruption in sub-Saharan Africa has 
been so difficult. Long-predetermined historical and cultural characteristics 
appear to have a significant impact on whether a country is perceived to be 
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corrupt, and it is not just government policy that matters. However, we believe 
that this finding should be seen in a positive rather than in a negative light. That 
is, even though long-predetennined historical and cultural characteristics which 
cannot be changed have an important effect in determining whether perceived 
corruPtion is higher or lower, this does not mean that countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa should be discouraged from pursuing sound policies. Indeed, one area 
for future research may be to examine whether a consistent pursuit of sound 
policies has a significant impact on whether a country is perceived to be more or 
less corrupt. 6 Unless countries persevere with good policies it will not be 
possible to study this potential effect. This means that pursuing sound policies 
is particularly important in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Throughout the chapter we shall use a widely accepted definition of 
corruption, according to which it is the abuse of public roles or resources for 
private benefit [Johnston (1996)]. 
It is important to note that, given the strictly subjective nature of the 
corruption scores, in discussing empirical results, whenever we refer to 
corruption we mean perceived corruption. 
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides a review 
of the two papers more closely related to our study, insofar as they consider the 
largest set of explanatory variables for the causes of corruption. Section 2.3 
outlines some theories and the results of further empirical studies on the 
6 Note that in that case, a country's more recent history (in terms of what policies governments 
pursued say one, two, or even ten years ago) would be included as a factor in explaining 
ituting "destiny", as our perceived corruption. Recent history is not included in factors const] I 
definition of "destiny" includes only long-predetermined historý,, such as whether a country was 
colonised. 
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deten-ninants of corruption. This section also derives the hypotheses that we 
consider relevant for determining corruption. Section 2.4 provides information 
and a critical discussion on current practices in measuring (perceptions of) 
corruption, ocusing on our selected measure. Section 2.5 describes the data and 
Section 2.6 presents the econometric analysis. The results (including sensitivity 
analyses) are discussed in Section 2.7. Finally, Section 2.8 provides some 
concluding remarks and suggests directions for further research. 
2.2 Related Literature 
The past few years have seen the emergence of a growing body of 
literature analysing the causes and determinants of corruption (see, for example, 
Svensson (2005) and Lambsdorff (2006) for a general survey on this literature). 
The growing number of empirical studies has investigated the correlation 
between a large set of variables and perceived corruption. 7 These studies have 
differed in their measures of corruption, samples, and more importantly, 
conditioning sets. 
Typically, each study tends to be concerned with a specific factor, or 
small group of factors, that is suspected of determining corruption levels [such 
as the effect of gender on corruption, as in Swamy et al. (2001), or of the 
different features of the electoral system, as in Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 
(2003)]. These studies include explanatory variables, other than the ones that 
constitute their main source of interest, but they are typically not concerned with 
the relative importance of these control variables in explaining corruption levels. 
7 Note that these studies use measures of perceived corruption. Therefore, in the context of 
empirical results, whenever we refer to corruption, we mean perceived corruption. 
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Also, these studies tend to include different control variables (for example, some 
studies omit variables on colonial heritage, some omit measures of democracy). 
There are two exceptions, namely, Treisman (2000) and Serra (2006). The 
objective of both these papers, albeit using different methodologies, is to 
determine the set of explanatory variables, given data limitations, which 
provides the most complete picture of the causes of corruption. 
Treisman (2000) derives 14 hypotheses about the causes of cross- 
national variation in corruption from the theoretical literature in political science 
and economics. Treisman analyses several indices of perceived corruption for 
the 1980s and 1990s, using worldwide cross-country regressions. The main 
dependent variable is Transparency International's annual Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) for 1996,1997 and 1998. Treisman also checks the 
robustness of the results using an index from Business International for the early 
1980s (also used in Mauro (1995), for example). Of the 14 hypotheses on the 
determinants of corruption, six find support. Perceived corruption is found to be 
lower in countries with Protestant traditions, British heritage, greater economic 
development, greater openness to imports and a long uninterrupted exposure to 
democracy. Federal states are perceived as more corrupt. 
Treisman (2000) acknowledges problems of endogeneity of several of 
his explanatory variables with corruption, and uses the technique of instrumental 
variables to address this. However, he is unsuccessful in finding suitable 
instruments, except for his measure of economic development (income), where 
latitudinal distance from the Equator is used as an instrument. In particular, no 
suitable instrument is found for openness to imports. 
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Due to the measure of corruption used, Treisman (2000) excludes a large 
number of sub-Saharan African countries from his sample. Also, the corruption 
index employed does not permit any time-series analysis. Although Treisman 
performs three separate single-year regressions, we believe there are gains to 
using a corruption measure that permits the use of panel data. 
The aim of Serra (2006) is to identify any truly robust determinants of 
perceived corruption among the various factors identified by previous empirical 
studies as significantly related to perceived corruption. In other words, they 
address the question: how much confidence should we have in the conclusions 
of cross-country perceived corruption regressions? The methodology used is 
Levine and Renelt's (1992) variant of Leamer's (1983,1985) Extreme-Bounds 
Analysis (EBA). 
Given that EBA is not a methodology routinely used in the literature, we 
provide a brief outline. See Learner (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) for 
more details. The EBA performs OLS regressions of the form 
M +, 811 +, 8z Z+u, where C is the level of perceived corruption in each 
country, M is the variable of interest, I is a set of variables always included in 
the regression, and Z is a subset of variables chosen from a pool of variables 
identified by past studies as potentially important explanatory variables of 
corruption. 
EBA involves varying the subset of Z-variables included in the 
regression to find the widest range of coefficient estimates on the variable of 
interest, M, that standard hypothesis tests do not reject. If the extreme upper 
bound and extreme lower bound of 8,,, (defined as the estimated coefficients 
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corresponding to the highest (lowest) value of 6,, plus (minus) twice its 
standard error) are significant at the 5% level and have the same sign, then 
variable M is considered robust to specification changes. That is, under EBA, 
an explanatory variable is found to be robust only if its estimated coefficient 
remains statistically significant and maintains the same sign in all the 
regressions run with different sets of control factors. 
It is important to note that even if an M-variable is found to be robust, 
this result is only valid if there are no doubts about the causality of the partial 
correlation identified by the EBA. 
The analysis is based on cross-country data covering 62 countries (both 
developed and developing). The main dependent variable is the Graft Index by 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (I 999a) for 1998 and the average value of 
the CPI for the period 1997-1999 is used as a sensitivity check. Serra (2006) 
tests the robustness of 16 variables, for a total of 28 proxies (more than one 
measure is often used), measuring economic policies, sociocultural issues and 
institutional design. Income per capita is the only I-variable, and the Z-variables 
are restricted to three, so that the number of explanatory variables is restricted to 
a maximum of five. Also,, due to potential multicollinearity concerns, for every 
M-variable, the pool of variables from which the Z-variables are chosen is 
restricted by excluding variables that, a priori, might measure the same 
phenomenon. For each M-variable the test relies on a total of 299 regressions 
(except for the I-variable, where 377 regressions are estimated). 
Serra's (2006) results show that five variables are robustly related to 
perceived corruption. Perceived corruption is lower in richer countries. where 
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democratic institutions have been preserved for a long continuous time, where 
the population is mainly Protestant, where there is a higher level of political 
stability and in countries with a British heritage. These results strongly support 
those of Treisman (2000). However, one weakness of EBA is that it does not 
solve the problem of causality. We believe that it is a serious weakness when 
studying corruption, as many of the variables that affect corruption are also 
likely to be affected by corruption. Another weakness of EBA is that the upper 
and lower bounds of & depend on the subset of Z-variables included, which is 
by definition limited to a few variables (in this case only three). We believe that 
it is better to examine robustness of variables by including extra explanatory 
variables that theory suggests belong in the model, rather than relying on the 
arbitrariness of EBA. 
One general weakness that is common to both Treisman (2000) and 
Serra (2006), and indeed to the rest of the empirical literature on the 
detenninants of corruption, is not testing whether their results are robust to 
taking into account the ordinal nature of the corruption measures. 
As noted above, although there is a growing literature that uses cross- 
country regressions to search for empirical linkages between the level of 
perceived corruption in a country and a variety of economic policy, political and 
institutional factors, most studies tend to consider only a small number of 
explanatory variables in attempting to establish a statistically significant 
relationship between perceived corruption and a particular variable of interest. 
Therefore, rather than reviewing the other related papers in this section, we do 
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so in the following section where we explore some of the theories and the results 
of further empirical evidence on the causes of corruption. 
2.3 The Causes of Corruption: Theories and Some Empirical Evidence 8 
The key questions we want to answer are: (1) Why do government 
officials in some countries misuse public office for private gain more frequently 
and/or for larger bribes than officials in other countries; and (2) What is the 
relative importance of "destiny" - long-predetermined historical and cultural 
factors (which cannot be changed or influenced) - compared to policies in the 
economic and governance arenas (which can be changed). The answers are not 
straightforward. A widely accepted benchmark model specifying the causes of 
corruption does not yet exist. In this section we explore a set of factors that 
have been found, either theoretically or empirically, to have a significant impact 
on a country's level of corruption. 
Colonial Heritage 
Young (1995) states that "Overall, colonial legacy cast its shadow over 
the emergent African state system to a degree unique among the major world 
regions. " Thus, it is not surprising that the legacy of colonial rule is thought to 
be a significant factor in explaining variations in the intensity and prevalence of 
corruption. Some features of former British colonies appear to render them less 
vulnerable to corruption than the French, Belgian, Portuguese or Spanish former 
' Rent-seeking is sometimes used interchangeably with corruption and there is a large area of 
overlap. But, while corruption involves the misuse of public power for private benefit, rent- 
seeking derives from the economic concept of "rents", i. e. earnings in excess of all relevant 
costs. 
1) 1) 
colonies. These features include a tradition of free press, durable legal 
institutions, emphasis on education and the impartiality of the British civil 
service. This appears to suggest that colonial regimes left an institutional legacy 
that has shaped the subsequent form and extent of corrupt practices. 
Although there are still no studies that analyse primarily the impact of 
colonialism on the level of corruption, variables of colonial heritage enter as 
control variables in some studies investigating the causes of corruption. Swamy 
et al. (2001), Treisman (2000) and Serra (2006) show that former British 
colonies exhibit lower levels of perceived corruption than other countries. 
Legal System 
The type of legal system in place in a country is an important factor 
when considering the causes of corruption, because the probability of being 
caught and punished for engaging in corrupt practices will differ according to 
the effectiveness of different legal systems. Legal systems differ in the 
formulations and the original intent of the law, thus differing in the degree of 
protection and the opportunities for appeal offered to private property owners 
harmed by corrupt officials. La Porta et al. (I 997b, 1999) argue that common 
law systems differ on this dimension from civil law systems. The common law 
tradition developed in England in the 17 th century, as an attempt by Parliament 
and the aristocracy to limit the power of the sovereign in regulating and 
expropriating them. A common law system can be viewed as intending to limit 
rather than strengthen the state. Common law developed from precedents 
established by judges. Civil law systems (in their Napoleonic, Bismarckian, or 
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other forms) developed more as an instrument used by the sovereign for 
building institutions to increase the power of the state. Civil law is mainly 
legislation created with the purpose of finding a just solution to a dispute, rather 
than following a set of procedures. La Porta et al. (I 997b, 1999) hypothesise 
that the greater protections of property against the state in common law systems 
improve several aspects of government performance, including reducing 
corruption. 
Religion 
Differences in religious affiliations may be used as a proxy for the 
cultural determinants of different countries. Religion may affect the perceived 
costs of corrupt actions through two different dimensions, hierarchy and 
influence between church and state. 
La Porta et al. (I 997a, 1999) identify the Catholic, Muslim and Greek 
Orthodox religions as "hierarchical ". They claim that countries with these 
religious traditions exhibit inferior government performance to that of largely 
Protestant countries. In terms of corruption, one might think that a society in 
which people are accustomed to a greater level of hierarchy in religion will tend 
to transpose this to other arenas, thus making challenges to office-holders rarer 
than in cultures that have more egalitarian or individualistic religions, such as 
Protestantism. Lipset and Lenz (2000) argue that "the Protestant ethos is more 
conducive to norm adhering behaviour ", mainly due to its emphasis on 
individual responsibility for moral conduct, as well as its generally intolerant 
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ind evidence that attitude towards human failing. La Porta et al. (1997a, 1999) f 
hierarchical religion has a positive correlation with perceived corruption. 
The doctrines of the Muslim and Catholic religions are more 
interventionist than Protestantism,, and historically they grew to support state 
power, indeed becoming state-sponsored religions. Unlike religions in which 
the state and church are closely linked, the institutions of the Protestant church 
may play a role in monitoring and denouncing abuses by state officials. 
A strong association between Protestantism and perceived corruption has 
been obtained by several studies. Using a sample of up to 64 countries, 
Treisman (2000) obtains a highly significant negative impact of the percentage 
of Protestants in the total population on perceived levels of corruption. This 
result is corroborated by Lipset and Lenz (2000), Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000), 
Paldam (200 1), Gerring and Thacker (2005) and Serra (2006). 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalisation 
The borders of African states were detennined through a series of 
negotiations between European powers following the 1884-1885 Berlin 
Conference. As these frontiers were not generally guided by concerns for the 
identity of indigenous states, societies or ethnic groups, the resulting borders 
split up ethnic groups. This in turn meant exacerbating already existing high 
levels of ethnic and linguistic diversity. According to Easterly and Levine 
(1997), 14 of the 15 most heterogeneous societies in the world are in Africa. 
Ethnically fractionalised societies may lead to a very damaging form of 
corruption. With each ethnic group being potentially allocated a region (or 
25 
ministry) in the power structure, they will be more likely to yield independent 
bribe-takers. This is important because different groups do not internalise the 
effects of their actions on other groups or on society as a whole, therefore, 
resulting in more bribes per unit of output as well as less output [Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993)]. Moreover, each distinct group may try to seize as great a share 
of rents as they can in order to avoid competing groups from doing so, until 
there are no more rents left. Mauro (1995) demonstrates the empirical 
association between ethnic fragmentation and high perceived corruption. 
It may also be that leadership, which Tanzi (1998) suggests is associated 
with less corruption, is more likely to flourish in more ethnically homogeneous 
societies. 
Economic Development 
There tends to be a strong negative correlation between GDP per capita 
and a country's score on corruption indices. However, the causal relationship 
between corruption and economic development is not yet well established. Is a 
country poor because of corruption, or is it corrupt because it is poor? 
Misuse of public office is more likely to be exposed in more 
economically developed countries, as economic development increases 
education,, literacy and depersonalised relationships [Treisman (2000), Tanzi 
(2000)]. Furthermore, the social stigma facing corrupt officials if exposed might 
be greater in a more economically developed country. 
In the specific case of rapid economic growth due to oil and mineral 
discoveries, the accrual of a majority of the revenue directly to the government 
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may exacerbate the incidence of rent-seeking behaviour. as claimed by Khan 
(1994) for the case of Nigeria. On the other hand, economic growth driven by 
the acquisition of human capital would be likely to generate fewer easily 
appropriable rents. 
In the literature on corruption there are two opposing views as to the 
effect of corruption on economic growth. Some authors [Leff (1964), 
Huntingdon (1968)] suggest that corruption might raise economic growth. It is 
argued that this would operate through two types of mechanisms. Firstly, by 
offering bribes that would act as speed money, individuals would be able to 
avoid bureaucratic delays. Secondly, the ability to levy bribes would act as an 
incentive for government employees to work harder, especially in the case 
where bribes act as a piece rate. The opposing view, as exemplified by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993), argues that corruption would tend to lower economic 
growth. In particular, Rose-Ackerman (1978) warns that it is difficult to limit 
corruption to areas where it might be "economically desirable ". Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1991) provide empirical evidence that countries where 
talented people are allocated to rent-seeking activities tend to exhibit slower 
growth rates. Mauro (1995) provides evidence that perceived corruption lowers 
investment,, thereby lowering growth. Keefer and Knack (1995) find that a 
variable of institutional quality, which incorporates perceived corruption, exerts 
a significant negative impact on growth. 
Several studies have attempted to disentangle the simultaneous 
relationship between corruption and economic development. All these studies 
use the technique of instrumental variables to address the problem of potential 
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endogeneity between corruption and income. Studies such as Hall and Jones 
(1999), Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (I 999b), Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2005), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Easterly and 
Levine (2003) identify the causal effects running from better governance to 
higher per capita income in the very long run. Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) 
report a strong positive causal effect running from better governance to higher 
per capita income and a weak and even negative causal effect from per capita 
income to governance. However, the result on the causal effect from income to 
governance is refuted by Lora (2002). Treisman (2000) also finds strong 
evidence that the process of economic development reduces the level of 
perceived corruption in a country. 
Level of public sector wages 
There has been some debate on whether the wages paid to civil servants 
are important in determining the degree of corruption. One may differentiate 
between corruption due to greed and corruption due to need [Tanzi (1998)]. If 
the wage level is low relative to the minimum required for a "decent" living, 
then it can be assumed that there is some level of corruption due to need. For 
example, Gould (1980) notes that in Zaire, as civil service salaries are well 
below the poverty line, there is a widespread perception that civil servants must 
cheat in order to survive. Lindauer et al. (1988) quote the following finding 
from the 1982 Report of Public Service Salaries Review Commission for 
Uganda: "the civil servant had either to survive by lowering his standard of 
ethics, peýfbrmance and dufýfulness or remain upright and perish. He chose to 
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survive. " However,, regardless of the wage level, some civil servants may be 
corrupt due to their moral characteristics, or because some bribes may be 
"irresistible". Therefore,, these two types of corruption are not mutually 
exclusive. Furthennore,, even in the case where higher wages could reduce the 
incidence of corrupt acts, it is still possible they could lead to higher bribes 
being demanded by those civil servants who continue to be corrupt. 
A number of recent theoretical papers has suggested that ensuring an 
honest civil service may be prohibitively expensive [Besley and McLaren 
(1993), Flatters and McLeod (1995)]. These models build on the work of 
Becker and Stigler (1974). The prediction is that high pay constitutes an 
incentive to be less corrupt. However, the wage necessary to eliminate 
corruption is high when bribe levels are high or the probability of detection and 
fines are low. In this case, Besley and McLaren (1993) argue that it may be 
cost-effective for governments to pay a wage at which nobody behaves honestly 
("capitulation wages") and rely on monitoring of tax inspectors as a means of 
raising revenues, rather than raise wages to the high levels required to deter 
corruption. On the other hand, Ul Haque and Sahay (1996) argue that raising 
wages to deter corrupt behaviour may be cost-effective by attracting better 
human capital to the government sector. 
Van Rijckeghern and Weder (2001) examine the effect of pay in the civil 
service on corruption. Using data on 31 developing countries for the period 
1982-1994, they find that in a cross-country regression the differential between 
wages in the civil service and in manufacturing is a significant determinant of 
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perceived corruption. 9 The economically and statistically significant 
relationship they find implies that a rather large increase in wages is required to 
eradicate corruption solely by raising wages. ' 0 
In some countries public sector wages are low relative to those in the 
private sector because of an inflated number of people working for the 
government. In these situations it is not realistic to recommend that these 
countries implement a policy of simply increasing civil servant wages without 
reducing the size of the civil service. Moreover, for many governments a 
reduction in the number of public employees would be incompatible with their 
objectives, or would be politically difficult. 
Gender 
The possibility of systematic differences in behavioural characteristics 
across gender has been the focus of a considerable number of studies over the 
past three decades. The general conclusion of this literature is that women are 
more community-oriented and selfless than men. The hypothesis that men are 
more individually-oriented than women has been demonstrated in a wide variety 
of institutional contexts, through both experimental and survey-based studies. 
The following results, surnmarised in Dollar, Fisman and Gatti (2001), have 
been established: women are more likely to exhibit "helping" behaviour [Eagly 
and Crowley (1986)], exhibit generosity and altruism [Eckel and Grossman 
(1998), Andreoni and Vesterlund (200 1)]; vote based on social issues [Goertzel 
9 However, the same explanatory variable turns out to be insignificant in a panel set-up. 
" Doubling the civil service (relative to manufacturing) wage improves the ICRG corruption 
index (which ranges from zero to six) by the order of 0.5 points. 
(1983)]; score higher on "integrity tests" [Ones and Viswesvaran (1998)] and 
take stronger stances on ethical behaviour [Glover et al. (1997), Reiss and Mitra 
(1998), Dodson and Carroll (1991)]. These results imply that women will have 
higher standards of ethical behaviour and thus be less likely to sacrifice the 
common good for personal material gain. This may be particularly relevant for 
the potentially beneficial role women may have in government, since one of the 
most significant difficulties faced by public bureaucracies is designing 
institutions that discourage their agents from acting opportunistically at the 
expense of the public. 
Given the prevalence of the perceptions outlined above [see also, World 
Bank (2001)], there is, however, little work done to evaluate the underlying idea 
that increased female participation leads to more honest government. Kaufmann 
(1998) presents a scatter plot showing a cross-country correlation between 
perceived corruption and an index of women's economic and social rights. 
Kaufmann emphasises the need for a more detailed investigation of the 
suggestive findings that having more women in the labour force and politics 
could be an effective force for good governance. Using different measures of 
perceived indices of corruption, Swamy et al. (2001) and Dollar, Fisman and 
Gatti (2001) present empirical cross-country evidence that higher levels of 
women's participation in public life are associated with lower levels of 
perceived corruption. Swamy et al. (2001) also show that perceived corruption 
is less severe when women comprise a larger proportion of the labour force. In 
addition, Swamy et al. (2001) reinforce their cross-country results by using 
micro-data (from the World Values Surveys and an enterprise survey in 
Georgia) to show that women are less involved in bribery and are less likely to 
condone bribe-taking. 
Democracy 
In recent years, economic explanations of corruption have been the most 
cited and probably also the most influential for policy formulations. However, 
corruption has also attracted much attention from other social sciences, in 
particular from political scientists. To understand corruption, political factors 
cannot be ignored. Political science has approached the phenomenon of 
corruption in terms of regime type and searched for its causes in authoritarian 
versus democracy and in development-oriented regimes versus neo-patrimonial 
rule. 
In conventional political science, the causes of corruption were thought 
to be in the "democratic deficit". Thus, the basic and practical argument on 
corruption was that it could only be reversed by democratising the state. 
There is another relatively large political science approach to the study 
of corruption that focuses on the informal aspects of power. This is the "neo- 
patrimonial" or "politics of the belly" approach that originated in the 1980s from 
French scholars, with a main focus on Africa. It stresses that African politics are 
radically different from politics elsewhere, arguing that the state is merely a 
faýade that covers the realities of deeply personalised political relations, 
clientelism and political corruption [Hope and Chikulo (2000), Bayart (1993), 
Bratton and van de Walle (1994)]. The effect of regime type on corruption is 
arguably very strong in the case of the neo-patrimonial mode of rule. 
11 
According to Coolidge and Rose-Ackennan (2000), neo-patrimonial states are 
characterised by rent-seeking behaviour by officials at the highest govenunent 
levels. This will produce excessive state intervention in the economy, inefficient 
rent-extracting monopolies, too big governments, privatisations that benefit the 
ruling elite, non-transparent and contradictory regulations on taxation and 
investments, excessively short-term investments and slow economic growth. 
The analytical and descriptive literature on the "politics of the belly" 
provides illustrations and explanations to the deep causes of corruption in such 
countries and gives a motive for calling for democratisation. However, empirical 
research on the effects of dernocratisation on corruption is considerably less 
developed and the evidence less conclusive. The linkages between corruption 
and democracy are not obvious. In recent years some empirical studies have 
explored the possible correlation between corruption and democracy. Paldam 
(2002) finds that, in general, perceived corruption will decrease with increasing 
levels of democracy. However, both variables interact strongly with the level of 
transition from a poor to a rich society, thus casting some doubt as to the 
independent effect of democracy on the level of corruption. Ades and Di Tella 
(1999) fail to find beneficial and significant effects of political rights on 
perceived corruption. Treisman (2000) finds that the current degree of 
democracy in a country makes almost no difference to how corrupt it is 
perceived to be. What matters is whether or not a country has been 
11 On the authoritarian-democratic scale, it is in-between the centrally controlled autocratic 
regimes and the consolidated democratic regimes. 
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consecutively democratic for at least 40 years. 12 Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) 
find that the strength of democratic institutions correlates negatively with the 
level of perceived corruption, as does a longer experience with democratic rule. 
Serra (2006) finds that countries that have maintained democratic institutions for 
a long continuous time have lower levels of perceived corruption. 
More recently, some studies have tried to provide a more intricate 
picture of democracy. They have examined the impact on corruption levels of 
certain features of democracy, rather than just looking at whether democracy 
reduces corruption. There is evidence that presidential systems fare worse with 
respect to perceived corruption as compared with parliamentary systems 
[Gerring and Thacker (2004), Lederman et al. (2005), Kunicova (2006)]. 
Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) relate corruption to different features of the 
electoral system. They find that larger voting districts (and, therefore, lower 
barriers to entry) are associated with lower perceived corruption, whereas larger 
shares of candidates elected from party lists (thus, less individual accountability) 
are associated with higher perceived corruption. Finally, electoral systems of 
proportional representation are associated with higher perceived corruption than 
plurality rule with single-member districts [Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 
(2003), Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005)]. 
International openness and trade 
It can be argued that a protectionist trade policy is one of the causes of 
corruption. Exposure to foreign competition may be used to measure the extent 
12 Even so, the corruption dividend is small. 
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to which domestic firms enjoy rents, as competition from foreign firms reduces 
the rents enjoyed by the former, thus reducing the rewards from corruption. 
Corruption will be higher in countries where domestic firms are sheltered from 
foreign competition by natural or policy induced barriers to trade, with 
economies dominated by a few number of firms, or where antitrust regulations 
are not effective in preventing anti-competitive practices. 
According to Ades and Di Tella (1999), countries that are more open to 
foreign trade (which they define as imports as per cent of GDP) tend to be 
perceived as less corrupt. Treisman's (2000) results suggest that greater 
exposure to imports lowers perceived corruption (although this relationship is 
not always significant). Wei (2001) also tests whether countries with a greater 
openness to trade exhibit less corruption. Wei separates a country's openness, 
defined as the sum of exports and imports as per cent of GDP, into two parts. 
The first part, "natural openness", is defined as the fraction of openness that 
can be explained by largely unchangeable factors such as geography, language 
and population size. The remainder is called "residual openness ", which 
potentially includes trade policies. Wei finds that "naturally " more open 
countries exhibit lower perceived corruption even after taking into account their 
levels of development. "Residual openness" is found not to be important once 
CC natural openness " is accounted for. 
Aid 
In Africa more than in any other region, engagement with the 
international community has come in the context of aid and debt. Sub-Saharan 
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African countries have been among the world's largest recipients of aid. 
receiving about one third of all aid disbursed [OECD (2005a)]. 
Theory cannot unambiguously detennine what the impact of aid will be 
on the quality of governance. On the one hand, aid could be associated with 
improved governance. For example, foreign aid can be used to improve training 
and increase salaries for public employees. Increased salaries can be used to 
attract more competent public officials, and to reduce the demand for bribes 
[Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001)]. Aid sometimes finances programmes 
intended to strengthen the legal and justice system and other responsibilities of 
the public sector. 13 On the other hand, aid may worsen governance in the 
recipient countries. Foreign aid can weaken the state bureaucracies of recipient 
governments. For example, often the most skilled civil servants are hired by 
donor organisations, which pay salaries many times greater than those offered 
by the recipient country's government, thereby stealing scarce talent from the 
civil service [World Bank (I 998c), Brautigam (2000)]. 
The World Bank (1989) has reported that the rapid increase in foreign 
exchange resources, mainly due to large concessional flows, has greatly 
expanded the opportunities for malfeasance. The fungibility of aid resources 
may well be an important factor for this to occur. For example, if a government 
would have undertaken a donor-financed project in the absence of that 
financing, then donor funds simply finance, at the margin, something else that 
may be undesirable. Theoretically, imposing conditionalities on incremental 
13 SNN,, eden's aid agency dedicated huge resources over 15 years to building Tanzania's auditing 
capacity. However. this had no impact on public sector accountability as the Auditor General's 
office fails to use auditing finns to audit government expenditures [Brautigam (2000)]. 
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spending could solve the fungibility problem. However, this is easier said than 
done. In practice, it is difficult to know what the goverment would have done 
in the absence of that donor financing. Moreover, the multiplicity of donors 
further complicates the analysis. Therefore, it is very difficult to preclude 
switching of donor funds. In an extreme case, the fungible aid funds may be 
used to finance expenditure projects on which corrupt governments may find it 
easier to collect bribes. 
More importantly, foreign aid represents a potential source of rents, with 
adverse effects on the incidence of corruption. Moreover, as rents available to 
those controlling the government increase, the resources devoted to obtaining 
political influence increase - as the returns to acquiring political connections 
and lobbying skills increase, talent is increasingly reallocated from productive to 
redistributive activities [Knack (2001)]. 
The empirical findings to date on the impact of aid on corruption have 
also been ambiguous. Alesina and Weder (2002) find weak evidence that aid 
causes perceived corruption to increase. Knack (2001) finds that higher aid 
levels erode bureaucratic quality and the rule of law, but that aid levels are not 
significantly related to perceived corruption. Tavares (2003) finds strong 
support for the argument that aid decreases perceived corruption. Svensson 
(2000) develops a game-theoretic rent-seeking model to explore the relationship 
between the widespread level of corruption and other types of rent-seeking 
activities and concessional assistance. He provides some preliminary evidence 
in support of the hypothesis that foreign aid and windfalls are, I on average, 
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associated with higher perceived corruption in countries that are more likely to 
suffer from competing social groups. 
It should be noted that aid to Africa is not only to governments. Many 
donors channel their aid through the proliferating Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), both indigenous and foreign. In 2003-2004 donors 
channelled about 13% of their worldwide aid through NGOs, with the US 
estimating that more than one third of its development assistance goes to NGOs 
[OECD (2005a)]. Given the increasing reliance by the major aid donors on 
NGOs to implement their programmes, particularly for poverty relief and state 
reconstruction, this percentage is expected to be higher in Africa. 
Other Variables: 
Economic rents are likely to arise in the case of natural resources, such 
as oil,, whose supply is limited by nature and whose extraction cost is much 
lower than its market price. Since abnormal profits are available to those who 
extract the natural resources, officials who allocate extraction rights are likely to 
be offered bribes. Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Leite and Weidmann (1999) 
suggest that in countries with large endowments of valuable natural resources 
corruption may offer greater potential gains to officials who allocate rights to 
exploit such resources. Although Ades and Di Tella (1999) fail to find a 
consistent and significant impact of natural resource abundance on perceived 
corruption levels. Leite and Weidmann (1999) do show that the extent of 
perceived corruption depends on natural resource wealth, as measured by a 
country's exports of fuels and minerals as a share of GDP. 
'38 
Viewing corruption as an illegal activity, one can follow Becker's (1968) 
suggestion that the probability of committing a crime depends primarily on the 
probability of being caught and the penalty imposed. Moreover, the deterrent 
value of the penalty depends crucially on the ability and willingness of the 
authorities to enforce the relevant regulations, as well as the level of acceptance 
by society of the judgements rendered by the country's institutions. Therefore, it 
follows that countries with political instability are unlikely to generate the 
political muscle necessary to adequately empower judicial institutions. Also, 
when a country lacks transparent rules and procedures it is unlikely that the 
I 
required widespread understanding and support is generated. In a political 
climate of instability, corrupt officials may also want to appropriate as many 
rents as possible while they are in office. 
Finally, a reduction in the size of the public sector and in the direct 
involvement of the state in economic activity is likely to decrease opportunities 
for rent-seeking activities. 
*** 
From the above discussion,, we postulate the following hypotheses regarding the 
causes of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Corruption will be lower in countries with the following characteristics: 
H I: Less ethnically divided; 
H2: Former UK colonies; 
H3: Common law systems; 
H4: Greater percentage of Protestants; 
145: Relatively small endowments of natural resources; 
146: More economically developed; 
HT Democratic and politically stable; 
1-18: Greater quality of legal and political institutions; 
H9: Greater openness to trade; 
HIO: Lower state intervention in the economy (in the form of regulation, 
taxation, or state commercial activity); 
H 11: Higher relative govermnent wages; 
H 12: Greater participation of women in the labour force; 
H 13: Smaller aid receipts. 
In terms of our fundamental question of whether corruption in sub- 
Saharan Africa is "destiny" or policy driven, for the purposes of our empirical 
analysis we assume that hypotheses HI to H5 broadly represent "destiny", 
whereas hypotheses H6 to H 13 provide an indication of policy. 
2.4 Measuring Corruption 
Given our empirical focus on corruption, it is imperative to have some 
way of measuring this concept. Without an indicator that measures corruption it 
is difficult to be able to ascertain what its causes (or indeed its effects) are. So 
in order to know whether a particular factor leads corruption to be higher or 
lower, we need to have a means of quantifying corruption. 
However, measuring corruption is by no means a trivial matter. The 
working definition of corruption typically invokes some notion of illegality. and 
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despite the fact that bribery can take place in the private sector, usually focuses 
on the use of public office for private gain. There are obvious difficulties in 
measuring illegal (and because of that, secretive) activities. In addition, there are 
different types of corruption that may occur and an indicator of one type of 
corruption should not be necessarily be expected to be a good proxy for other 
types of corruption. For example, corruption can be petty or grand and it may 
be desirable to have indicators that distinguish between these two types of 
corruption. 14 Also, the incidence of corruption from a household perspective 
differs from the corruption related to doing business. It may also be desirable to 
be able to distinguish between the incidence and level of corruption, which may 
be driven by different factors. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in measuring corruption, several 
indicators that attempt to measure some facets of corruption are available. In 
particular, they have become more widespread as the increasing awareness of 
the importance of governance in general and corruption in particular has been 
accompanied by an increase in the supply of such indicators, be it by 
commercial firms or non-govenunental organisations. 
The indicators of corruption are typically based on polls of experts or 
surveys of entrepreneurs or citizens in general, who assign scores to countries in 
terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public 
officials and politicians and the degree to which business transactions involve 
14 Petty corruption typically involves low-level officials extracting small sums of money through 
extortion, theft, bribery or misuse of private property. On the other hand, grand corruption 
occurs xN,, hen high-level officials use their power to grant contracts or extract large sums of 
money for their personal or political enrichment. Either or both forms of corruption may be 
infrequent or systemic. 
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corruption or "questionable" payments. Therefore, these are indices of 
perceived corruption. This is an important point, as the subjective nature of 
corruption measures will have implications in terms of the conclusions and 
assertions that may be made in empirical studies using these measures. This is 
discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.2. 
The sources of these subjective indices are commercial agencies (such as 
the Economist Intelligence Unit, Political Risk Services and Business and 
Environmental Risk Intelligence), non-govermnental organisations (such as 
Freedom House) and international organisations (such as the World Bank). The 
surveys/polls produced by commercial agencies are costly and their clients are 
typically banks, multinational companies and other international investors, who 
use the data and information to make business and investment decisions. 
More recently, two composite indices - drawing on a number of existing 
polls and surveys from perception-based sources as described above - have been 
created. The first composite index has been compiled by the non-governmental 
organisation Transparency International (TI) and is called the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI). The source of this index varies from year to year, as 
does the coverage of countries. The latest CPI 2007 is based on 14 surveys and 
expert assessments from 12 institutions. It covers 180 countries. The second 
composite index has been derived by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 
(1999a, 1999b), and subsequently, Kayfmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) - it 
was initially called Graft, but has since been renamed Control of Corruption 
(CC). This index is one of six governance indicators, known as the Worldwide 
LI-, 
Governance Indicators (WGI). 15 They have a broader definition of corruption 
than TI and include most cross-country indices reporting scoring of countries on 
some aspect of corruption. The latest CC 2006 is based on 33 surveys and 
expert assessments from 30 institutions. It covers 212 countries. Both the CPI 
and CC are freely available. Although the CPI is widely disseminated among 
policyrnakers and academics, as well as receiving substantial media coverage, 
the WGI have become increasingly quoted and used. 16 This may be due to the 
fact that it includes several governance indicators, rather than just focussing on 
corruption. By incorporating judgements of several independent sources, the 
CPI and CC indices are presumably less subject to measurement error than the 
remainder. Fortunately, as detailed in Mauro (1995), the data for the various 
corruption indices, including measures of various aspects of bureaucratic 
efficiency, are highly correlated. 
2.4.1 Selected Measure of Perceived Corruption 17 
As the focus of this study is sub-Saharan Africa, the choice between the 
corruption indices hinges primarily on the availability of data for the countries 
in that region. The coverage of sub-Saharan Africa by TI's annual CPI indices 
is far from ideal - it ranges from none in 1995, to two countries in 1997, and to 
a maximum of 39 countries in 2007. Note that, given the availability of data for 
the explanatory variables, the most recent feasible year should be no later than 
15 The full set of governance indicators is: Voice and Accountability; Political Stability; 
Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and Control of Corruption. 
" For example, the Millennium Challenge Account uses the CC indicator to make decisions on 
aid allocation. This is discussed in Chapter 4. 
" When discussing measures of perceived corruption, we refer interchangeably to corruption 
indicators, corruption indices and corruption measures. 
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2002 or 2003 at most, for which the CPI has data on 18 and 24 countries, 
respectively. The CC index covers the years 1996,1998,2000,2002,2004 and 
2006. It covers 33 sub-Saharan African countries in 1996 and 46 in the later 
years. Using this index entails the same problems on coverage of explanatory 
variables as the CPI index. 
Perhaps the greatest limitation of using either the CPI or the CC 
composite index is that neither is comparable over time, as the polls and surveys 
used to construct them vary over time. As stated in Lambsdorff (2005), "... as 
pointed out repeatedly in our annual ftamework document, year-to-year 
comparisons of a country's score do not only resultftom a changing perception 
of a country's performance but also ftom changes in the samples and the 
methodology. With differing respondents and slightly differing methodologies, a 
change in a country's score may also relate to the fact that different viewpoints 
have been collected and different questions been asked The CPI primarily 
provides an annual snapshot of the views of business people, with less of afocus 
on year-to-year trends. Such changes in methodology are primarily due to 
changes in the list of sources that enter into this composite index. When new 
sources are used and old and dated sources are deletedftom the list of sources 
it is arduous to identify valid time series information. " (Emphasis added. ) 
Thus, using the CPI or CC would inhibit any attempts at averaging over 
time and/or using panel data. In contrast, the corruption index in the publication 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) produced by Political Risk Services 
(PRS) is available for a large number of countries and for a long period, 
comparable over time. 
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The PRS group has been producing the ICRG scores since 1982. The 
ICRG provides assessments of political, financial and economic risks (based on 
a set of 22 components/variables) in a large number of both developed and 
developing countries. 18 Each risk component is assigned a numerical value to 
represent its risk assessment (score). The components within each category of 
risk are added to provide a risk score for each risk category (political, financial 
and economic). The risk scores for these categories are then combined using a 
formula to provide a country's overall, or composite, risk score. The ICRG 
model permits users to tailor it to provide a risk assessment more geared towards 
their particular interests by changing the weighting of the components. It should 
be noted that, of the three major categories of risk, only the components of the 
political risk index report subjective assessments of the factors influencing the 
business environment in a particular country. The financial and economic risk 
assessments are made on the basis of objective data, such as inflation and GDP. 
Corruption in Government is one of the (12) political risk components in 
ICRG. This corruption index measures perceptions of corruption within the 
political system. Such corruption "distorts the economic and financial 
environment, reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling 
people to assume positions ofpower through patronage rather than ability, and 
introduces an inherent instability in the political system. The most common 
fiorm of corruption met directly by business isfinancial corruption in theform of 
demands. for special payments and bribes connected with import and export 
licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans. " This 
" Further details can be found at http: //www. prsgroup. com. 
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measure is also concemed with "actual or potential corruption in the form of 
excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, favour-for-favours', secret 
party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. " The 
major risk arising from corruption is that a major political scandal provokes a 
"popular backlash, resulting in a fall or overthrow of the government, a major 
reorganizing or restructuring of the country's political institutions, or, at worst, 
a breakdown in law and order, rendering the country ungovernable. " [Howell 
(2001)] 
The technique that ICRG employs to measure corruption (and the 
remainder political risk components) is to poll its worldwide network of experts. 
Therefore, it is a measure of perceptions of corruption. An initial assessment is 
made by country experts. The assessments are guided by a checklist of specific 
issues which are taken into account in the provision of initial scores. The initial 
scores are then subject to a peer review by a panel of region and subject 
specialists, to ensure coherence and comparability across countries. 
The ICRG corruption index is scored from zero to six, where low scores 
indicate "high government officials are likely to demand special payments " and 
"illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of 
government - in the form of "bribes connected with import and export licenses, 
exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans" [Keefer and 
Knack (1995)]. It is important to note that the experts polled assign scores 
rounded to the nearest 0.5. This means that the ICRG corruption index is a 
discrete score with half digits from zero to six, and that there are 13 possible 
outcomes. 
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ICRG produces monthly scores. As PRS is a commercial organisation, it 
sells its ICRG assessments to commercial subscribers for considerable fees. For 
example, an annual subscription to PRS's ICRG on CD-ROM (which includes 
12 months of previously published data) currently costs US $4,595. 
However, it is possible to obtain a subset of the ICRG indicators at 
substantially lower prices. Stephen Knack and Phillip Keefer [Keefer and 
Knack (1995,1998)] compiled a data set using ICRG data, which is distributed 
by the Institutional Reform and Informal Sector (IRIS) Centre at the University 
of Maryland. The dataset includes computed annual average scores for 
corruption in government 19 and is available for 140 countries and for the time 
period 1982-1997 (comparable over time). 20,21 It should be noted that, as the 
annual average scores are given, this means that a range of many different 
values for the corruption index is possible (so that more than the original 13 
possible outcomes are possible). It is unfortunate that the data ends in 1997,22 
but nonetheless, it is available for 37 African countries, 32 of which sub- 
Saharan. The potential number of observations is thus 512. This is especially 
important, as we want to test a large number of hypotheses and include a variety 
of explanatory variables. 
19 Described in detail by Keefer and Knack (1995). 
" The other variables included are Rule of Law, Bureaucratic Quality, Ethnic Tensions, 
Repudiation of Contracts by Government, and Risk of Expropriation. 
" Very recently, a further subset of ICRG scores has become available, the ICRG's Researcher's 
Data Set. This data set has annual averages of the subcomponents of the ICRG Political Risk 
scores, available for all 140 countries covered by ICRG until the last ftill calendar year. 
Although it is sold at a fraction of the price charged to commercial subscribers, it is still 
substantially more expensive than the IRIS data set. 
22 This is discussed further in Chapter 5. 
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2.4.2 Critical Discussion of the Selected Measure of Perceived Corruption 
Although it has been possible for several sources to provide some 
indicator of perceptions of corruption in a country, it is essential to recognise the 
limitations of such corruption measures. In particular, these limitations should 
be kept in mind when interpreting results of empirical analyses that use these 
measures. If care is not taken in acknowledging these limitations, the usefulness 
of corruption indicators for researchers, policy-makers, investors and donors 
will be reduced. It is important to reduce the misuse of corruption indicators 
and,, consequently, to contribute towards incentives for improvements in their 
construction and,, therefore, usefulness. 
Given that we will use the PRS ICRG measure for corruption, we will 
focus our discussion on that particular indicator, although we will also make 
more general observations where appropriate. 
Firstly, we start by presenting some of the advantages of our selected 
corruption measure. As previously stated, the ICRG corruption measure is 
based on polls of experts. The main benefit of this technique is that polls of 
experts are explicitly designed for cross-country comparability. By having an 
effective benchmarking process, polls of experts do not suffer from the 
disadvantage of surveys, where questions can be interpreted in context- or 
culture- specific ways, thereby making it more difficult to make cross-country 
comparisons. 
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23 It should be noted that the reliability of polls depends on the expertise/ability of the experts. 
The PRS ICRG indicators are, as stated previously, subject to a centralised review of all country 
scores, which is carried out before they are finalised. That, and the fact that PRS is a 
commercial firin whose (almost 30-year-old) success depends on its commercial subscribers, 
provides an indication that the information it provides is useful. (According to PRS, more than 
Footnote continues on ncxt page. 
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Another of the benefits/advantages of the ICRG corruption measure is 
that it is representative, in that it covers a very large and broad sample of 
developed and developing countries. 24 This means that it is less likely that the 
corruption indicator for developing countries, in general and sub-Saharan 
African countries in particular, suffers from a "curse of inclusion" bias, in the 
sense they receive worse scores than they might otherwise have received if they 
were not being implicitly compared with countries in which corruption might be 
lower. 
PRS ICRG uses a consistent methodology from year to year, and its 
indicators are comparable over time (indeed, that is one of its features that is 
much valued by its commercial subscribers). Therefore, unlike the majority of 
indicators from other sources, comparability across countries and time is 
maximised. 
Despite these advantages, there are some non-negligible 
problems/disadvantages with corruption indicators in general and our selected 
indicator in particular. 
One of the problems with these measures of corruption is that they are 
subject to margins of error. This is because there are unavoidable uncertainties 
with measuring corruption (there is an inherent difficulty in measuring such a 
complicated and multifaceted concept), and so indicators of corruption are 
80 per cent of the world's largest multinationals ranked by Fortune magazine use its data and 
infon-nation to make investment decisions. ) 
24 Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a) construct a coverage index that measures, for 
each of the source of governance measures, differences between the distribution of included 
countries across classifications of income and region and the distribution of all countries in the 
world across these categories. Only five of the 13 sources of governance data are representative 
according to this measure. Of the sources that measure corruption, PRS ranks first in terms of 
being the most representative source. 
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subject to measurement errors. 25 Measurement errors mean that the indicators 
may not always be used reliably to differentiate between levels of corruption 
across countries. Existing corruption indicators differ in their transparency in 
terms of measurement errors. Unfortunately, PRS ICRG does not provide 
estimates of the sizes of those measurement 
26 
errors . On the other 
hand, 
Transparency International's CPI provides the number of surveys on which the 
score is based, as well as an estimated confidence interval depending on the 
estimated degree of measurement precision. The World Bank Institute's 
Governance Indicators is explicit about the unavoidable uncertainty inherent in 
measuring different aspects of governance - estimates of margins of error are 
provided and the importance for users of taking the measurement errors into 
account are emphasized. In addition, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006) 
call for "other producers of governance indicators to be similarly transparent 
about the imprecision of all types of measures ofgovernance. " 
It is worth highlighting the fact that measurement error is not unique to 
these perceptions-based indicators of corruption - measurement error also exists 
in objective measures, such as measures of income (where actual income 
deviates from reported income). As Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007) 
state, "this imprecision is not a consequence of our reliance on subjective or 
perceptions data on governance - rather imprecision is an issue that should be 
squarely addressed in all efforts to measure the quality ofgovernance. " So, it is 
25 It should be noted that this is also true of other indicators of governance and institutional 
quality. For more on this see Kaufinann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004). 
26 Indeed, it seems that PRS ICRG entirely ignores margins of error for its governance and 
investment climate indicators (at least in its discounted-price data sets of annual averages). Note 
that we were unable to ascertain whether PRS ICRG provides any information of the 
accompanying margins of error of its indicators to its commercial subscribers. 
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important to be upfront about this limitation. One point to note is that if the 
measurement errors are not systematically related to country characteristics, it 
may be less of a concern when looking at variations in corruptions across 
countries, the same being true across time. 
One criticism of expert assessments produced by commercial firms is 
that these focus exclusively on the business enviromnent faced by foreign 
investors. This is problematic if the scores are capturing the component of the 
business environment for foreign investors that is uncorrelated with true 
governance, or if respondents give favourable corruption scores to rich countries 
simply because they are rich (the "halo" effect). Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2006) address the issue of whether perception errors are correlated 
among expert assessments of corruption. 27 Considering their five major data 
sources provided by commercial agencies (of which PRS is one) and their only 
very large cross-country survey of firms, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2006) find that for corruption the expert assessments are on average more 
correlated with the survey than with each other, which is inconsistent with 
shared prejudices. 28 So the experts producing the assessments do not appear to 
share a common set of preconceptions or prejudices about cross-country patterns 
of corruption. 
Another criticism of using subjective information from polls of experts is 
that the indicators may reflect an ideological bias of the institution compiling the 
27 The exercise is perforined for the ftill set of governance indicators (Voice and Accountability; 
Political Stability; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and Control of 
Corruption). We focus the discussion on the corruption indicator. 
28 The same is found for Political Stability; Government Effectiveness; and Rule of Law. 
Although the results for Voice and Accountability and Regulatory Conflict are not as strong, the 
authors argue that "the role ofshared prejudices in expert assessments is at most minor". 
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scores. However, Kaufmann,, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) show that there is no 
evidence of such an ideological bias in polls of experts (including PRS ICRG) 
measuring corruption. 
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An important factor to bear in mind when using corruption indicators, 
such as the PRS ICRG, to examine changes across time and countries is that 
these are subjective measures of corruption and, as such, are effectively ordinal 
indices. That is, a country which has a score of one in the PRS ICRG corruption 
indicator cannot be said to be twice as 'clean' as a country that has a score of 
two. Similarly, a one-point difference between country A scoring 2 and country 
B scoring 3, and between country C scoring 4 and country D scoring 5 is not 
necessarily the same. That is, one country can be considered more corrupt than 
another, but it is not possible to ascertain specifically how much more corrupt it 
is. 
However, although the PRS ICRG corruption indicator is ordinal, we 
believe it is perceived as having some cardinal value. Our belief is based on two 
main reasons. Firstly, the ICRG corruption indicator and II other components 
are added up to construct a broader index of ICRG political risk. Adding them 
in that way would not be valid if they were only ordinal. In addition, ICRG 
calculates a composite political, financial, and economic risk score, for which 
the political risk score contributes 50% of the composite score, while the 
financial and economic risk scores (based on objective data) each contribute 
29 Note that Kaufi-nann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) find that only one of their sources of polls 
of experts, the Heritage Foundation, does show an ideological bias, but only in relation to the 
governance indicators of Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law. In any case, they point out that 
the statistical evidence even in this case suggests that the importance of ideological bias is quite 
modest in magnitude. 
1: 1 1 
25%. If the political risk variables (one of which is corruption) had no cardinal 
value, this would not be valid. So this indicates that PRS ICRG believes that the 
index makes sense as a cardinal measure. It is useful to note that the ICRG 
corruption measure is sold (at quite a substantial price) to companies who use 
the information to inform decisions about whether or not to invest in given 
countries. It could be argued that the companies who pay substantial amounts of 
money must also attach some cardinal value to this measure - the fact that the 
commercial company that sells this information to other commercial companies 
at a substantial price has been successful for almost 30 years at doing so could 
provide an indication as to the value that their customers obtain from their data. 
At this point, it is important to note that it is obviously in the best interest of 
PRS ICRG (and other commercial agencies) to overemphasise the inherent 
cardinality of their subjective measures in order to be able to sell their 
information at high prices. In addition, it could also be argued that companies 
may actually only use the ordinal information, i. e., they may only want to know 
which countries are relatively riskier/more corrupt, and in the extreme may even 
just be interested in whether countries are above or below a certain threshold. 
Secondly, there are many precedents in the academic literature where 
corruption indices have been used and interpreted as a cardinal variable. 
Perhaps one of the better known examples is Mauro (1995), who finds that high 
levels of perceived corruption hinder investment and growth. More specifically, 
Mauro (1995) finds that an improvement (of one-standard deviation) in the 
corruption index is associated with an increase in the investment rate of 2.9 per 
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cent of GDP. Other examples of where corruption indices have been treated as 
cardinal variables include Serra (2006) and Svensson (2000). 
Notwithstanding beliefs that there is cardinal value to the corruption 
index, we believe it is appropriate to conduct checks on our results obtained 
when assuming cardinality, in order to see whether these results are broadly 
maintained when taking into account the ordinal nature of the corruption index. 
A result of qualitatively similar results would provide some evidence as to the 
validity of treating the corruption index as cardinal. 
2.4.3 Examination of the Selected Measure of Perceived Corruption 
Although the next section describes the data used in this chapter, it is 
useful to examine in some more detail the ICRG corruption measure. Firstly, in 
order to facilitate the interpretation of the regression results, but mainly to 
increase comparability with other studies, we transform the ICRG corruption 
index so that 0= least corrupt; 10 = most corrupt. This is carried out in the 
following way: 
Rescaled Corruption Index = 10- 
10 
x Original Corruption Index. 6 
This is simply a linear transformation of the scale of the dependent 
variable, the corruption index, and as such only has a linear impact on the 
estimated coefficients, without altering their significance or the measures of fit 
of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
The following figure plots the evolution of the corruption index through 
time for the sub-Saharan African countries in our sample. The figure illustrates 
some interesting points. Firstly. there appear to be three main patterns of change 
54 
in the corruption index, namely, no change, one step change (that is, when a 
country has a certain score for some years and then has a different score for the 
other years in the time period) and variation (that is, a country has several 
different scores over the time period). Note that there are some countries that 
exhibit a 'quasi' one-step change, in the sense that the transition from one 
corruption score and the step change includes an intermediate score, e. g., South 
Africa. Note also that even when there is variation, there tends to be at least two 
years with the same corruption score. Secondly, the corruption scores tend to be 
clustered around the values equivalent to the integers (0,1, ..., 6) of the 
originally scaled corruption index (which translate into 0,1.7,3.3,5,6.7,8.3, 
10, in terms of the rescaled corruption index). This seems to suggest that the 
experts assigning the scores may have an inherent difficulty in distinguishing 
between small differences in corruption levels. This reinforces the need to 
check the robustness of results obtained when treating the corruption measure as 
having cardinal value, by using appropriate econometric approaches for when 
the dependent variable is ordinal. This also suggests that results from studies in 
the empirical literature on the determinants of corruption that do not perform 
this robustness check should be viewed with caution. 
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Table 2.1 provides the summary statistics for the corruption index. In 
spite of the existence of countries where the corruption index does not vary 
much over time,, the between- and within-country variations of the corruption 
index shows the times-series variation is of the same order of magnitude as the 
cross-section variation, and that there is time-series variation to be explored in 
the corruption index. 
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of corruption index 
Obs. 470 
No. Countries 32 
Mean 5.5 
Std. Dev 2.0 
Min 0 
Max 10 
Std. dev. of country means (between variation) 1.7 
Mean of country std. deviations (within variation) 1.0 
Given that the corruption index measures subjective perceptions of 
corruption, and is, therefore, effectively an ordinal variable (even if one believes 
there is some cardinal value to the scores), we reclassify the corruption index 
into bands. This will be useful in estimating models which allow for an ordinal 
dependent variable in which the actual values or categories are irrelevant, except 
that higher values correspond to higher outcomes, such as ordered probit 
models. This class of models seems appropriate if we believe that the precise 
meaning of the scores in the corruption index is unclear. Using this technique 
also serves to perform a check on the argument that there is cardinal value to the 
corruption index. These issues are discussed further in Section 2.6. 
:, s 
In deciding into how many bands to categorise the corruption index, we 
adopted the following approach. As noted above, an inspection of the data 
shows that the values of the corruption index tend to be clustered around the 
values equivalent to the integers of the corruption index as originally scaled. 
We create seven equidistant bands, whereby each band contains one of the 
higher frequency values. These are shown in the following table: 
Table 2.2: Creating bands/response categories for the corruption index 
Original Rescaled Cut-off pointS30 Interval Bands Score Score 
6 0 1.4 [0,1.4] 1 
5 1.7 2.9 (1.4,2.9] 2 
4 3.3 4.3 (2.9,4.3] 3 
3 5 5.7 (4.3,5.7] 4 
2 6.7 7.1 (5.7,7.1] 5 
1 8.3 8.6 (7.1,8.6] 6 ýz 
0 10 10 (8.6,10] 7 
Figure 2.2 presents a histogram of the corruption index in the seven 
selected bands/response categories. Given that category I has a very low 
frequency (I %), we merge categories I and 2, so that we retain a total of six 
ordered response categories. 31 
10. . '0 The cut-off points were calculated as follows: cut-off for band i= -i , i-= 
1,..., 7. 
7 
Note that post-rec lass i fi cation, the bands are as follows: 
123456 
[0,2.9] (2.9,4.3 (4.3,5.7] (5.7,7.1] (7.1,8.6] (8.6,10] 
,c 
Note that the approach we adopted to categorise the corruption index 
into different bands represents just one of several other possibilities, and does 
not change the qualitative results. For example, the corruption index could have 
been divided into two (low, high), or three (low, medium, high) or five bands 
(very low, low, medium, high, very high). 
Figure 2.2: Histogram of the corruption index 
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2.5 Data 
Table 2.3 gives a brief description, including the sources they come 
from, of the variables used in this chapter to test the (frighteningly numerous) 
hypotheses posited in Section 2.3. We provide a brief summary, and where 
r- 0 
appropriate, further explanation, of the main variables used in the empirical 
specifications. 
ELF60 is the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation as of 1960 (and,, 
therefore,, time-invariant). It measures the probability that two randomly selected 
people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. 
AVELF GUNNI, GUNN2, ROBERTS AND WLLER are used as altemative 
measures, as well as instrumental variables to control for measurement errors 
that ELF60 might be subject to. 
We use dummy variables to indicate the colonial heritage of a country - 
we look at British, French,, Belgian and Portuguese colonial heritages, as well as 
no colonial heritage. 
32 
We look at the percentage of the population adhering to different 
religions (Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, or traditional (indigenous)), and 
these variables are available as of 1985. Like the index of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation, these variables are also time-invariant. 
The type of legal system in a country is given by a dummy variable that 
indicates whether a country has a common law system. This is a broad 
specification of a country's legal system and does not take into account the 
differences between different types of civil law systems (eg, French, German) 
and that some countries may exhibit legal systems that are neither "pure" 
common nor civil law. 
33 
32 Note that only two countries in our sample have no colonial heritage, namely Ethiopia 
(ignoring the 1936-1941 Italian occupation during World War 11), and Liberia. 
Note that most former British colonies tend to have a common law system, and there are just 
three -divergent' cases. That is, 'Just common law" countries are Liberia, Democratic Republic 
Footnote conlinues on nextpage. 
f, I 
The World Bank provides data on fuel, mineral and metal exports as per 
cent of merchandise exports. Unfortunately, although the country coverage of 
these data is excellent, the time series is plagued by missing values for most sub- 
Saharan African countries. To overcome this problem we use these data to 
construct a measure of natural resource abundance that ranges from I to 4, 
where higher values represent greater natural resource abundance. In particular, 
countries with less than 25% of merchandise exports from fuel, minerals and 
metals are coded 1, countries between 25 and 50% are coded 2, countries 
between 50 and 75% are coded 3, and countries with greater than 75% are coded 
4. 
Given the relative stability of natural resources for most countries in the 
sample, missing values are interpolated by examining the value of the 
constructed resource abundance score immediately before and after the missing 
data. This constructed measure is then used to create a dummy variable for each 
of the categories and for two further dummy variables indicating whether 
countries have less (more) than 50% of merchandise exports from fuel, minerals 
and metals. 
We are confident in our constructed variable, as results are broadly 
unchanged when we replace it with a variable compiled by Fearon and Laitin 
(2003). Using data from the World Bank from 1960 onwards on fuel exports as 
a percentage of merchandise exports, they created a dummy variable indicating, 
for each year, whether countries had fuel exports greater than 33% of total 
exports. Firstly, they linearly interpolated missing data from 1960 to 1980. 
of Congo and Namibia (although Namibia has a 'quasi' British heritage given its link to South 
Africa). We have no observations for "just British heritage, '. 
A, 1) 
Then they created the aforementioned dummy variable. This variable was then 
extended forward for each country for the most recent years if these lacked data, 
and backwards for missing years prior to 1960, "on the assumption once 
countries come 'on line' for oil production they generally stay there (this 
assumption was checked to a significant extent by going through the data and 
making country-specific inquires where we had doubts or concerns). " Finally, 
they carried out country- specific research for a few countries with missing data. 
As a measure for economic development, we use GDP per capita, 
adjusted for purchasing power. 
Data on democracy comes from the Polity IV Project [described in detail 
in Gurr, Jaggers and Marshall (2003)], which provides infonnation on the 
authority characteristics of states in the world for purposes of comparative and 
quantitative analysis. It is a widely used resource for monitoring and studying 
regime changes and the effects of regime authority. Polity IV includes 
constructed annual measures for both institutionalised democracy (DEMOC) 
and autocracy (AUTOC). These measures are "composite indices derivedftom 
the coded values of authority characteristic component variables ", according to 
pre-deten-nined formulas (Gurr, Jaggers and Marshall (2003). A composite 
indicator, POLITY, which is derived by subtracting the AUTOC value from the 
DEMOC value, provides a single regime score that ranges from - 10 (full 
34 
autocracy) to +10 (full democracy) . 
In order to facilitate interpretation of this 
variable, we rescale it, so that it ranges from 0 (strongly autocratic) to 10 
(strongly democratic). 
34 Note that the two scales (DEMOC and AUTOC) do not share any categories in common. 
Al 
In order to proxy for political stability, we use a measure of the 
durability of a regime. This is provided by the variable DURABLE from the 
Polity IV project. This provides a running measure of the durability of the 
regime's authority pattern for a given year, that is, it gives the number of years 
since the last substantive change (defined as a 3-point change in the POLITY 
score) in authority characteristics. It should be noted that this measure of 
political stability places, in terms of durability of regimes, "good" and "bad" (in 
terms of democracy/autocracy) regimes on a par. That is, what is being 
measured is how long a regime lasts. As an alternative measure, we use the 
incidence of civil war (dummy variable that indicates whether a country 
experienced a civil war in a given year). 
As a measure of the quality of legal and political institutions, we use an 
index on the rule of law from ICRG. This (subjectively) measures the degree to 
which the citizens of a country are willing to grant to the established institutions 
the authority to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes. This 
variable is measured on the scale 0-6, where higher scores indicate: "sound 
political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly 
succession of power. " Lower scores indicate: "a tradition of depending on 
physicalforce or illegal means to settle claims" [Keefer and Knack (1995)]. 
To measure openness to trade, the value of the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services as a share of GDP is used. We also use two 
alternative measures, namely imports as a share of GDP, and the Sachs and 
kli 
Warner (1995) trade openness variable 35 (including the updates by Easterly, 
Levine and Roodman (2004), as the openness index created by Sachs and 
Warner is only available until 1992). It should be noted that the Sachs and 
Warner openness measure has limited variation within sub-Saharan African 
countries, as it tends to cluster around "not open" until the late 1980s to earlY 
1990s. The variable imports as per cent of GDP has the advantage that it 
isolates the effect of exports of natural resources. (The variable sum of exports 
and imports will tend to be correlated with the natural resources variable. ) 
However, in practice, the use of the variable on imports or the sum of exports 
and exports makes little difference to the regression results. 
General goverranent spending as per cent of GDP is used as a proxy for 
state intervention in the economy. An attempt is made to use the output of state- 
owned enterprises as per cent of GDP to check the robustness of the results 
obtained using general govenunent spending. Unfortunately, this drastically 
reduces the number of observations in the regressions, and, therefore, the results 
obtained are not reliable. 
One of the hypotheses we posited in Section 2.3 was that increased 
female participation in the labour force and government could lead to lower 
levels of corruption. We use a measure of female labour force participation (as 
per cent of total labour force). Unfortunately, we are unable to use a measure of 
female political participation, which would better permit ascertaining whether 
-'5A country is classified as open if it satisfies all of the following criteria: (i) average tariff rates 
are less than 40%. (ii) nontariff barriers cover less than 40% of trade; (iii) black market premium 
less than 20% relative to the official exchange rate, on average; (iv) the country is not classified 
as Socialist and (v) the government does not monopolise major exports. 
A C% 
there are systematic behavioural differences across gender that impact on the 
levels of perceived corruption. This is further discussed in Section 2.7.5. 
The measure of aid that we use is total development aid (both bilateral 
and multilateral aggregate aid) as per cent of GDP of the recipient country. In 
the literature of aid effectiveness [see, for example, Collier and Dollar (2002), 
Hansen and Tarp (2001), Addison, Mavrotas and McGillvray (2005)], the 
measure Aid/GDP is generally accepted as being the appropriate measure to 
capture the "importance" of aid. We are interested in ascertaining the 
importance of aid in the economy and how it impacts on perceived corruption, 
so this measure seems appropriate for our purposes. 36 
As a measure of public sector wages, we use a variable of government 
wages and salaries (as per cent of total government expenditure) that is available 
from the World Bank (2005b). The coverage of this variable for sub-Saharan 
Africa is particularly poor, as it is plagued by missing observations. As we are 
unable to find a suitable alternative measure, the hypothesis we had posited in 
Section 2.3 that corruption is lower in countries with higher relative government 
wages cannot be adequately tested. More detail is provided in Section 2.7. 
Nevertheless, we include this variable in the tables below. 
Table 2.4 provides descriptive statistics. 37 For ease of reference, we 
divide the variables into time-varying and time-invariant. Table 2.5 presents 
3 ., 6 In Chapter 4 we examine the impact of perceived corruption on aid receipts by sub-Saharan 
African countries. In that chapter we focus on bilateral aggregate aid receipts, and as such the 
measure of aid differs from the total aid measure (which includes multilateral, as well as 
bilateral aid) used in this chapter. 
3 37 For completeness and ease of reference we include the corruption measure. which was already 
examined in the previous section. 
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average corruption scores for specific categories of the main explanatory 
variables. Table 2.6 reports the correlations between the main variables. 
A '7 
Table 2.3: Description and sources of data 
Code Description Source 
AID Aid (% GNP) World Bank (2005a) 
AID_NET DISBURSEMENTS Natural logarithm of Total OECD (2005a) 
Official Development 
Assistance - net disbursements 
(2000 US$) 
AREA Surface area (square km) World Bank (2005a) 
AVELF Average value of Elf6O, Muller, 
Roberts and Gunn I and 2. 
CIVIL Dummy=I for countries that Until 1992: Bates 
experienced a civil war After 1992: SIPRI 
Yearbooks. 
CL_N Measure of civil liberties, with I Freedom House (2005) 
representing the highest degree 
of freedom and 7 the lowest. 
Transformation: I-lowest; 7- 
highest degree of freedom. 
CORRUPT ICRG measure of Corruption Keefer and Knack (1998) 
Originally, 0-most corrupt; 6- 
least corrupt. 
Transformation: 0-least corrupt; 
I 0-most corrupt 
DMBELG Dummy=I if the country was a Bates 
Belgian colony 
DMFRNC Dummy=l if the country was a Bates 
French colony 
DMNO Dummy=l if the country was Bates 
never a colony 
DMPORT Dummy= 1 if the country was a Bates 
Portuguese colony 
DMUK Dummy= I if the country was a Bates 
UK colony 
DURABLE Regime durability: The number Gurr, Jaggers and 
of years since the most recent Marshall (2003) 
regime change. 
ELF60 Index of ethnolinguistic Easterly and Levine 
fractional isation, 1960. (1997) 
Measures the probability that 
two randomly selected people 
from a given country will not 
belong to the same 
ethnolinguistic group. 
FEMALE Labour force, female (% of World Bank (2005b) 
total). 
GOVREV Government revenues (% GDP) World Bank (2005b) 
_ GUNN] Gunnemarkl: per cent of the Easterly and Levine 
population not speaking the (1997) 
official language. 
GUNN2 Gunnemark. 2: per cent of the Easterly and Levine 
population not speaking the (1997) 
most widely used language. 
ILLIT Illiteracy rate, adult total (% of World Bank (2005a) 
people aged 15 and above). 
INDEP Number of years as an CIA (2005) 
independent country since 1900 
A9 
_Code 
Description Source 
IMORT_INFANT Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 World Bank (2005a) 
live births) 
fNSTAB Degrees of governmental Bates 
instability as measured by the 
occurrence and success of coup 
attempts. 
This ordered categorical 
variable takes a value of 2 if 
there was a successful coup; a 
value of I if an unsuccessful 
and/or attempted or plotted 
coup; and a value of 0 
otherwise. 
_IMPORTS 
Imports as % GDP World Bank (2005a) 
LANDLOCK Dummy= 1 if a country is Bates, CIA (2005) 
landlocked. 
LATITUDE Latitudinal distance from the CIA (2005) 
equator 
LAW Dummy=l if Common Law La Porta et al. (1997b), 
System. CIA (2005) 
LGDP-PC-PPP Natural Logarithm of Real World Bank (2005a) 
(PPP) GDP per capita, 2000 
US$ 
MULLER Probability of two randomly Easterly and Levine 
selected individuals speaking (1997) 
different languages. 
OlL_FL Dummy= 1 if Fuels, ores and Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
metals exports (% of 
merchandise exports) more than 
33%. 
_OPEN 
Dummy= 1 if country is open Sachs and Warner (1995) 
PCTCATH Percentage of population Bratton and van de Walle 
adhering to Catholicism, 1985. (1997) 
PCTMUSL Percentage of population Bratton and van de Walle 
adhering to Islam, 1985. (1997) 
PCTPROT Percentage of population Bratton and van de Walle 
adhering to Protestantism, 1985. (1997) 
PCTTRAD Percentage of population Bratton and van de Walle 
adhering to traditional religions, (1997) 
1985. 
POLITY2 N Measure of democracy. Gurr, Jaggers and 
_ Originally, ranged from -10 Marshall (2003) 
(strongly autocratic) to +10 
(strongly democratic). 
Transformation: 0 (strongly 
autocratic); 10 (strongly 
democratic). 
POPULATION Population (millions). World Bank (2005a) 
PR N Measure of political rights, with Freedom House (2005) 
_ 1 representing the highest 
degree of freedom and 7 the 
lowest. 
Transforination: I-lowest; 7- 
highest degree of freedom. 
PR CL N Average of political rights and Freedom House (2005) 
K () 
_Code 
Description Source 
civil liberties, with I 
representing the highest degree 
of freedom and 7 the lowest. 
Transformation: I -lowest; 7- 
highest degree of freedom. 
RESOURCES-UNDER50 Dummy=l if Fuels, ores and Constructed variable 
metals exports (% of using World Bank 
merchandise exports) less than (2005a) 
50%. 
RESOURCES-OVER50 Dummy=l if Fuels, ores and Constructed variable 
metals exports (% of using World Bank 
merchandise exports) more than (2005a) 
50%. 
ROBERTS Probability that two randomly Easterly and Levine 
selected individuals do not (1997) 
speak the same language. 
RULE ICRG measure of rule of law Keefer and Knack (1998) 
Scale 0-6, with higher values 
indicating sound political 
institutions. 
STATE_AC State-owned enterprises, World Bank (2005a) 
economic activity (% GDP) 
TEGDP-J Total Government Expenditure World Bank (2005a) 
(% GDP) 
TRADE_GDP Trade (imports + exports) as % World Bank (2005a) 
GDP 
TROPICAL Dummy=1 if absolute value of Constructed variable from 
"LATITUDE" less than 23. CIA (2005) 
WAGE Government wages and salaries World Bank (2005b) 
(% of Total Govemment 
Expenditure) 
'70 
Table 2.4: Summary statistics of main variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
TIME-VARIANT. 
CORRUPT 470 5.5 2.0 0 10 
RESOURCES-OVER50 512 0.4 0.5 0 1 
POLITY2_N 504 3.4 2.8 0.5 9.5 
DURABLE 504 14.9 17.6 0 105 
RULE 470 2.6 1.1 0 6 
TEGDP-J 462 15.6 6.9 4.4 54.5 
FEMALE 512 43.0 5.4 27.0 50.9 
WAGE 219 29.2 10.1 5.6 60.7 
LGDP-PC-PPP 466 7.3 0.8 6.2 9.3 
TRADE_GDP 465 61.0 29.0 6.3 161.2 
AID 469 14.2 14.2 0 87.1 
POP 512 14.7 18.8 0.7 117.7 
IMORT_fNFANT 512 106.6 33.4 48 195 
TIME-INVARIANT- 
ELF60 480 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.9 
DMUK 512 0.4 0.5 01 
DNINO 512 0.1 0.3 01 
PCTPROT 512 19.7 22.0 0 88 
LAW 480 0.5 0.5 01 
TROPICAL 512 1.0 0.2 01 
LANDLOCK 512 0.3 0.4 01 
AREA 501 645211.5 603065.4 11300 2505810 
Table 2.5: Average perceived corruption for different 'cuts' of data 
0 1 
DMUK 5.7 5.2 
DNINO 5.4 6.4 
LAW 5.2 5.6 
RESOURCES-OVER50 5.0 6.3 
Below averag e Above average 
ELF60 4.9 5.8 
PCTPROT 5.9 4.6 
POLITY2_N 5.7 5.1 
DURABLE 5.6 5.3 
RULE 6.3 4.6 
LGDP-PC-PPP 5.5 5.4 
TRADE_GDP 5.3 5.7 
TEGDP-J 5.8 5.1 
FEMALE 5.8 5.3 
AID 5.6 5.3 
WAGE 5.2 5.5 
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2.6 Analysis and Estimation Issues 
In Section 2.3 we postulate a series of hypotheses regarding the causes of 
corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. We adopt the following procedure to test 
those hypotheses. We begin by considering a baseline specification, consisting 
of the most "exogenous" group of variables, i. e., the long-predetermined 
historical, geographical, cultural and ethnic characteristics. We then sequentially 
add further groups of variables. First, we add a measure of economic 
development, then, we add a group of variables characterising the level of 
democracy and political instability, followed by the quality of legal and political 
institutions. Finally, we include variables capturing public policy. 
We compile a panel data set 38 covering 32 sub-Saharan African countries 
over the period 1982-1997.39 Panel data sets for economic research possess 
several major advantages over conventional cross-sectional or time-series data 
sets . 
40 First, they permit controlling for unit heterogeneity. 41 Second, panel data 
provide a large number of data points, give more informative data, more 
variability, increasing the degrees of freedom and reducing the collinearity 
among explanatory variables, thus improving the efficiency of econometric 
estimates. Third, they are better able to identify and measure effects that are 
simply not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series data. Fourth, 
38 A panel, or longitudinal or cross-section-time-series, data set is one that follows a given 
sample of units over time, thus providing multiple observations on each unit in the sample. 
39 The countries in the sample are: Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo 
(Republic), Cote d'lvoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(formerly Zaire), Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
" See, for example, Greene (2000). Hsiao (1986), Baltagi (1995). 
41 Heterogeneity across units is an integral part, indeed often the central focus, of the analvsis. 
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panel data models allow for the construction and testing of more complicated 
behavioural models than purely cross-section or time-series data. 
There are three main data analysis/estimation issues we would like to 
highlight. Firstly, it is important to note that we are considering a substantial 
number of hypotheses, and, therefore, explanatory variables. This is especially 
significant given the number of observations available in our estimation 
samples, due in part to our focus on sub-Saharan Africa. So we have a problem 
of losing degrees of freedom as we control for many explanatory variables 
simultaneously, and there is the risk that there may not be enough variation in 
the data that would permit ascertaining the impact of the different factors. On 
the other hand, the problem of not controlling for several explanatory factors 
and only looking at each hypothesis individually (or with a very limited number 
of other explanatory variables), is that there is the risk of omitted variable bias. 
As the hypotheses we posited in Section 2.3 derive from a set of factors that 
have been found,, either theoretically or empirically, to have a significant impact 
on a country's level of corruption, and we have a panel data set, we prefer the 
risks of controlling for a substantial number of factors rather than the risks of 
omitted variable bias. 
Secondly, many of the variables are likely to be endogenous - they may 
cause corruption and corruption may cause them. The standard technique to 
correct for endogeneity is instrumental variables or two-stage least squares. 
However,, this requires the identification of suitable instruments. A good 
instrumental variable should be both highly correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variable and uncorrelated with the dependent variable. However, 
7 1; 
there is an acknowledged difficulty in finding suitable instruments. Indeed, we 
are not always successful in finding good instruments. In addition, results are 
typically very sensitive to the choice of instruments. Therefore, we also use an 
alternative approach to IV in addressing endogeneity issues. This alternative 
approach consists of using lagged values of the potentially endogenous 
explanatory variables instead of IV. That is, we use lagged values in place of 
the contemporaneous values of the potentially endogenous variables. Insofar as 
lagged values of these variables are predetermined with respect to current 
perceived corruption, we should be able to address the causality issue. 42 
The third issue relates to the estimation techniques based on different 
treatments of the dependent variable, perceived corruption. As we discuss in 
Section 2.4, the corruption measure we use is based on subjective perceptions 
and, despite the widespread belief in the literature that its scores have cardinal 
value, it is an ordinal variable. So in order to test the robustness of our results, 
we perform a sensitivity analysis on our main results by estimating the models 
treating the dependent variable as ordinal rather than cardinal. 
When the dependent variable cannot be treated as continuous and instead 
takes on a finite/discrete number of outcomes, qualitative response models 
should be used. In addition, if the multinornial-choice variable is inherently 
ordered, then this ordinal nature of the dependent variable must be taken into 
account. Even if we do not believe there is cardinal value to the corruption 
42 We have defined "destiny- as including long-predetermined historical, natural and cultural 
conditions which cannot be altered. So our definition excludes previous policies adopted by 
governments. Had we defined a broader notion for historical conditions, these could include 
policies from previous years/periods. In that case, the use of lagged, or out-of-sample values, 
could also potentially help to distinguish the broader concept of "destiny" from policy-mduced 
determinants of corruption. 
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index (and therefore the actual values are irrelevant), it is true that higher values 
correspond to higher outcomes, 43 i. e., we do not believe that the ordering of the 
scores is irrelevant. Therefore, an ordered probit model is appropriate. Note 
that if we believed the ordering was irrelevant (as is the case, for example, in 
choice of occupation), the multinornial logit model would be appropriate. The 
ordered probit model for the dependent variable y, "perceived corruption in 
bands", (conditional on explanatory variables) can be derived from a latent 
variable model. Let y be an ordered response with values 10, JI, where J 
is a known integer. Assume that a latent variable y* is determined by 
x, 6 + e, elx - Normal(0,1) 
where 8 is KxI and x does not contain a constant. Define 
y=0 ify* < a, 
y= if al Y* < a2 
y=j ify* > aj 
where a] "ý a2 ": ý ... < aj are unknown cut-off points or threshold parameters. 
The conditional distribution of y given x can be derived and the probability of 
each outcome/response computed as a linear function of the explanatory 
variables and the set of thresholds. The parameters cr and 6 can be estimated 
by maximum likelihood. 
44 
In these models, the estimated coefficients 8 are of limited interest. 
What are of interest are the marginal effects of the regressors on the response 
43, In the case of the original ly-scaled variable, a country with a higher value corresponds to a 
country perceived as -cleaner"/more honest, whereas in the case of the rescaled variable, a 
country with a higher value is a country perceived as more corrupt. 
4' Note that if e has the standard logistic distribution we have the ordered logit model. 
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probabilities. Note that in these non-linear models, the magnitude of the change 
in the outcome/response probability for a given change in one of the explanatory 
variables depends on the levels of all the explanatory variables. 
We focus on estimating linear regression models and present some 
estimates of non-linear models as a robustness check. We estimate static models 
(that is, we model a contemporaneous relationship between perceived corruption 
and the explanatory variables). The empirical corruption literature focuses on 
static models for several reasons. Firstly, most papers in the literature tend to 
have only cross-section data. Secondly, even if panel data is available, the 
typical problem encountered is that most of the factors that are thought to affect 
corruption levels tend to be time-invariant, or to change slowly over time. So 
the estimators used for dynamic models (such as the Arellano-Bond estimator) 
would not be appropriate in this context. 
Firstly, as our point of departure, we estimate our models using the 
average of perceived corruption over the period 1982-1997, using ordinary least 
squares (OLS). We do so for reasons of comparability with other studies. 
These estimates can be interpreted as representing aggregate correlations over 
the long term. Unfortunately, given the limitations in terms of observations and 
the number of explanatory variables, it is not possible to derive robust 
conclusions from the estimation of this model. 45 We then estimate our 
specifications using a pooled sample of observations. By estimating a pooled 
model we are increasing the number of observations (as we have observations 
for multiple years for each country in the sample). This also allows for the 
45 Note that estimating a model that uses averages over time (in this case, over the period 1982- 
1997) for each countrý' is effectivelý' estimating a Between Groups (BG) model. 
Q 
comparison of our results with those papers that have data for several countries 
and years and that estimate pooled models. We then re-estimate each 
specification, explicitly taking into account the panel nature of the data set. We 
estimate a random effects (RE) model. 
Consider the following model, y,, = 6'x,, + a, + pit ýi=N; t= 
where i denotes the cross section dimension (countries), t denotes the time series 
dimension (years) and xil is a vector of K regressors. pit denotes the vector of 
disturbance terms, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with the xil's. The aj 
denote the time-invariant unobservable country -specific effect. Their inclusion 
in the model ensures that unobserved country heterogeneity, that is, 
heterogeneity of countries that is not fully captured by the explanatory variables, 
is accounted for. Whether the individual effect is correlated with explanatory 
variables is the substantive assumption that distinguishes between the RE and 
the fixed effects (FE) models. In the RE model, ai is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the xi, 's, whereas in the FE model a, is correlated with the 
Xit , S. 
FE models may be estimated by pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
on the deviations from the group means (i. e., on time-demeaned data)46 - this 
estimator is called the within-group (WG) estimator. Note that any potential 
correlation of the explanatory variables with the time-invariant individual 
country effects is avoided by wiping them out of the equation to be estimated. 
46 Time-demeaned equation: The overbar denotes time 
averages. 
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One disadvantage is that the coefficients of time-invariant variables cannot be 
estimated. 
RE models may be estimated by Generalised Least Squares (GLS). The 
GLS estimator is simply the pooled OLS estimator of the quasi-demeaned 
data. 47 Note that RE models can also be estimated using the WG estimator 
(although if aj is uncorrelated with the xi, 's the WG estimator is consistent but 
not efficient, whereas the GLS estimator is consistent and efficient). The GLS 
estimator takes into account the variation within, as well as between countries, 
therefore, exploring the cross-sectional and time-series dimensions of the data. 
Its efficiency, however, holds only if the countries' unobserved heterogeneity is 
uncorrelated with their observed characteristics. 
Our choice between the RE and FE models is based on the Hausman 
teSt. 48 All the regressions presented fail to reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficients estimated by GLS and WG do not systematically differ from each 
other (Hausman specification test). Therefore, it can be assumed that the 
individual country effects can be treated as random effects and that the 
coefficients of the GLS estimator are free from unobserved heterogeneity bias. 
Quasi time-demeaned equation: y,, - Ay,. =, 6'(x,, - Axi. 
) + c, where E, is a white noise 
C/2 
U2 + TO-Cr error and 
A= I-::: 
E2 
P 
48 Note that some authors, such as Lloyd, Morrissey and Osei (2001). prefer to consider the 
Hausman test as a test for efficiency against consistency. Briefly, this is because the WG 
estimator may be used to estimate a RE model as well as a FE model, even though 
it is a 
consistent but inefficient estimator of the RE model, whereas GLS 
is both a consistent and 
efficient estimator of the RE model. 
Ro 
2.7 Regression Results 
It will come as no surprise to anyone who studies Africa that the greatest 
difficulties typically arise from missing data. Indeed, our choice of corruption 
index is guided by the availability of adequate coverage for sub-Saharan Africa 
for a reasonable period of time. We encounter some problems with the variable 
used to measure the endowment of natural resources in a country (fuels, ores 
and metals exports as per cent of exports). To solve this problem, we construct 
a measure using available data. 
The other variable that presents problems is the measure of government 
wages and salaries, as it is plagued with missing observations. In particular, 
including the wage variable reduces the number of observations from a 
minimum of 385 when all hypotheses except the wage hypothesis are considered 
to 183 when the wage hypothesis is also accounted for. Although this appears to 
be a reduction from a minimum of 28 countries to 24 countries, a closer 
inspection reveals that a further five countries only have observations for at 
most four of the original 16 years. Given that our data set already only includes 
32 of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, we are particularly wary of 
reducing our sample size to effectively 19 countries. 
We try to solve the problem of missing data for the wage variable by 
using an alternative measure. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) use a wage 
variable that is the ratio of government wages to manufacturing wages. 
Although this cross-national data set on govenunent employment and wages is 
available from the World Bank's website, it provides no information on 
goverrurnent relative to manufactunng wages for sub-Saharan African countries. 
R1 
Rauch and Evans (2000) are the only other source of data on relative wages. 
They conducted a survey with experts in 35 less developed countries that 
included a question on the level of civil-service wages relative to comparable 
private sector employment. Unfortunately, their data set only includes four sub- 
Saharan African countries. 
Given that we are unable to find an alternative measure for the wage 
variable, we include it in our final regression (column [7] of the results tables) as 
a means of providing some indication as to the potential impact of civil-service 
wages on a country's level of corruption and for the sake of completeness. 
However, we focus our discussion of the results mostly excluding the result on 
the wage hypothesis, i. e., on regression [6]. 
Although we present results for the models estimated using the average 
of perceived corruption over the period 1982-1997 as a starting point, the main 
discussion of results, including robustness checks and detailed information on 
instrumental variables, is given in the discussion of the pooled model in Section 
2.7.2. This is because, given the small number of observations,, the results of the 
former models are not very reliable and therefore do not form the basis for our 
conclusions. 
2.7.1 Cross-section on 1982-1997 Averages 
As our starting point, we estimate our models using the average of 
perceived corruption over the period 1982-1997, using ordinary least squares 
(OLS). Although, given the relatively small initial sample of '32 sub-Saharan 
African countries we lose degrees of freedom thus worsening the efficiency and 
R') 
reliability of our estimates, we perform this estimation on country averages for 
comparability with other studies in the literature. These estimates can be 
interpreted as representing aggregate correlations over the long term. In 
particular, we are motivated by the fact that the existing empirical work tends to 
group sub-Saharan Africa, and indeed sometimes even the whole of Africa, into 
a dummy variable in world-wide cross-country regressions. However, as we are 
well aware of the limitations in terms of observations and number of 
explanatory variables, we do not rely on these results to fonn the basis of robust 
conc usions. 
49 
The results are presented in Table 2.7. Two strong correlations emerge - 
countries with a British heritage are perceived as less corrupt, whereas those 
with a common law system are perceived as more corrupt. This result is 
counter-intuitive, as a country's common law legal system and British colonial 
experience are highly correlated. The number of "divergent" cases where a 
country has a common law system but no British heritage, or where a country 
has just a British heritage but no common law system is very small in our 
sample. 50 More details on how an attempt is made to draw a distinction between 
these highly correlated variables are given in Section 2.7.2. Three other 
variables are significant in all regressions, yet lose their significance when 
alternative measures are used. Political stability, as measured by the number of 
'9 We also experiment with earlier versus later period averages (averages over 1982-1989 for the 
former, and over 1990-1997 for the latter), and test whether the coefficients would be equal 
across the two period averages. Our results show that the coefficients for the two period 
averages are not statistically different (we fail to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients from 
the different periods are equal). Tberefore, we only present results for the overall average of the 
period 1982-1997. 
""Just common law"': Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Namibia (although Namibia 
has a 'quasi' British heritage given its link to South Afi-ica). We have no observations for "just 
British heritage". 
QI 
years since the last regime change, is no longer significant when measured by 
either the number of civil wars or when measured by the occurrence and success 
of coup attempts. Trade ceases to be significant when either the Sachs and 
Warner index of openness or imports as a per cent of GDP measure is used 
instead of exports and imports as per cent of GDP. Finally, when government 
revenues as per cent of GDP are used as an indication of state intervention, the 
coefficient exhibits the expected (positive) sign but is insignificant. Although 
no other variables are consistently significant across all specifications, their 
coefficients tend to exhibit the expected signs (with the exception of "never a 
colony", which is always positive). 
We attempt to address the problems of endogeneity between corruption 
and income, trade and aid by using instrumental variables. Unfortunately, all 
the instruments we use (whether a country is tropical, landlocked, its size, 
population, infant mortality)51 perform very badly. The alternative approach of 
controlling for the possibility of endogeneity bias by using lagged values for 
income, trade and aid yields insignificant coefficients for all these variableS. 52 
This is independent of whether the lag is one period (that is, using averages over 
the preceding period 1966-1981), or whether it is the year preceding the initial 
year of the period (that is, using the values for the year 1981). Thus, we are 
unable to fully address the enclogeneity problems, 
51 More details on the instruments used can be found in Section 2.7.3. 
S2 Insofar as lagged values of these variables are predetermined with respect to current perceived 
corruption levels, we should be able to address the causalitv, issue. 
QA 
Whilst estimating this model provides a starting point, it is plagued by 
limitations, and does not allow for the determination of which factors might 
affect perceived corruption in sub-Saharan African countries. 
Q lr% 
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2.7.2 OLS Results, Pooled Data 
We now explore the fact that we have observations for multiple years for 
each country in the sample. Estimates from the regressions performed using 
OLS on the pooled data are presented in Table 2.8. Note that, following the 
literature, and in order to make comparisons with the existing empirical studies, 
we are assuming that the measure of perceived corruption has cardinal meaning, 
so that we refer to the magnitude of coefficient estimates in the discussion of 
results, rather than to simply their sign and significance (as would be appropriate 
given the ordinal nature of the corruption index). Section 2.7.4 contains a 
sensitivity analysis that takes into account that the corruption measure is an 
ordinal variable, and shows that the results are qualitatively similar. 
Of the variables included in the baseline regression, only the dummy for 
former UK colonies, the percentage of Protestants, 53 natural resource abundance 
and the legal system are consistently individually significant. The first three also 
exhibit the expected signs on their coefficients. As was the case in Section 2.7.1, 
not only does a country with a conunon law system appear to be perceived as 
more corrupt, but this variable is also the one that has the greater magnitude in 
determining perceived corruption. A country that has a common law system has 
a corruption score between 3.1 and 3.9 points higher than a country that does 
not, ceteris paribus. This suggests that caution is needed in stating that legal 
systems per se determine corruption levels - the way that institutions work may 
depend fundamentally on the political and cultural setting into which they were 
introduced. 
5' 
-' This is true even controlling for the percentage of the population that was Muslim, Catholic or 
adhering to traditional (or indigenous) religion. 
QQ 
In order to ascertain whether colonial heritages other than the British 
were associated with greater or lower perceived corruption, we run the baseline 
regression including dummies for French, Belgian and Portuguese colonial 
heritages. The British heritage dummy remains significant but the remainder are 
never significant, therefore, suggesting something specific about former British 
colonies. 
Although legal system and colonial experience are highly correlated, the 
overlap is not perfect. Drawing a distinction between the highly correlated 
common law and British heritage variables involves considering the "divergent" 
cases, in which a country has just a common law system but no British heritage 
or in which a country has just British heritage but no common law system. We 
use these variations to attempt to distinguish between the effects of being a 
former British colony and having a common law legal system. Following 
Treisman (2000), we run regressions considering such distinctions, and although 
with the small number of "divergent" cases significance is reduced, the results 
do appear to suggest that countries with both common law and British heritage 
probably have lower perceived corruption and that those with only a common 
law have higher perceived corruption. We must emphasize the fragility of these 
results, as they depend on a small number of "divergent" cases - only three in 
our sample of 32 countries. A more refined study of how certain aspects of 
legal practice relate to corruption in goverm-nent is needed. Nonetheless, our 
results do suggest that a country's political and cultural setting may significantly 
condition the way that institutions work. A legal system based on judicial 
precedents and which gives judges broad discretion may reduce corruption in a 
QQ 
country with an effective system of enforcement, whereas it may foster 
corruption in a country that lacks a strong tradition of procedural justice, or in a 
country where the judges themselves are corruPt. 
The fact that a country has never been a colony does not appear to 
decrease perceived corruption. In fact, the coefficient is always positive, being 
significant in columns [4] through [6]. Re-estimating the models with the 
observations used in column [6] yields results broadly similar to those in 
columns [4]-[6]. As it does not seem very intuitive that a lack of colonial 
heritage should increase perceived corruption, we try verifying this result by 
estimating the models using a variable that measures years of independence 
instead of the "never a colony" dummy. The results suggest that, in fact, the 
longer a country has been independent, the less likely it is to be perceived to be 
corrupt. It is important to bear in mind the limitations of these variables. As we 
noted earlier, there is very little variation across countries in the variable "no 
colonial heritage". The same is true of the variable "years of independence", as 
most sub-Saharan African countries became independent in the early 1960s. 
The coefficient of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation has the expected sign 
and is significant at the conventional levels in all regressions except [5] (and [7], 
although as explained above, we only include these results for the sake of 
completeness and not to derive conclusions). However, it is significant at the 
12% level. This is confirmed when alternative measures are used (namely, 
Gf) 
54 GUNN I, GUNN2, AVELF). In any case, the impact on perceived corruption 
levels of an ethnically diverse population is not very strong. 
Countries where fuel,, metals and minerals constitute more than 50% of 
exports tend to have higher perceived corruption - between 0.6 and I point 
higher - than those countries with low natural resource abundance. This result 
is robust to using an alternative measure of natural resource abundance [Fearon 
and Laitin (2003)]. In Treisman. (2000) and Serra (2006), the impact of natural 
resources on perceived corruption disappears when economic development and 
democracy are controlled for. Similarly, Ades and Di Tella (1999) fail to find a 
consistent and significant impact of natural resource abundance on perceived 
corruption levels. However, Leite and Weidmann (1999) do show that the 
extent of perceived corruption depends on natural resource wealth. This 
discrepancy in results may be related to the sample of countries included in each 
study. In particular, Leite and Weidmann (1999) appears to be the study 
including the greatest number of sub-Saharan African countries. 55 
A striking result in Table 2.8 is the correlation between economic 
development and perceived corruption. Not only is the coefficient only 
significant and with the expected negative sign in column [2], its effect is very 
54 We also use ROBERTS and MULLER. However, due to the lower data availability, there is a 
significant reduction in the number of observations. 
55 The main dependent variable used by Treisman (2000) is TI's CPI for 1997, which includes 
only two sub-Saharan African countries and for 1998 (includes 15 sub-Saharan African 
countries). In order to check his results, Treisman also uses a corruption index from Business 
International for the early 1980s (includes only 10 countries fi7om sub-Saharan Africa). Ades 
and Di Tella (1999) include only three sub-Saharan Affican countries in their 1980s regressions 
and none in their 1990s regressions. Serra (2006) selects a sample of 62 countries based on data 
availability for her 28 variables. Therefore, although she uses the Kauftnann Kraay and Zoido- 
Lobaton. (1999a) Control of Corruption measure, which covers 33 sub-Saharan African 
countries in 1996 and 46 in 1998, she also uses the CPI average for 1997-1999, which includes 
at best 16 countries from sub-Saharan Africa. 
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small, only -0.4. This implies that, ceteris paribus, a doubling of GDP per 
capita - say from that of Zimbabwe to that of Botswana - would lead to a drop 
in the corruption score of 0.4 points - which would bring Zimbabwe down to the 
Republic of Congo's score. The magnitude of this significant result is consistent 
with Serra (2006) and Treisman (2000). The coefficient on income per capita 
loses significance and has a positive sign as soon as measures of democracy and 
political instability are included. 
An obvious question is the direction of causation. By increasing the 
probability of identifying and punishing illicit rent appropriation and thereby 
lowering government officials' incentives to behave dishonestly, it may be 
argued that economic development exerts a control on corruption. However, 
corruption may also slow down economic development [see, for example, 
Mauro (1995)]. In order to tackle this endogeneity problem, we use 
instrumental variable estimation in the next sub-section, as well as lagged values 
of the endogenous economic development variable in Section 2.7.4. 
The measure of democracy in a country is always significant and with 
the expected impact on perceived corruption levels, signalling that more 
democratic countries tend to be perceived as less corrupt. A country relatively 
more democratic (one standard deviation increase) is perceived to be 0.32-0.48 
points less corrupt. In order to check the robustness of this result we use an 
alternative measure of democracy, namely, a measure of political rights from 
Freedom House. This measures the degree of political freedom in a country, on 
a scale of 1-7, where higher values denote less freedom. We rescale this 
G') 
variable so that higher values denote more freedom. 56 The result of more 
democratic countries being perceived to be less corrupt is not robust to the use 
of an alternative measure of democracy. We also experiment with a composite 
measure of political rights and civil rights (from Freedom House). The results 
are still insignificant. Treisman (2000) finds that the current level of democracy 
in a country does not impact perceived corruption, but that if a country has been 
consecutively democratic for at least 40 years then there is a small dividend in 
terms of perceived corruption reduction. Unfortunately, there is no country in 
our sample with a continuous period of 40 years of democracy. We experiment 
with shorter periods of consecutive democratic institutions. Our results 
considering a period of 10,20 or 30 years of continuous democracy are 
insignificant at conventional levels. It is important to bear in mind that 
Botswana is the only country in our sample with a long record of democracy. 
More politically stable (as measured by the durability of the regime) 
countries tend to be perceived as less corrupt. To test the robustness of this 
result we experiment with another measure of political instability, the incidence 
of civil wars. Once again, the results are not confirmed. 
The quality of legal and political institutions, as measured by an index on 
the rule of law, has a significant impact on the level of perceived corruption. A 
one standard deviation increase in the rule of law index decreases perceived 
corruption by between 0.28 and 0.35 standard deviations. 57 Given the strong 
56 We perform a linear transformation, where Rescaled vari able= 8 -Original variable. 
S7 Note that by using the standardized, or beta, coefficients in our discussion of the results we are 
able to abstain from the units of measurement of the explanatory variables and, therefore, are 
better able to compare the magnitudes of their impact on the dependent variable. See 
Wooldridge (2003) for further details. However, note that we report the magnitude of 
Footnote continucs on next page. 
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correlation between the rule of law and perceived corruption, we also try 
including measures of education and civil and human rights. To the extent that 
formulation, implementation and public knowledge of written codes and laws 
reduces corruption, a more educated population may be less tolerant of 
corruption. Furthermore, a society with greater respect for civil liberties and 
human rights will provide the means for the population to expose corrupt 
behaviour. In principle, a more educated and active civil society could help to 
reduce corruption by being less tolerant to corrupt practices, thereby having 
greater incentives and means to expose that type of behaviour. Greater civil 
liberties and respect for human rights, though never significant, tend to decrease 
perceived corruption. 
As a measure of the education of the population, two alternative 
variables are available, namely, the illiteracy rate of the total adult population 
(aged 15 and above), and the average years of schooling attained by the total 
adult population. However, due to the large number of sub-Saharan African 
countries that lacks observations for the average years of schooling attained, the 
former measure has to be used. The percentage of illiterate population is never 
significant and tends to exhibit the wrong sign. 
The estimates in Table 2.8 suggest a relationship between greater 
openness to trade (as measured by imports and exports as per cent of GDP) and 
higher perceived corruption. This result is at odds with the theoretical and 
empirical literature. In order to check our result we use two alternative 
measures of openness to trade, namelv, imports as a per cent of GDP and the 
coefficients for comparison with other studies, as given the ordinal nature of the corruption 
index it is best to look only at sign and significance. 
OA 
Sachs and Warner index of openness to trade. The correlation between imports 
and perceived corruption levels in a country is also strongly positive. In 
contrast, open economies exhibit lower levels of perceived corruption. These 
results are not incompatible, although they may seem so at first. Measures of 
exports and imports relates to quantities of trade, whereas the Sachs and Warner 
index relates to policy stances. For example, sub-Saharan African countries 
with large endowments of natural resources where these constitute a large 
proportion of exports will typically fail the Sachs and Warner criteria of lack of 
government monopoly over major exports. Also, a larger trade flow may 
increase the opportunities for both the solicitation of bribes by corrupt 
govermnent officials, as well as the offer of bribes by the trade partner. In 
particular, bribing of foreign officials was not considered illegal prior to the 
OECD's Anti-Bribery Convention that came into effect in 1999.58 A notable 
exception is the US, where bribing foreign officials has been illegal since the 
1974 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 
However, openness to trade is clearly endogenous. Openness to trade 
and the consequent exposure to foreign competition may constrain corruption, 
but corrupt officials may create rent-seeking barriers to trade. In order to tackle 
this endogeneity problem, we use instrumental variable estimation in the next 
sub-section, as well as lagged values of the endogenous trade variable in Section 
2.7.4. 
An increase of ten percentage points in general govenunent total 
expenditure as per cent of GDP decreases perceived corruption by around 0.3 
58 In some countries, such as Portugal, bribing foreign officials was actually tax-deductible. 
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points. We use the output of state-owned enterprises as per cent of GDP to 
check the robustness of the results obtained using general govenunent spending. 
Unfortunately, this drastically reduces the number of observations in the 
regressions and, therefore, the results obtained are not reliable. We also try 
using government revenues as a proportion of GDP. The coefficient is never 
significant, although it has the expected positive sign in regression [5]. 
A possible explanation for an uncertain effect of goverment size on 
corruption relates to competition between government officials and their 
perceived balance between risk and reward. When bureaucrats have 
overlapping enforcement areas, then clients have a choice of which bureaucrat 
to approach [Rose-Ackerman (1999)]. This introduces competition and reduces 
the monopoly power of any one bureaucrat. This, in turn, reduces the 
bureaucrats' ability to demand large payoffs. Of course, even with low bribe 
levels, corruption may still be considered rampant if there are overwhelming 
numbers of corrupt bureaucrats. Also, lower levels of reward may induce some 
officials to remain honest. Note, however, that this is more likely to be the case 
when the risks of being corrupt are greater. These risks are greater when there is 
effective monitoring, a high probability of being caught, as well as a high 
likelihood of being punished. 
The results in columns [5] and [6] show that a ten percentage points 
increase in the percentage of the labour force that is female is associated with a 
decrease in perceived corruption of around 0.4, and a standard deviation 
increase is associated with a decrease in perceived corruption of 0.12-0.13 
standard deviations. This effect is important. Women in Africa work 
aA 
predominantly in agriculture, 59 and have less access to productive assets and 
complementary factors of production such as credit and education. Greater 
equality in the access to education and production factors would increase the 
share of labour force that is female, thus not only helping to reduce corruption, 
but also increasing growth rates. 60 Therefore, the impact of increased 
participation in the labour force may be direct or indirect. 
To the extent that the definition of corruption used in this study is the 
misuse of public office for private gain, it would be extremely interesting to 
have data on women's political participation (i. e. percentage of women in 
parliament) and test whether this variable also decreases perceived corruption. 
This is discussed further in Section 2.7.5, including the limitations of using this 
variable instead of a variable measuring female political participation. 
The importance of aid, as measured by aid as per cent of GDP, has an 
insignificantly negative correlation with perceived corruption. When total aid 
flows, as measured by aid net disbursements in constant 2000 US$, 
6 1 
are used 
instead, the coefficient becomes significant (at I %) and remains negative. 
Using data on total aid commitments also yields a significant and negative 
coefficient. 62 It would also be interesting to obtain data on the breakdown of aid 
59According to the World Bank (2000), in sub-Saharan Africa in 1980,74% of female labour 
was employed in agriculture, 5% in industry and 21% in services. 
60 The World Bank (2000) estimates that growth rates could be as much as 0.8 percentage points 
higher. 
6' Net disbursements measure the disbursements of grants and highly concessional loans (loans 
with a grant element of at least 25%) minus amortization. 
62 Commitments represent donors' intentions (that is, they are the amount the donor agrees to 
make available to the recipient during the relevant time period), whereas disbursements 
represent the actual amount of aid donors transfer to recipients (that is, the amount of the 
commitment actually spent during the relevant time period). As we are interested in aid as a 
potential source of rents, data on disbursements are a more appropriate measure. Note, however, 
that, as would be expected, the two are highly correlated. 
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to governments and to NGOs, as we would expect aid to governments to 
represent a greater source of rents, and, therefore, have a greater impact on 
corruption. There is also the issue of endogeneity with aid - countries that rely 
heavily on aid may be more corrupt, but donors may choose to allocate aid to 
recipients that are less corrupt. Given that we specifically look at the impact of 
perceived corruption on aid receipts by sub-Saharan African countries in 
Chapter 4, it is important to assess the causal relationship between aid and 
perceived corruption. Accordingly, in order to address this endogeneity 
problem, we use instrumental variable estimation in the next sub-section, as well 
as lagged values of the endogenous aid variable in Section 2.7.4. 
In sum, we find seven robustly significant variables - British heritage, 
Protestant tradition,, natural resource abundance, common law system, rule of 
law, openness to trade and female labour force. We find that economic and 
political explanations add to long-predetermined historical and cultural ones, as 
the adjusted R2 increases from 0.43 in column [1] to 0.56 in column [6]. 
Perfonning OLS on the pooled data using just the seven robustly significant 
variables (where they maintain sign and significance) indicates that these 
variables account for 56% of the variation in the corruption index (see Table 
2.9). 
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Table 2.9: Robustly Significant Detenninants of Perceived Corruption - OLS, 
Pooled model 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation 
Former British Colony -1.471*** 
[0.208] 
Never a colony 
Protestants (%) -0.048*** 
[0.004] 
Common law system 2.751*** 
[0.234] 
Natural resources 0.636*** 
[0.148] 
Log (GDP per capita) 
Democracy 
Political stability 
Rule of law -0.670*** 
[0.063] 
Trade (% GDP) 0.005** 
[0.002] 
Government expenditure (% GDP) 
% Females in labour force -0.020*** 
[0.006] 
Aid (% GNP) 
Govemment wage 
Constant 8.354*** 
[0.604] 
Time dummies Yes 
Observations 443 
R2 0.56 
Adiusted R2 0.533 
White heteroskedasti city corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
2.7.3 IV Results, Pooled Data 
Having identified potential problems of endogeneity between (perceived) 
corruption and income, trade and aid, in this sub-section we provide more 
information on our attempt to find convincing instruments so that we can 
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perform instrumental variables (IV), or two-stage least squares, estimation. A 
good instrumental variable should be highly correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variable and should not directly influence the dependent variable. 
In addition, we check the two key indicators of instrument quality, as suggested 
by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995), namely, the partial W and the F-statistic of 
the instrument [Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest a rule of thumb threshold 
between 10 and 25]. Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) show that if a set of 
potential instruments is weakly correlated with the endogenous explanatory 
variable, then even a small correlation between the potential instruments and the 
error can seriously bias IV estimates. 
One instrument that has been considered to cause economic growth but 
is not likely to cause (perceived) corruption is a country's latitudinal distance 
from the Equator. Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) find that location and 
climate have large effects on income levels and income growth, through their 
effects on transport costs, disease burdens, and agricultural productivity, among 
other channels. In particular, they find that countries located closer to the 
Equator exhibit lower income levels. Treisman (2000) also uses latitudinal 
distance from the Equator as an instrument. This instrument has the added 
benefit of having no missing observations. We construct a dummy variable 
equal to I if the absolute value of a country's latitude is smaller than 23 degrees. 
Countries for which this variable is I are considered to be tropical countries. 
Our instruments for trade also draw upon geographical characteristics. 
Following Frankel and Romer (1999) and Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg 
(2000), we use as instruments whether a country is landlocked and its area. 
1 (Y) 
Since geography should not inherently be correlated with (perceived) 
corruption, these are valid instruments. We experiment with two instruments for 
aid, namely, population as in Svensson (2000), and infant mortality as in Knack 
(2001). 
Estimates from the regressions performed using IV on the pooled data 
are presented in Table 2.10.63 The key indicators of instrument quality are very 
favourable for our instruments for income and trade. Firstly, the partial R2 are 
considerable, ranging from 0.11 to 0.35. Secondly, the F-statistics produce 
values adequately above the 10-25 range. A standard test for overidentified 
restrictions fails to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments and the error 
term are not correlated. Thus the chosen variables are valid instruments in a 
statistical sense. Also, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients in the OLS and the IV regressions do not systematically differ from 
each other. Population turns out to be a weak instrument for aid, as the F- 
statistic is only 6.28. Also, the test for overidentified restrictions rejects the null 
hypothesis that the instruments and the error term are not correlated (the p-value 
is 0.05). It is not entirely surprising that population is a weak instrument for aid 
- there are inherent problems with this variable, as population data is likely to be 
plagued with measurement error, especially for countries such as those in sub- 
Saharan Africa, where census reports may not accurately reflect the true 
population (due, for example, to problems such as the lack of adequate resources 
for undertaking census, or lack of adherence to international standards in 
census-taking). In addition. there are problems with an inherent ' opulation r__ P 
' 6' Note that the results when population is used as an instrument are not included in the table. 
This is because population turns out to be a weak instrument. More detail is given in the text. 
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bias', whereby smaller countries receive proportionately more aid, for example 
because donors want to "show the flag" [Knack (200 1)]. In contrast, the key 
indicators of instrument quality are favourable for our alternative instrument for 
aid, infant mortality, with a partial Rý of 0.11, and an F-statistic of 3 1. In 
addition, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the 
OLS and the IV regressions do not systematically differ from each other. 
So in our discussion on the IV estimation for income, trade and aid we 
refer to the results obtained when infant mortality, rather than population, is 
used as an instrument for aid. Note that, as before, we report the results for the 
regressions including wages for completeness, although we do not consider 
them in our discussion of the results for the reasons already mentioned. 
The results for instrumented income are quite striking. The coefficients 
are always significant and negative. The IV coefficients are always more 
negative than the OLS coefficients from Table 2.8, which are biased upward. 
This upward bias means that OLS will underestimate the impact of economic 
development on perceived corruption levels. This result is consistent with 
Treisman (2000). If it can be shown that countries perceived as less corrupt 
have greater income levels, then establishing a causal relationship of income on 
perceived corruption provides evidence that there is indeed a virtuous cycle 
between economic development and perceived corruption - less corrupt 
countries will enjoy greater income levels, which will in turn help to lessen 
corruption. 
Our results for instrumented trade show that there is a strong positive 
correlation between trade and perceived corruption. Also, the IV coefficients 
1 OA 
are larger than the OLS coefficients, which is not what we would expect. 
Countries that are corrupt for reasons other than trade tend to have lower income 
levels and worse institutions,, which lower trade openness. This would lead to a 
negative correlation between trade and the error term in an OLS regression and 
thus to upward bias in the OLS estimates of trade's effects. The difference in 
the coefficients could be due to measurement error in the trade variable that 
creates attenuation. 
Although our result on the impact of trade on perceived corruption is at 
odds with intuition and other empirical results, it is worth noting that Rigobon 
and Rodrik (2004) find that trade openness is bad for democracy. 64 They find 
that trade's estimated negative impact on democracy is very significant and that 
it is a very robust result. They suggest that "openness in general tends to 
weaken democratic institutions, perhaps because openness exacerbates 
distributional conflicts. " 
Our results for instrumented aid show that there is a significant and 
negative impact of aid on levels of perceived corruption. As the IV coefficients 
are always more negative than the OLS coefficients, OLS underestimates the 
impact of aid on perceived corruption levels. This is consistent with the view 
that donors direct less aid to countries that are (perceived to be) more corrupt. 
This is consistent with both intuition and with the results in Chapter 4, where we 
find a negative correlation between a country's level of perceived corruption and 
the aid it receives from bilateral donor countries (although we do not find a 
6' Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) do not perform instrumental variable estimation. Instead, they 
rely on a novel approach called Identification through Heteroskedasticity. This approach 
achieves identification by exploiting plausible differences in the variances of error terms across 
sub-samples of the data. 
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causal effect of perceived corruption on aid receipts) . It should 
be noted that, 
while the variable infant mortality satisfies the requirements for not being a 
weak instrument,, in Chapter 4, where we look at the deten-ninants of aid 
receipts, it does not enter the specification modelled - when it is tried as an 
explanatory variable to proxy for recipients' poverty, it is insignificant (without 
affecting any other coefficient). 
Regarding the other variables, protestant tradition, democracy and 
political stability cease to be significant for all regressions. As in the OLS case, 
when government expenditure is replaced by government revenues it is no 
longer significant. Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation is now significant in all 
specifications. 
In sum, results obtained from IV estimation suggest that nine variables 
significantly impact the level of perceived corruption in a country - 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, British heritage, natural resource abundance, 
common law system, income per capita, rule of law, openness to trade, aid and 
female labour force. 
'5 Note that this negative correlation is also true of total, i. e., bilateral and multilateral, aid flows 
also scaled by GDP. 
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2.7.4 Sensitivity Analyses: Nature of Dependent Variable and 
Endogenous Explanatory Variables 
In this sub-section we perform two types of sensitivity analyses to the 
results obtained for the pooled model. We examine whether the results 
change when the ordinal nature of the corruption index is taken into account 
and an ordered probit model is estimated, and when the enclogeneity of the 
income,, trade and aid variables is addressed by using lagged values of these 
variables (instead of IV estimation). 
We use the corruption index reclassified into six categories 66 and 
estimate ordered probit models, which allow for a dependent variable in 
which the actual values are irrelevant, except that higher values correspond to 
higher outcomes. Table 2.11 presents the results for the sensitivity analyses 
for specification [6]. 67 From Table 2.11 we can see that the ordered probit 
estimates turn out to be qualitatively very similar to the OLS estimates. This 
seems to indicate that the results we obtained when treating the (perceived) 
corruption measure as having cardinal meaning, as is done widely in the 
literature, are valid in the sense that the coefficient estimates exhibit the same 
sign and significance. 
It should be noted that in these models, the estimated coefficients P 
are of limited interest. What are of interest are the marginal effects of the 
66 We had originally coded the corruption index into seven categories. In order to avoid cells 
with low frequency, we subsumed categories 1-2 into band I and retained the remaining in 
ascending order up to band 6. See Section 2.4.3 for more details. 
6' Results for all specifications are included in Appendix 2. A. 
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regressors on the response probabilities. 68 The marginal effect indicates the 
change in the share of countries belonging to a stated perceived corruption 
band when the explanatory variable increases by one unit (except for dummy 
variables, where the marginal effect corresponds to a change from 0 to 1). 69 
Put another way, the marginal effect indicates the change in the probability of 
belonging to a stated perceived corruption band when the explanatory 
variable increases by one unit. For simplicity, in Table 2.11 we present only 
the marginal effects for category/band 4 of the corruption measure for 
specification [6]. 70 For example, having been a former British colony lowers 
the probability of a country having a perceived corruption score in band 4 by 
40 percentage points. 71 
In Section 2.7.3, in order to control for potential endogeneity of 
income, trade and aid, we conducted instrumental variables estimation on the 
pooled model. However, in practice it is difficult to find good instruments, 
and in addition, the results obtained using IV are typically very sensitive to 
the choice of instrument (as indeed, was the case for our instrument for aid). 
68 Note that in these non-linear models, the magnitude of the change in the outcome/response 
probability for a given change in one of the explanatory variables depends on the levels of all 
the explanatory variables. 
69 In calculating marginal effects the non-dummy explanatory variables are evaluated at their 
sample means. 
70 Note that results for the other categories/bands can be found in Appendix 2. A. 
71 Note that if the corruption index had a smaller number of scores (say, if the scores were 
the integers between zero and six), then it would be interesting to look at the marginal effects 
for each response and compare them with the coefficient estimates obtained from OLS, to 
see whether the assumption of constant marginal effects was valid. However, as explained in 
the text, the corruption index (which is reported monthly) is a discrete score with half digits, 
so it has 13 possible outcomes. Moreover, as we have annual averages, the corruption index 
can take on an even wider range of scores/outcomes. Therefore, comparing the marginal 
effects of the bands we have created with the OLS estimates is not as informative. For 
example, in comparing a country in band 2 with a country in band 3, we could be comparing 
scores of 3 and 5.7, or 4.3 and 4.4, or several other combinations. 
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Therefore,, it is appropriate to check the robustness of those results using an 
alternative procedure. In order to control for the possibility of endogeneity 
bias,, in this sub-section we use variables for income, trade and aid lagged for 
one year. 72 Insofar as lagged values of these variables are precletennined 
with respect to current perceived corruption levels, we should be able to 
address the causality issue. For example, we control for the possibility of 
endogeneity bias (that donors give more aid to countries perceived as less 
corrupt), by using aid variables lagged for one year, as the current perceived 
corruption level will not influence the magnitude of previous year aid flows. 
If the estimation results of using lagged values are qualitatively the same as 
those from using IV, then we are able to robustly conclude we have been able 
to ascertain the causal effect. 
On the basis that current perceived corruption levels are not a 
determinant of past values of income, aid or trade, from Table 2.11 we can 
see that the results obtained by IV estimation for income and aid are not 
substantiated by using lagged values instead. 73 The only result that is robust 
is that trade openness causes an increase in perceived corruption. 74 Neither 
lagged income nor lagged aid is significantly correlated with perceived 
corruption levels, whereas lagged trade openness tends to be positively and 
significantly correlated. This seems to suggest that whereas windfalls from 
increased income or aid are dissipated quite quickly, rents from trade take 
72 This approach has been used, for example, by Morrissey et al. (2006), and Gupta et al. 
(2003). 
7, The estimated coefficient on lagged income is positive for specification [6], but it is 
negative for specification [2] and insignificant for the other specifications. 
7' This result is robust to using the variable imports as a per cent of GDP. 
III 
longer to dissipate and that over time they continue to impact on perceived 
corruption levels. 
75 
Table 2.11 also includes the ordered probit estimates when lagged 
values for income, trade and aid are used. They confirm the results obtained 
by OLS, including the existence of the causal effect of trade on perceived 
corruption. 
In terms of the other explanatory variables, British heritage, protestant 
tradition, common law system, natural resource abundance, rule of law and 
female labour force are significant for all specifications. When alternative 
measures for government expenditure, democracy and political stability are 
used, these cease to be significant in all specifications. 
In sum,, results obtained from sensitivity tests of both treating the 
corruption measure as having only ordinal meaning, and using lagged values 
for potentially enclogenous explanatory variables, suggest that seven 
variables significantly impact the level of perceived corruption in a country - 
British heritage, protestant tradition, natural resource abundance, common 
law system, rule of law, openness to trade, and female labour force. 
75 We also experimented with a two-year lagged trade value, which was also positively and 
significantly related to perceived corruption. 
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2.7.5 Random Effects 
Most empirical studies tend to focus on cross-section regressions, either 
looking at corruption indices for a given year or averaging over a number of 
years, while the few that have a panel set-up tend to simply pool the data. 76 We 
now explicitly take into account the panel nature of our data set. In particular, 
we estimate a random effects (RE) model, taking into account the variation 
within, as well as between countries. 
The results are presented in Tables 2.12 and 2.13 (the latter presents the 
results for only those variables that are robustly significant). Some results are 
quite similar to those from OLS estimation on the pooled data. A country's 
British heritage, common law system, natural resource abundance, Protestant 
traditions and rule of law have a significant impact on perceived corruption. 
There are, however, some important exceptions. Democracy and political 
stability have lost significance. We have already established in the pooled 
model that these results are not very robust - changing the variable used to 
measure them results in a loss of significance. The coefficients on trade 
openness and the size of government now have the expected signs (negative and 
positive, respectively), although they are insignificant. There is no longer a 
significant relationship between the proportion of women in the labour force and 
the level of perceived corruption in a country. We have already noted that it 
would be extremely useful to have data on the political participation of women, 
as this would be a more pertinent variable to use in assessing the impact of 
gender on levels of perceived corruption. Unfortunately, as is the case with so 
76 A notable exception is Ades and Di Tella (1999). 
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many variables for sub-Saharan African countries, data on political participation 
of women [for example, from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2005)] is typically 
available for only very few countries in our sample. Such a measure would be 
more meaning I than the proportion of women in the labour force, particularly 
in the context of sub-Saharan African countries, where there are difficulties in 
obtaining complete and reliable information on the labour force, especially due 
to the size of the informal sector and subsistence agriculture. In addition, 
women are disproportionately engaged in these activities, creating further 
measurement problems [Blackden and Bhanu (1999)]. Swamy et al. (2001) 
state that the proportion of female labour force can be seen as a partial measure 
of the overall concept of women's participation in public life. However, in the 
case of sub-Saharan Africa, given the definitional problems of labour force 
mentioned above, and the preponderance of recorded female labour in 
agriculture (where the scope for engaging in corrupt activities may be lower), 
this measure is likely to be a weak indicator for the impact of gender on 
perceived corruption levels. 
We also attempt to address the problems of enclogeneity between 
corruption and income, trade and aid by using instrumental variables. 
Unfortunately, the instruments we identified and are able to use successfully in 
the pooled model now perforrn very badly. All of the instruments (whether a 
country is tropical, landlocked, its size, population, and infant mortality) are 
weak - the F-statistics are never above 6 and the partial 
W are typically around 
0.001. The alternative approach of controlling for the possibility of endogeneity 
bias by using one year lagged values for income, trade and aid yields 
117 
insignificant coefficients for all these variables. Therefore, although by using 
random effects we account for country heterogeneity, we are unable to fully 
address the problems of simultaneity. 
Results obtained from estimating the RE model suggest that five 
variables significantly impact perceived corruption levels in a country, namely 
British heritage, natural resource abundance, common law system, Protestant 
tradition and rule of law. Estimating the RE model using just these five 
explanatory variables (where they maintain sign and significance) indicates that 
these variables account for around 50% of the variation in perceived corruption 
(see Table 2.13). 
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Table 2.13: Robustly Significant Determinants of Perceived Corruption - 
Random Effects model 
Ethnolinguistic fractional i sation 
Former British Colony -1.773*** 
[0.609] 
Never a colony 
Protestants -0.054** 
[0.024] 
Common law system 3.206*** 
[0.600] 
Natural resources 0.428* 
[0.247] 
Log (GDP per capita) 
Democracy 
Political stability 
Rule of law -0.349*** 
[0.063] 
Trade (% GDP) 
Goveniment expenditure (% GDP) 
% Females in labour force 
Aid (% GNP) 
Govemment wage 
Constant 6.299*** 
[0.345] 
Observations 30 
Countries 443 
Hausman test (p-value) 0.679 
R20.496 
White heteroskedasti city corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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The following table provides a summary of the variables that are robustly 
significant in explaining perceived corruption levels in sub-Saharan African 
countries. It shows the direction (sign) of the impact on perceived corruption 
of the explanatory variables robustly related to perceived corruption. 
Table 2.14: Impact of robust variables on perceived corruption 
cl cl 4.0 10 
1 ; 0. it 10 "0 A 
00 eIA 00 _r Q _r 
0 0 
9 =C Q "0 "a .2 
"a W W= 
I -r rA 44 e 
0-1 Vý 0 Qn 0 
> 
0 -0 
(W 10 
0 
c 
04 
ta 
U 
Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalisation 
Former British Colony 
Protestants (%) 
Common law system + + + + + + + 
Natural resources + + + + + + + 
Log (GDP per capita) 
Rule of law 
Trade (% GDP) + + 
% Females in labour 
force 
Aid (% GNP) 
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2.8 Concluding Remarks 
The concept of exploring the heterogeneity of sub-Saharan African 
countries is particularly appealing, even more so in the context of a subject 
for which anecdotal evidence abounds and rigorous empirical analyses are, to 
our best knowledge, non-existent. However, corruption is hard to study 
empirically, as its many possible determinants interrelate in complicated 
ways. Problems are exacerbated by the lack of comprehensive data for many 
variables for several sub-Saharan African countries. Notwithstanding the fact 
that we are unable to fully explore the panel set-up, this study provides a few 
insights into the exploration of the causes of corruption in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Our purpose in this study is not to provide definitive proof of the 
causes of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. Rather, we aim to provide an 
initial round of hypothesis testing, to highlight a series of potentially 
compelling relationships that may spur further theoretical development and 
empirical testing to explore causal pathways more precisely than we are able 
to do here. 
We would like to emphasise that perhaps the greatest difficulty has 
been the availability of data suitable for our purposes. Note that we by no 
means wish to undermine the importance and relevance of the data that does 
exist. Indeed, there is a wealth of data sets easily available, including freely 
and electronically available data, as well as data kindly provided by the 
authors of many important studies. However, data for sub-Saharan Africa is 
notoriously scarce. Our greatest concern regards not being able to use 
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alternative measures of perceived corruption to check the robustness of our 
results. This concern forcefully inhibits us from drawing strong inferences 
from our study. However, we are able to Provide a rough idea of the 
different effects that some variables have on perceived corruption. 
The determinants of corruption in cross-country studies are usually 
investigated empirically under the assumption that it is possible to cardinally 
measure the extent to which corrupt activities take place. However, the very 
nature of corruption means that these illegal activities occur in a covert 
fashion, and therefore, concrete data on, for example, the amount of money a 
corrupt official demands (and is paid) in bribes, is not available. Instead, we 
have to rely on measures that subjectively measure perceptions of corruption. 
However,, economists are likely to be sceptical with regards to a cardinal 
interpretation of subjective variables. We show that the least squares 
estimation that treats the corruption index as a cardinal variable offers 
qualitatively very similar results to the estimates from an ordered probit 
model. So,, although the indices that attempt to measure corruption levels are, 
strictly speaking, of an ordinal nature, as they measure subjective 
perceptions, we show that the results obtained when treating the corruption 
index as having cardinal meaning are valid (in terms of sign and significance 
of coefficient estimates). This is a reassuring result, as the empirical 
corruption literature uses and interprets subjective corruption indices as a 
cardinal variable. However, caution suggests that care should be exercised 
when interpreting results, and one should avoid giving an inordinate weight 
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to the magnitude of the coefficients - indeed one should focus on their sign 
and significance. 
We find strong support for two arguments: Countries with a British 
heritage are perceived as less corrupt, while those with a common law system 
are perceived as more corrupt. We find weaker support for four further 
arguments: Countries with good quality institutions and a greater proportion 
of women in the labour force are perceived as less corrupt. Countries with 
greater natural resource abundance and with greater trade openness are 
perceived as more corrupt. 
The long-predetermined historical and cultural legacies of a country 
appear to significantly influence current perceived corruption levels. 
Countries that were British colonies have significantly lower perceived 
corruption. On first thought, this could reflect the fact that most former 
British colonies have common law legal systems. However, as the common 
law legal system significantly increases perceived corruption in the 
regressions, it is more likely that the British heritage effect is linked to a 
distinct legal "culture" of procedural fairness governing the way the law is 
administered and enforced. As the results obtained so strongly indicate that 
having a common law system increases perceived corruption, it is worthwhile 
investigating this further. A possible explanation is that the infonnality of the 
British law, where practices are strongly based on unwritten rules, seems to 
be more subject to corruption than other traditions (where rules are explicitly 
defined) in countries that lack an effective system of enforcement and a 
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strong tradition of procedural justice. 77 However,, a more detailed and 
narrower specification of the legal system 78 and a study of how particular 
aspects of legal practice relate to government performance in general and 
corruption in particular are needed. 
We find that a greater proportion of women in the labour force 
significantly reduces the level of perceived corruption in a country. 
However, as we noted previously, there are difficulties in obtaining complete 
and reliable information on the labour force, especially due to the size of the 
informal sector and subsistence agriculture in sub-Saharan African countries. 
Therefore, this result should be treated cautiously. A better measure of 
whether women do have different ethical values than men, which in turn 
leads them to be less corrupt, would be female participation in the political 
system. It could be that using a measure on the labour force instead is 
underestimating the true effect of the behavioural differences across gender. 
One must, however, also bear in mind that more democratic countries, with a 
tradition of fairness, pluralism and tolerance may also facilitate the entry and 
permanence of women in key political positions. If having a long tradition of 
democracy also reduces corruption, then the impact of increased female 
participation in politics may not be as large as expected. In any case, 
increasing female participation, both in the labour force and in government, 
77 Note, however, that drawing distinctions between the highly correlated common law and 
British heritage variables depends on a small number of "divergent" cases in our sample. 
78 For example, David and Brierly (1985) suggest that Botswana, Namibia, South Affica and 
Zimbabwe have legal systems that mix elements of common law and Romano-Dutch law. 
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may be valued for its own sake, for reasons of gender equality. If this brings 
positive spin-offs in terms of reducing corruption, then society benefits more. 
Countries where natural resources account for over 50% of exports 
are perceived to be more corrupt. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
rents cause corruption. The fact that natural resource abundance increases 
perceived corruption does not mean that fighting corruption in resource-rich 
countries is impossible. It does mean, however, that strategies/policies that 
specifically take into account the detrimental impact of rent-seeking activities 
when there is abundance of natural resources need to be developed. In 
particular, there is a need for increased transparency and accountability to 
reduce the risk of diversion or misappropriation of resources. 
One example of such a strategy is the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), announced by the UK Prime Minister at the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, September 
2002. The EITI aims to increase transparency in transactions between 
governments and companies within extractive industries. There are currently 
20 countries in several stages of EITI implementation. Of these, 14 are in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Although the EITI is certainly a step in the right 
direction, it has limited power to detect and punish corrupt activities. 
Although we find only weak evidence that democracy and political 
stability reduce perceived corruption, we do find stronger evidence that 
sounder institutions. indicated as a high score on rule of law, tend to be 
associated with lower perceived corruption. Previous studies have also failed 
to find a relationship between perceived corruption and whether a country is 
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currently democratic. What seems to make a difference is whether a country 
has been democratic for decades. This suggests that the beneficial impact of 
sound political institutions should not be disregarded. Rather, countries 
should not be dismayed by the lack of immediate benefits, but persevere in 
building good institutions and promoting good governance. 
Our result on trade openness is surprising. Unlike previous studies, 
we find that having a greater proportion of exports and imports in terms of 
GDP (or alternatively, just imports as per cent of GDP) increases perceived 
corruption. One possible explanation is that a greater volume of trade creates 
more opportunities for extracting bribes. It may be the case that sub-Saharan 
African countries are very vulnerable to volatile world market fluctuations 
and that when prices are low officials demand more or higher bribes. In any 
case, this result merits a closer investigation. 
Our findings suggest why fighting corruption in sub-Saharan Africa 
has been so difficult. Long-predetermined historical and cultural 
characteristics appear to have a significant impact on whether a country is 
perceived to be corrupt, and it is not just government policy that matters. 
However,, although policy decisions may have little impact on corruption or 
work very slowly, they do have an impact. The fight against corruption is by 
no means lost. Perseverance in sound policies is likely to pay off, even if it 
takes time. 
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Chapter 3 
The Supply of Bribes - How Much Are Firms Willing to Pay? 
3.1 Introduction 
Corruption is a complex phenomenon, as it takes on various forms and 
operates in different contexts. Accordingly, the study of corruption has been 
multi-di sc ipl i nary and dispersed, ranging from stylised theoretical modelling to 
detailed descriptions of single corruption scandals. It has been studied as a 
political, economic, cultural or moral problem, and, in most cases, as a 
combination of these. 
79 
Despite the voluminous literature on the subjeCt, 80 the scope for research 
has by no means been exhausted. There is a tendency for the existing models to 
focus on the choice of whether or not to engage in corruption on the part of 
administrators or politicians. Frequently, the private sector's willingness to offer 
bribes is given less attention. 81 This appears to be quite puzzling, as one would 
assume that understanding the incentives for firms to offer bribes would prove 
helpful in devising counter- incentives. Furthermore, as it takes two to tango, one 
would think that if firms are unwilling to offer bribes, then the whole concept of 
a corrupt politician or government official would become redundant. Indeed, 
because it takes two to enter into a corrupt deal, the crime will not occur if at 
'9See Bardhan (1997) for a comprehensive review of the economic literature on corruption. 
80There has been an increasing number of both academic and non-academic articles on 
corruption. Leiken (1997) reports that the number of media articles mentioning corruption in 
1995 increased by four times since 1984. Glynn, Kobrin and Naim (1997) reach similar 
conclusions based upon the number of times corruption is mentioned in the financial press. Of 
course, this does not imply that useful analyses of corruption did not exist before this rise in 
interest - see Rose-Ackerman 
(1978), Klitgaard (1988,1990), among others. 
8 'Notable exceptions include Lui (1985). Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien (1986,1987,1990). 
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least one of the parties is deterred. Therefore, we feel that there is a need to 
study the decision-making process of firms that offer bribes. In particular, we 
are interested in examining the conditions that influence firms' decisions of the 
magnitude of bribes, and consequently, how the choices made by corrupt 
officials based on these bribes affect allocation efficiency. Our starting point is 
the widespread belief that transparency is one of the most fundamental aspects 
in combating corruption. It is important to distinguish between transparency in 
institutions, in terms of ensuring that government officials do not engage in 
corrupt practices and that the awarding processes are 'clean' and fair, and 
transparency in terms of availability of information. In this chapter we are 
concerned with this second aspect. Therefore, in order to assess the virtues of 
transparency as a deterrent to bribery, we explicitly consider the infonnation 
structures of firms. Also, due to the essential illegal nature of corruption, we 
include in our study the possibility of punishments for corrupt firms (i. e., firms 
that offer bribes). 
This chapter considers the case of corruption in the government 
contracting process. Corruption that is endemic in the way the government 
carries out its routine activities, such as tax collection, customs and inspections, 
is not considered. When the government is the buyer or contractor, there are 
several reasons for firms to bribe the governinent officials. Firstly, a firm may 
pay so that it is included in the pre-qualifying list of the bidders, as well as to 
reduce the size of the list. Secondly, it may pay to obtain inside information, 
such as maximum and minimum price thresholds, average offer prices and the 
selection criteria for the projects. Thirdly, the bribes may induce the government 
1 )8 
officials to structure the specifications of the public tenders in such a way that 
the bribing firm is the only qualified supplier. Fourthly, the fi-rm may pay to be 
selected as the winner. Finally, once a firm has been selected, it may bribe to 
obtain a higher price or to reduce the required quality. This chapter is primarily 
concerned with the fourth aspect. 
It is well known that corruption in government procurement contracts 
exists in both developed and developing countries, albeit at different degrees. 
Furthermore,, this type of corruption occurs in public tenders that involve both 
domestic and international firms. Most large transborder bribery allegations are 
connected to foreign government contracts in several sectors, including military 
procurement, energy, telecommunications, construction and transportation. The 
following examples illustrate the occurrence of bribery in goverm-nent 
procurement contracts, and hence the importance of developing appropriate 
tools for analysing this type of corruption. 82 
For the cumulative period from 1994 through the end of 2001, the US 
Government estimates that competition for over 460 contracts valued at over 
$210 billion may have been affected by bribery involving foreign firms. US 
finns are believed to have lost at least 115 of these contracts, worth 
approximately $35 billion, to foreign competitors offering bribes. 83 
In Paraguay, during the regime of President Alfredo Stroessner (1954- 
1989), corruption in the award of international construction contracts ranged 
82 The examples in the second and third paragraphs are taken fi7om Rose-Ackerman (1999). 
831t What the US Government can do to assist US companies with respect to transnational 
corruption", Eleanor Roberts Lewis, Chief Counsel for International Commerce, US Department 
of Commerce - American Bar Association Forum on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the 
OECD Convention, 2002. 
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from 10 to 20% [Nickson (1996)]. During the 1970s in Indonesia, two German 
firms were accused of paying bribes of 20% of the value of the construction 
contract of a steel mill to a government official [Schwarz (1994)]. A major 
corruption scandal in Singapore involved a senior official of the Public Utilities 
Board being paid by several multinational firms to reveal confidential 
information about the proposals. Five international manufacturing firms 
implicated in the scandal were blacklisted, and the government official was 
sentenced to 14 years in prison. 84 
In Germany, bribes were paid in order to win contracts worth DM 2.5 
billion for the construction of Terminal 2 of Frankfurt Airport (mainly in the 
procurement for communication electronics). According to the Frankfurt anti- 
corruption prosecutor, corruption led to an overcharge of 20 to 3 0%. 
85 In 
Belgium, US $1.9 million in bribes may have been paid to senior members of 
the Flemish Socialist Party, in connection with a defence contract. 86 In Italy, 
successful bids in public tenders were 40 to 50% lower in 1997 than in 1992 
(before the 'Mani Pulite', or Clean Hands, inquiries) [della Porta and Vannucci 
(1997)]. 
One of the most prominent cases of international bribery ever was the 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project, in which several western companies paid 
huge bribes to local managers in order to win contracts. The Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project was an US $8 billion infrastructure scheme, with five major dams, 
84tv Singapore Exposes Tip of Corruption Iceberg-Efforts to Curb Bribery in the Award of 
International Contracts are in Their Infancy", Financial Times, 15th February, 1996. 
85, 'Gen-nan Airport Corruption Probe Deepens: Five Jailed and 20 Companies under 
investigation", Financial Times, 2nd July, 1996. 
86, 'Tentacies of Defence Scandal Reaches Out for Claes", Financial Times, 19th October, 1995: 
"Belgians Seek to Arrest Dassault", Financial Times, 10th May, 1996. 
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200 kilometres of tunnels and a powerful hydroelectricity station to be 
completed by 2020. Three multinational companies (from Germany, France and 
Canada) were found guilty of bribery and fined a total of around US $3 
mi ion. 
87 
In this chapter, we adopt the terms of demand and supply of bribes. By 
demand for bribes, we denote the government official's propensity to demand a 
payoff, or bribe. We denote a firm's willingness, or propensity, to offer bribes to 
government officials as the supply of bribes. The main issue we address is the 
role of information in the supply of bribes. The types of information that we 
focus on are information on rival firms and information on the nature of the 
goverrunent official. 
Firms may not necessarily know whether a government official is 
corrupt or not. This uncertainty may occur because finns do not know the 
punishment that the official will suffer if he is caught engaged in corrupt 
dealings, or because firms do not know his moral scruples. Other justifications 
include finns trying to bribe a foreign govenunent official, or a situation of 
political instability and a high political turnover, so that the corruptibility of a 
given official is unknown. 
Firms competing for a government project may also not know each 
others' characteristics (e. g., cost and/or quality levels) with certainty. In fact, 
sometimes each firm may only have incomplete information about the identities 
of the other suppliers. More often, each finn can only observe its own cost level, 
87-Western contractors face bribery charge over Lesotho dam", Financial Times, 19th 
November, 1999; "World Bank to face fresh pressure to stamp out graft", Financial Times, 21 st 
July, 2004. 
141 
with incomplete information about the cost levels of the other firms. Firms such 
as Boeing and Airbus, which operate in industries that are very concentrated, are 
likely to have more information on each other than firms in less concentrated 
industries. Likewise, firms that produce more homogeneous products are also 
less likely to have uncertainty regarding their rivals than firms that operate in 
markets of differentiated products. 
The second issue that is addressed is the illegality of bribery. Corruption 
may be defined as the use of public office for private gains [Johnston (1996)], 
where an official entrusted with carrying out a task engages in some sort of 
malfeasance for private enrichment. The essential aspects of corruption are, 
therefore, that the bribee must necessarily be in a position of power, created 
either by market imperfections or an institutional position that grants him 
discretionary authority, and that there is an illegal or unauthorised transfer of 
money or an in-kind substitute. This illegal nature of corruption implies that 
individuals engaged in corrupt practices must be punished if they are found out. 
This fact needs to be incorporated into a model that examines firms' decisions in 
offering bribes. Indeed, as Becker (1968) stated "when other variables are held 
constant, an increase in a person's probability of conviction or punishment if 
convicted would generally decrease, perhaps substantially, perhaps negligibly, 
the number of offences he commits. " It is necessary to quantify, or at least 
qualify, how the penalty incurred by firms affects the bribes they offer in 
equilibrium. Furthermore, the interaction between the information structure of 
the firms and their punishment may have policy implications, in terms of 
determining the optimal monitoring technology and punishment. 
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This chapter considers a very simple set up in which n>2 firms 
compete to win a fixed price government procurement contract. Finns differ in 
the cost and quality at which they can carry out the project. Unlike the usual 
assumptions in the bribery literature, we do not assume that the lowest cost firm 
is also the one that can complete a project with the highest quality. Instead, we 
assume there is a menu of cost and quality (or value) combinations, which is 
given by a function that is concave in cost. The main implication of this 
assumption is that the lowest cost firm will not be the highest quality one, and, 
therefore, when there is competitive bribing, allocation efficiency will not be 
maintained. The government official who awards the contract may be either 
benevolent or corrupt. If he is honest, the firm closest to the optimal will be 
awarded the contract, whereas if he is corrupt, the finn that offers the highest 
bribe will win. 
The analysis proceeds in four main stages. First, we assume that there 
are no penalties for bribing (or attempting to bribe) a governi-nent official. 
Second, we drop the assumption of no penalties and assume instead that there is 
an auditing technology by which there is an external inspection of the firm that 
wins the contract. If the winning firm has offered a bribe, then a penalty, which 
is proportional to the bribe offered, is imposed. Third, we assume that, instead of 
a proportional fine, a fixed fine is levied on the winning firm if it is found to 
have offered a bribe. Finally, we consider a fine proportional to the firm's 
surplus. 
In each case, finns' bribing strategies are analysed in the scenarios of 
complete information, imperfect information regarding firm types, imperfect 
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information regarding the official's type, and finally, when both types of 
information asymmetries are present. We examine the extent to which the 
availability of information, and thus, transparency, can affect the incidence of 
corrupt dealings, as well as the implications for allocation efficiency. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on 
competitive bribery games that is more closely related to this research. 
International developments in the awareness of the importance of the supply 
side of bribery are presented in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 describes the main 
framework used to analyse corruption and looks at the case where there are no 
penalties. Section 3.5 examines the case where the winning firm might face 
paying a penalty proportional to its bribe, whereas Section 3.6 analyses the case 
of a fixed fine. In Section 3.7, we consider a third penalty scheme, namely, 
when the winning firm faces a fine that is proportional to its surplus. Section 3.8 
looks at the models from the perspective of foreign firms. Finally, Section 3.9 
presents some concluding remarks. 
3.2 Review of the Literature on Competitive Bribery 
This section reviews the literature on competitive bribery games that is 
more closely related to this chapter. This literature has focused solely on 
allocation efficiency - bribery has been analysed in so far as it may result in any 
loss of efficiency in comparison with competitive bidding procedures. There are 
three main aspects that have been largely ignored and thus not adequately 
studied. 
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Firstly, it is generally assumed that firms only differ in one dimension, 
namely, their cost. Firms competing for a government contract are assumed to 
be capable of carrying out the project with equal qualities, i. e., the value of the 
project to the govemment official is the same for all firms. This has obvious 
implications for allocation efficiency - because the most efficient finn is the one 
that has a greater capacity to bribe, unless there is discrimination there will 
always be allocation efficiency. In these situations corruption only detennines a 
different distribution of surplus between the firms and the official and the only 
conclusions pertain to the magnitude of the bribes. 
Secondly, there has been very little emphasis on the illegal nature of 
bribery and as such the punishment of firms that engage in bribery has been 
mostly overlooked. The existing literature either considers that unsuccessful 
bribes are refunded or that all bribes are irretrievable. It is also assumed that 
there is no form of exogenous monitoring to the process of awarding the 
contract and, therefore, firms are never punished when they engage in bribery 
with corrupt officials. Firms that offer bribes suffer a punishment only if they 
attempt to bribe an honest government official, in which case they pay a fine. 
Thirdly, although competitive bribery games have been studied under 
different types of information asymmetries, no importance has been given to the 
interaction of the information asymmetries and their role in determining the 
sizes and frequencies of the bribes. Consequently, no attempt has been made to 
model the relationship between the competition between bribers and their 
information structure. 
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Beck and Maher (1986) compare bribery to competitive bidding in the 
context of government contracts for goods and services. In their bribery model, 
firms are assumed to know the government's policy of awarding the contract to 
the firm offering to pay the largest bribe. There is an absence of penalties for 
bribery and all unsuccessful bribers get refunds. Firms are assumed to know 
their own costs,, but to have incomplete information about competitors' costs and 
profits. They show that, in equilibrium, each firm offers a bribe that represents a 
markdown from its potential gross profit. The government official is able to 
extract producers' surplus in the fonn of a bribe. Their analysis is restricted to 
symmetric games. They show that for a predetermined contract price, the 
bribery model is isomorphic to the bidding model, as the same firm wins the 
contract and the government pays the same net-of-bribes purchase price. 
Therefore, under this model, firms would be indifferent between bribery and 
bidding institutions. 
Lien (1986) uses the same framework of Beck and Maher (1986) to 
show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium that is symmetric. It is also 
shown that under an alternative model specification where all firms, whether 
successful or not, forfeit their bribes there still exists a unique Nash equilibrium 
that is symmetric. The equilibrium bribe under this specification is always lower 
than that under the assumption that all unsuccessful bribes are refunded. 
Lien (1987) analyses competitive bribery games with incomplete 
infon-nation about the nature of the potential bribee. The same basic framework 
of Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien (1986) is used, except that the govenunent 
official in charge of the awarding process may or may not be corrupt. If he is 
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corrupt, the finn that offers the highest bribe wins. whereas if he is honest., the 
lowest cost firm wins and the bribing finn must pay a penalty proportional to the 
bribe. The estimate of the probability that the official is corrupt may vary across 
firms. In the case that these estimates are equal for all firms and equal to one, 
the equilibrium will be unique and symmetric, with equal bribe functions for all 
firms [as shown in Lien (1986)]. For the general case, unless the estimates are 
equal for all firms, in which case the Nash equilibriw-n is symmetric, the 
equilibrium will be asymmetric if it exists. The Nash equilibrium only exists in 
the case in which all the bribers have similar beliefs about the nature of the 
bribee. At the same realized cost level, Firm Z will pay more bribes than Finn 1 
whenever its estimate of the probability that the official is corrupt is greater than 
that of Firm J. If Firm i changes its estimate whereas the other firms retain 
their estimates, then all the bribery functions of Firms 3 ;; -- z will change: if one 
firm believes there is a greater probability the official may be corrupt, all firms 
will bribe more and vice versa. In equilibrium every firm bribes. 
Lien (1990) investigates the possibility of allocation inefficiencies 
associated with competitive bribery games with discrimination. It is shown that 
in the presence of discrimination, inefficient allocations may be chosen by the 
corrupt official. Furthermore, the possibility of inefficient allocations increases 
when the degree of discrimination increases. Another result obtained is that if 
the firm discriminated against is low cost, the economy less frequently suffers 
allocation inefficiency through competitive bribery procedures. Clark and Riis 
(2000) consider an unfair bribery procedure between asymmetric plavers and 
find that in this case there is no parameter setting that guarantees allocation 
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efficiency, thereby being unable to unambiguously determine the effect of 
making the procedure more (or less) unfair. 
3.3 International Awareness of the Supply Side of Bribery 
In this section,, we briefly present some developments and examples 
outside academia in terms of focus on the propensity of firms to offer bribes to 
government officials, i. e., the supply of bribes. We interpret this increasing 
awareness of bribery as a further motivation for the analysis we have conducted 
on this subject. 
It is interesting to note that a bias towards exploring government 
officials' propensity to accept bribes, i. e., the demand for bribes, had 
traditionallY also been true of the news media and most international. institutions 
(whether official or non-governmental). There appeared to be a lack of balance 
in anticorruption efforts, whereby governments and international organisations 
devoted more effort and resources to exposing bribe takers rather than bribe 
givers. 
However, some action has recently been taken to attempt to reform the 
supply side of bribery. On 17 December 1997, a step was taken to curb bribe 
givers involved in international business. 88 The Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (also 
known as the Anti-Bribery Convention) was signed by representatives of the 29 
member governments of the OFCD. The Convention entered into force on 15 
88Until then, only the US had a law (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1977) that specifically made 
it a criminal offence for a company to pay bribes abroad. See Pieth (1997) for some issues 
concerning the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Lambsdorff (1998) for an empirical analysis 
of its impact. 
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February 1999 and makes it a crime to offer, promise or give a bribe to a foreign 
public official in order to obtain or retain international business deals. The 
Convention commits its now 35 signatory countries to adopt common rules to 
punish individuals and companies that engage in bribery transactions. The 
countries are also subjected to close monitoring in order to determine the 
adequacy of their implementing legislation. 
Another initiative is the "Integrity Pact" scheme launched by TI. This 
relates to individual major public procurement contracts for goods and services 
and is designed to safeguard public procurement from corruption. Each pact 
represents a single contract, or a set of contracts in a single sector. Under a TI 
Integrity Pact, all bidders for a project must publicly pledge not to use bribes in 
the contracts in question, while the host govenunent also pledges to ensure total 
transparency on behalf of its officials involved in the tendering and contract 
award processes. Whenever procurement is funded by bilateral and/or 
multilateral development agencies, these also pledge to make their best efforts to 
ensure the "cleanliness" of the procurement process. The Integrity Pact has 
already been implemented in several countries and in large-scale infrastructure 
projects, ranging from telecommunications to public transport. 
These recent actions focusing on bribe givers raise the question of 
whether they are sufficient, or indeed necessary, for combating corruption. A 
suitable framework for the decision-making process of firms that engage in 
bribery is necessary in order to evaluate the adequacy of these actions and to be 
able to design better policies. We turn now to our simple model of government 
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procurement that attempts to shed some light on the importance (or not) of 
certain types of transparencies and punishment structures. 
3.4 The Basic Model (Model A) 
A goverrument official has to choose one firm to undertake an indivisible 
proj ect. 89 A Fixed Price Contract T (gross-of-cost reimbursement transfer) is 
awarded to the winning finn, and is paid for with public funds (A >0 denotes 
the shadow premium on public funds). We assume that the government official 
may either value aggregate social welfare (SW), therefore, valuing the quality 
of the project carried out, or he may be solely interested in the amount of bribes 
(B ) that he can collect. Therefore, the government official's payoff function 
will be of the foirm: 
90 
Gi 
= aSW, + (I - ce)Bi, (3.1) 
where aCf0,11, thereby denoting whether the government official is corrupt 
0) or honest (a = 1). If the government official's type is private 
information, then firms do not know his true type. In that case, the firms assume 
that the government official is honest with probability -y, (i. e. Gi = SWj), and 
that he is corrupt with probability (I - -y), (i. e., G,. - Bj For simplicity, it is 
assumed that this belief/probability -y is common to all firms. 
"We assume that the government official always awards the project to one of the firms. 
90The government official's payoff ftinction may be expressed more generally by 
n 
G, I = aS I JI + (i - n)E 
Bk- 
. 
This formulation includes the case in which losing firms also 
k=1 
have to pay the bribe they offered. 
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There is a finite number of firms, denoted by i=1,2,..., n, that compete 
to win the government procurement contract. The firms differ in the cost and 
quality at which they can carry out the project. There is a menu of cost and 
quality (or value) combinations, which is given by the function 
V(C) - alnO, a>0, with V' >0 and V" < 0. Quality is 
increasing with cost, but at a decreasing rate. Note that, given the value function, 
what determines a firm's type is its cost. A firin's cost belongs to the interval 
T7], where C>0. If a firm can-not observe its rivals' costs, it assumes that 
they are independently drawn from a probability distribution F(Cj). A firm may 
choose to bribe the government official in an attempt to win the contract, i. e., 
each firm may offer the government official a monetary reward of Bi >0 to be 
awarded the contract. The firm (briber) is thus the "active" party, whereas the 
goveniment official is "passive". 91 
Denote a finn's gross gain by gi, that is, gi =T_Ci . 
92 The profit 
function for Firm Z is given by 93 
Bi, if Gz > Gj 
I(gj - Bj) if Gi = Gj Vi=1,..., n n, 
0 if Gz- < Gj 
Note that the government official's payoff function will depend on 
whether the firms competing for the contract are national or foreign. More 
9'ln practice, the distinction between active and passive corruption (and between extortion - 
where the public official is the active party who extorts a payoff - and bribery) means little 
because both parties must agree before corruption can occur. 
920Ccasionally, g, and T- Ci may be used interchangeably. 
93 Note that a firm's ability/capacity to bribe is given by its gross gain, that is, if g-, > g,, then 
Firm 1 can afford a higher bribe than Firm 
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specifically, it is the aggregate social welfare that differs. If there are only 
national firms competing to win the government contract, then a benevolent 
official must take into account the profits of the firms, whereas if there are only 
foreign firms, he will only consider the value of the project and the price it must 
pay. Therefore, if there are only national firms, (3.1) becomes 
Gj- =a [Vi - Ci - AT] + (1 - a)Bi, (3.2) 
and if there are only foreign firms, (3.1) becomes 
Gi =a [Vi - (1 + A)T] + (I - ce)Bi. (3.3) 
As situations where both national and foreign firms compete would 
entail assumptions about discrimination on the part of the government official 
and further complicate the analysis, we abstract from dealing with those cases in 
this chapter. For an analysis of discrimination in bribery games, see Lien (1990) 
and Clark and Riis (2000). 
We assume that first the firms announce their bribes; then, the 
government official awards the contract to one of the firms; and finally, the 
winning fin-n pays its bribe. This approach follows the lobbying literature, where 
each organized interest group confronts the govermnent with a contribution 
schedule that maps every policy vector into a campaign contribution level; the 
government then sets a policy vector and then collects from each lobby the 
contribution associated with its policy choice [Grossman and Helpman (1994), 
Bernheirn and Whinston (1986)]. 
This sequence of movements is also more intuitive than considering that 
bribers get refunds whenever their bribery attempts fail. Although refunds for 
unsuccessful bribes can be justified by assuming that, if an official receives 
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bribes from some firms without granting them the procurement contract, he 
faces great risk of being brought to the court and eventually being penalised, this 
assumption may not be suitable in some circumstances. For example, the 
unsuccessful briber's threat would not be credible as he might also be punished 
for attempted bribery. Also, due to possible future contract awarding 
opportunities and fears of revenge, the firm's threat would not be credible. 
Furthermore, as it is assumed that a firm pays the bribe after it has won, 
this chapter abstracts from the problems emphasized in Boycko, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1995) concerning slips between the bribing transaction and the actual 
delivery of the good or service involved. 
When solving the model we assume that first, the firms simultaneously 
offer a bribe and announce their cost; then, the government official chooses the 
winning firm; and finally, the official receives the payoff from the winning firm. 
We assume that the firms always truthfully announce their cost and, therefore, 
abstract from revelation problems. 
3.4.1 Complete Information 
This is a game of complete information where each player's payoff 
function is common knowledge among all the players, i. e., all the parameters are 
common knowledge. 
The cases where the government official is corrupt and those in which he 
is not corrupt are considered. 
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The government official is not corrupt ((x = 1) 
When ce = 1, the goverment official only values social welfare and, 
therefore, derives no benefit from bribes. His objective function becomes 
Gi = SWi. 
Result 1 When there is complete information and the government official 
is honest: 
(i) Firms offer zero bribes; 
(ii) The official awards the contract to the optimalfirm (or the firm closest to 
it), which is given by Cý = 2a, if only nationalfirms compete, or Cý = C, 
if onlyforeign firms compete. 
The equilibrium is welfare-optimal. 
Proot (i) If firms know with certainty that the official is not corrupt, it is 
useless offering bribes. 
(ii) The equilibrium quality level is determined straightforwardly by 
maximizing the government official's objective function. The resulting 
equilibrium cost level is the one that equalizes the marginal value and the 
marginal cost. 
If there are only national firms, GN-- Vi - Ci - AT, so 
MqxGj = V, - Ci -AT = aInC, 2 - C, -AT yields 
L-' =0 C, 6c, 
2a. 
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If the official has to choose between foreign fin-ns, his objective function 
becomes G- occurs at C* - C. F Vi - (I + A)T. The maximum of 
GF 
F 
Notice that Q< CP. m NF 
Example Consider a simple example where a= 10; C=1 and ýý = 50. 
T C, so g=0 and g -- 49. In this case, Q- 20 and Cý - 50. The 
figure below illustrates the value function. 
Fi gure 3.1: V(C) and V(C) -C 
V, V-C 
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The government official is corrupt (a = 
Result A. 1 When the government official is known to be corrupt, the firm 
that offers the highest bribe wins the contract. The bribe function for Firm Z 
94 
is given 
Bi 
gj if gi > gj 
I 
VZ = 11 ... ,n 
(3.4) 
gi if gj < gj 
ProoL If Finn Z is the one with the highest gross gain, then it only needs to 
offer a bribe equal to the second-highest gross gain plus a little more (E) to 
guarantee that it wins the contract. Finn i wants to choose E as close as 
possible to (but different from) zero. As such an E does not exist, the 
equilibrium is defined as the limit. So Firm z offers gj, J* ;, -- i. It does not 
want to increase its bribe, as it would not affect its chances of winning 
(already one) and would only serve to decrease its expected payoff. It does 
not want to decrease its bribe, as this would decrease its chances of winning. 
The remaining j2 firms with gj < gi offer bribes equal to their gross 
gain - they do not want to increase their bribes as they would have a negative 
expected payoff, and they are indifferent between offering gj and anything 
less. m 
94 Actually, if g, > gj, Finn i offers a bribe of gj + -c- to make sure it wins the contract. Finn 
,I. wants to choose E as close as possible to (but different 
firom) zero. As such an E does not 
exist, the equilibrium is defined as the limit. 
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In this case, the firm with the highest gross gain, g, or, equivalently, 
lowest cost, Ci, wins. The only situation in which there is no welfare loss is the 
one where the lowest-cost firm is the one with C*. As long as there exists at 
least one firm with a cost level lower than C*, the equilibrium is not welfare- 
optimal. This result contrasts to the one obtained in the models commonly used 
when either (i) firms only compete in cost and the value of the project is 
independent of the firm chosen to carry it out, or (ii) firms compete in cost and 
quality, but the lowest-cost firm is also the highest quality. In those cases, if in a 
bribery game there is competitive bidding by private firms for a government 
procurement contract, and the corrupt official awards the contract to the highest 
bidder in bribes, then allocation efficiency is maintained, as only the lower-cost 
firm can afford the largest bribe. Our result thus marks a major departure from 
such papers [Beck and Maher (1986), Lien (1986,1987,1990)]. Bribery no 
longer signifies a mere transfer from firms to government official, but instead 
entails an allocation inefficiency. 
3.4.2 Firms' Types are Private Information 
The government official is not corrupt (a = 1) 
In this case, firms know that the government official is not corrupt, but 
don't know their rivals' types. Firms will not offer a bribe. We assume that firms 
always truthfully announce their true cost level. Without this assumption, it is 
not always true that firms truthfully announce their cost levels. If a firm 
truthfully announces its cost. its probability of winning is given by 
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Pr (I C1 - C* <I Cj - C* 1), Vj ;; -- Z. If all firms are known to be truthful, 
there is a very high incentive for one firm to deviate and pretend to be the 
optimal one. The deviating firm will win the contract with probability one (or, at 
worst, it will be as equally likely to win as the true optimal firm, if it exists), 
giving it a higher expected profit than if it were to be honest. 95 
However,, if the other firms believe that one firm will deviate they too 
will deviate and claim to be the optimal firm. In this case, there are n firms 
claiming to be the optimal one, and they will have an equal probability (I / n) of 
winning. It can be shown that firms only prefer to tell the truth if they are 
sufficiently close to the optimal cost level. In our example, if there are two firms 
and cost levels are uniformly distributed on [C, C], then firms will only prefer to 
*- C* Z7-c be truthful if their cost level belongs to the interval C 4+ ý). In 4 
this case, firms have a higher expected profit from telling the truth than from 
96 
pretending to have the optimal cost level. Of course, any one firm that deviated 
and lied would win and be awarded the government contract. 
The assumption that firms truthfully announce their cost level seems 
reasonable. The honest government official may be suspicious that all firms 
claim to have the optimal cost level. He will verify the actual quality, and, 
therefore, cost,, when the project is completed. If we assume that a firm's cost 
level must incorporate a contingency for any unexpected increases (or 
95Naturally, in the case of the optimal firm, it would be indifferent between being truthful or not. 
96However, this is only true if all firms have cost levels belonging to this interval. If one firm 
does not belong, then it prefers to lie. Furthermore, finns do not know their rivals' type, and 
having a cost level inside the interval does not guarantee that this is also true of the other firms. 
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decreases) in cost, it becomes difficult for the winning firm to argue that it 
suffered an unexpected shock and that consequently its cost is different to the 
one it announced. 
The government official is corrupt (a = 0) 
When a=0, Gi = B,. Now the firms decide how much they will offer 
as a bribe. The bribe a firm offers is going to depend on its cost, or, 
equivalently, on its gross gain, i. e., the difference between the fixed transfer T 
it receives from the government official if it wins the project, and the cost it 
incurs. 
Result A. 2 When firm types are private information and the government 
official is known to be corrupt, Firm Z's equilibrium bribing strategy is 
9 
gi [F(s) ]n-I ds 
. B(gi) = gi --i=, n. (3.5) [ F(gi) ]n II 
Proot Consider the decision of Firm i, whose gross gain if it wins the project 
is g,. Firm Z conjectures that the other finns are following a decision rule 
given by a bribing function B: that is, it predicts that any other Firm 3 will 
bid an amount B(gj) if its gross gain is gj (although Finn Z does not know 
gj). We assume that B is an increasing function in gross gain. What is Firm 
'I .Is best bribe? If it offers a bribe of bi and wins, its net gain is gi - b, . The 
probability of winning with a bribe bi is the probabilit-N, that all n-I of the 
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other finns have a gross gain gj such that B(gj) < bi. This probability is 
[F(B-l(bi ))]n-1 
. 
97,98 
Firm i chooses its bribe bi to maximize its expected net gain: 
? Tj -- (gi - bi )[ F(B- 
1 (b i ))]n-1. (3.6) 
Therefore, Firm Z chooses bi such that 67Tj / 6bi -0. By differentiating 7i 
with respect to bi , we obtain 
99 
d7ri 
- 
67ri 
+ 
67ri dbi 
_ 
67rz 
(3.7) 
dgi 6gi 6bi dgz- 6gi 
By differentiating (3.6), an optimally chosen bribe must satisfy 
d7ri &Ts- 
= [F(B-1 (bi 
))]n-l (3.8) 
dgi 6gi 
We now impose the Nash requirement that the conjectured decision rules 
are consistent with optimizing behaviour by the other firms. Together with an 
assumption of symmetry (i. e., any two bidders with the same gross gain will 
submit the same bid), this implies that Firm Z's optimal bribe bi , satisfying 
(3.8), must be the bribe implied by the decision rule B, that is, at a Nash 
Equilibrium, bi =B (gi ). Substituting this condition into (3.8), we obtain an 
equation defining Firm i's expected net gain at a Nash Equilibrium: 
d7ri 
F (gi 
dgi 
(3.9) 
97 From the point of view of the winning firm, the other firm's gross gain is an independent draw 
from a probability distribution F- 
98 PrIb, > B(gj)j = PrfB-l(b, ) > B-'B(gj)l = PrIB-l(b, ) > gjj = 
[F(B-l(bi n-1 
99 Equation (3.7) is the Envelope Theorem. 
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At a Nash Equilibrium, all n firms must be maximizing simultaneously, 
so that (3.9) must hold for all firms i=n. We solve the differential 
equation (3.9) for 7ri by integrating (using the boundary condition that if a 
firm has the lowest possible gross gain then it has a net gain of zero, implying 
B (q) =q=T- Zý). Using the definition of 7ri (3.6) and the Nash 
condition bi =B (gi ) we obtain each firm's decision rule: 
B(g gf 
F(s) ]n-l ds 
I,... , n. (3.5) F(gi) 
m 
The bribe function is increasing in gross gain, gi, as was assumed. The 
second term on the right-hand side of (3.5) indicates how much the firm 
decreases the bribe it offers in relation to its full capacity to pay (that is, its gross 
* th gain). In particular, we can see that the Z firm's expected bribe is effectively 
bounded by the expected gross profit of the second lowest cost finn. 100 Another 
property exhibited by (3.5) is that the expected bribe paid to the govenunent 
official is a non-decreasing function of the number of firms, n. Increased 
competition among firms affects the equilibrium bribe by increasing the 
probability of including the highest gain (lowest cost) firms and by inducing 
firms to become more aggressive. 
100To see why, notice that the expression for Firm i's bribe can be re-written as 
B(g, )F(g, (n - 1)g fg's - F(S)n-2 f (s)ds. The left-hand side is the expected value 
of the bribe paid by the i 'h firm, while the right-hand side is the expected gross profit of the finn 
offering the second largest bribe (given that the 1 'h firm offers the largest bribe). 
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If cost levels are uniformly distributed on [C, C], then the gross gains, 
are also uniformly distributed on [g, g] . 
101,102 The bribe function becomes 
B(gz) nI gi +1g. 
n n- 
The following two figures show both the gross gain, gi, and the bribe 
function 7' (g + for the case where n=2. Two cases are illustrated in 27 
Figure 3.3 - one where T=C, i. e., g=0 (T 50), and another where 
T>C, i. e., g>0 (T = 75; C = 50). 
Figure 3.2: Bribe function 
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'O'This follows from a simple change of variable from C., to T, - C, [Robinson (1985)]. 
T- 102 Note that T-T.; and - 
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Figure 3.3: Bribe functions for different values of T 
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The bribe ftinction indicates that the winning firm will always be the one 
with the greater gross gain, or, equivalently, the one with the lowest cost. As in 
the complete information case, the only situation in which there is no welfare 
loss is the one where the lowest-cost firm is the one with C*. As long as there 
exists at least one firm with a cost level lower than C*, the equilibrium is not 
\velfare-optimal. Once again, this result contrasts to the one obtained when the 
value of the project is the same regardless of a firm's cost. In that case, the 
lowest cost finn will offer the highest bribe and, therefore, there is no loss of 
allocative efficiency. 
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3.4.3 Government Official's Type is Private Information 
When the firms don't know whether or not the government official is 
corrupt, but do know the types, or cost levels, of their rivals, they also know 
their gross gain, and thus their capacity to bribe. 
Result A. 3 When the government official's type is private information, Firm 
.r zs equilibrium bribing strategy is the same as in the case of complete 
information with a corrupt officiaL 
ProoL As in this simplest model there is no punishment for bribery and firms' 
types are common knowledge, if a firm offers a bribe to an honest 
govermnent official it will not be penalised. Therefore, a finn has the 
incentives to act as if the official is corrupt. m 
In sum, when firms incur no punishment for bribery (attempted or 
actual), having infonnation about the government official's corruptibility does 
not change their equilibrium bribes. 
3.4.4 Two Information Asymmetries 
Result A. 4 When the two information asymmetries are present, firms offer 
the same bribes as when only firm types are private information and the 
government official is knoivn to be corrupt. 
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Proot In this case, both the govenunent official type and the firms' types are 
private information. When deciding what bribe to offer, Firm Z maximizes its 
expected profit, given by 
Pr (winning Ia= 1) + (I - -y) rl'i=o Pr (winning Ia= 0). (3.10) z 
This problem is solved in the same way as in the case of only one 
information asymmetry (fin-ns' types as private information), except that now 
we must calculate the probability of Firm Z winning the contract when the 
government official is not corrupt. When the govenunent official is honest he 
will want to award the contract to the firm with the optimal cost level, C*, 
or, if there is no such firm, to the one that has the cost level closest to C*. 
That is, the probability of winning with cost Ci is the probability that all 
n- 1 of the other firms have cost Ci such that I C, - C* I<I Cj - C* 13 
vi : 7, -- z (or altematively, that I gi - g* I<I gj -g*1 9 Vj :; ý-- i ). Thi s 
n-1 
probability is given by [I-F (g* +I gi - g* 1) +F (g* -I gi - g* 1) ]. By 
maximizing (3.10) we obtain each firm's decision rule: 
B(gj) = gi - 
f gi [F(S) n- IdS 
ýi=II..., 
which is exactly the same as the one obtained when only firm types were 
private infonnation. m 
From the analysis of the basic model, we are able to draw the following 
conclusions: 
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(a) When the government official is corrupt, the economy will always suffer 
from welfare inefficiency; ' 03 
(b) When the government official is known to be corrupt, uncertainty regarding 
firms' costs leads to lower bribes. However, there is still welfare inefficiency; 
(c) The results for when the goverm-nent official's type is private inforination are 
exactly the same as when the official is known to be corrupt; 
(d) When firms are not punished for bribery (attempted or actual), the 
availability of information regarding the government official or rival firms does 
not affect welfare optimality. Transparency does not ensure welfare efficiency. 
It is pointless to design policies targeting one or the other type of information 
flow. The only measure that can affect welfare efficiency and also lower the 
levels of bribes is not to allow the lower cost firms to compete for the 
government contract. This would involve a pre-qualification of the bidders, 
which in turn could give rise to another type of bribery, that is, firms making 
payments so that they are included in the pre-qualifying list; 
(e) In terms of the magnitude of the bribes, if the firm types are private 
information, then it is irrelevant whether or not the government official is known 
to be corrupt - the bribe levels are the same in either case. This 
is also the case 
103 Except in the special case where the lowest-cost firm is the one with C* (this is true 
regardless of firms knowing their rivals'types). 
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when firm types are known. Bribes are lower when there is uncertainty 
regarding rival firms. It seems that transparency regarding firm types increases 
the incidence of bribes. This would imply that when there is no punishment for 
bribery, firms operating in less concentrated markets or firms in markets with 
differentiated products tend to bribe less. 
These conclusions suggest that there should exist some form of 
punishment for firms that offer bribes. In the following sections, we extend the 
basic model in order to incorporate the possibility of penalties for corrupt firms. 
Three different types of penalties are examined, namely, a fine proportional to 
the bribe, a fixed fine and a fine proportional to gross gain. 
3.5 Fine Proportional to a Firm's Bribe (Model B) 
In order to incorporate into the model the notion of illegality that is 
associated with bribery and corruption, we assume there is an auditing 
technology. With probability 7r there is an external inspection to the winning 
finn. If the winning firm is found to have offered a bribe, a fine is administered 
with probability one. The fine (f ) will be a proportion of the bribe the firm is 
offering the goverranent official, f= ýoB, -. Therefore, the expected value of the 
104 fine will be E[f(Bi)] =7rýoBj . 
It is assumed that the probability of 
inspection, 7r, and the proportion of the bribe that constitutes the fine, 4-. are 
both common knowledge. Therefore, the possibility of inspection and the fine 
1041 f we assume that punishment is only enforced with some probability P, then the expected 
value of the fine becomes E[f (B, )]=T, p;, B, . Although this 
ftirther assumption would make 
the analysis more realistic, it would not significantly affect the results. 
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levied on fin-ns that bribe government officials reflect the punishment incurred 
by the firms that engage in illicit activities. It is not costless for the firm to bribe, 
or even to attempt to bribe, government officials, and the punishment that they 
incur will be proportional to the bribe that they offer. The auditing technology 
assumes there is an external inspection of the firm that wins the contract. 
The probability 7r can be thought of as a measure of the effectiveness of 
the legal system, whereas ýo measures the stance against actual (and attempted) 
bribery, so that a higher value of ýo makes the purchase of influence more costly 
to the firms. Note that ýo > 0. For example, in the US, the federal law allows a 
briber to be penalized an amount equal to four times the bribe. ' 05 
Note that the expected penalty the government official incurs by 
engaging in corrupt activities is not explicitly modelled. As this chapter is 
primarily interested in the private sector's willingness to offer bribes, there is a 
focus on the punishment to the firms (the bribers). 106 The punishment of the 
government official (the bribee) can be thus interpreted as implicit - the official's 
decision to be corrupt has already taken into account this expected penalty. 
When there is uncertainty as to the government official's corruptibility, the firms 
105US Code, vol. 18, sec. 20 1, par. (e), 1962 provides that the penalty for 'corrupt giving' shall be 
a fine of 'not more than $20,000 or three times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value, 
whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than fifteen years, or both... ' Moreover, US 
Code, vol. 18, sec. 3612.1949, provides that if the bribe itself can be recovered, it shall be 
deposited in the registry of the court. This makes a fine of up tofour times the bribe. 
106 See Rose-Ackerman (1975) for an example -where the expected penalties for both the 
government official and the firms are explicitly considered. 
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incorporate the punishment of the bribee in their beliefs (a greater penalty for 
the official would imply a higher 07 
It is very important to stress that we are not arguing that punishing 
bribers is more important, or indeed more effective, than punishing bribees. If 
corrupt government officials incur punishments such that they are completely 
deterred from corruption, then there is clearly no need for any further penalty 
schemes for firms, as the crime will not occur if the law can deter at least one of 
the parties. Anti-corruption laws and initiatives have typically focused on 
officials, yet, as Peter Eigen, the chairman of Transparency International, stated, 
"there is no end in sight to the misuse of power by those in public office and 
corruption levels are perceived to be as high as ever in both developed and 
developing worlds. " 
Corruption is still a rampant problem, and concentrating anti-corruption 
efforts on the punishment of officials has clearly not been enough. Therefore, 
given that targeting the demand for bribes has not been successful in eliminating 
bribery, tackling the supply side of bribery becomes relevant. A further 
justification for concentrating on the punishment of firms is the case where third 
parties, such as the World Bank, are interested in reducing corruption as part of 
their mandate, but have limited instruments for punishing officials within the 
affected countries. In this case, tackling the supply side of bribery becomes their 
only option, even if it may only be second-best. 
107 Typically, in the literature bribe-givers are punished less severely than bribe-takers. For an 
example where bribers suffer a greater punishment, albeit in a different context than that of this 
study, see Mookherjee and Prig (1995). 
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The payoff functions for Finn Z, when the government official is corrupt 
and when he is not corrupt, are (respectively) defined as follows: 
gi + irýo)B, 
1- ( gi (I + 7rV)Bi n 
0 
and 
gi -7yBi 
rl iI( gi -7yBj) n 
0 
if Gi > Gj 
if Gi = Gj 
if Gi < Gj 
if Gi > Gj 
if Gi = Gj 
if Gz < Gj 
i=1,..., n ,i 4- 
i 
i= 1'..., n ,i#i. 
3.5.1 Complete Information 
Result B. 1 When the government official is known to be corrupt, and the 
winningfirm mayface afine proportional to its bribe, the firm that offers the 
highest bribe wins the contract. The bribe function for Firm Z is given by'08 
Bi 1+ 
1 
7T ýO 
gi if gi > gj 
Vi = 11 n, j' 
-1- gi if gi -< gi 
T+ 
77 
The difference between this model and the basic model is thatfirms have to 
take into account the fine that they have to pay if there is an inspection and 
they are finedfor bribery. 
108 Actually, if 9, > g., , Firm i offers a 
bribe of 1+1, r,, ý, gj 
+E to make sure it wins the contract. 
Firm i wants to choose E as close as possible to (but different from) zero. As such an E does 
not exist, the equilibrium is defined as the limit. 
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ProoL The equilibrium strategy is derived using the same approach as that in 
Result A. 1. m 
The bribe ftinction in this model is a fraction 1 of the one in the basic 1+7rýp 
model (1< 1). Once again, the firm with the highest gross gain, gi, or, 1+7rýO 
equivalently, lowest cost, Ci, wins. As long as there exists at least one firm with 
cost lower than C*, the equilibrium is not welfare-optimal. 
Note that : F1, is smaller than one, but greater than zero. For example, if 1+7ý0 
both the probability of an external inspection and the fine as a proportion of the 
bribe offered to the govermnent official are equal to one, a firm will still 
continue to offer a positive bribe (in particular, it would offer a bribe equal to 
half of what it would offer in the absence of a fine). Taking the US federal law 
as a further example, then the greatest reduction in the bribes offered to the 
government official that this penalty scheme can achieve, if there is an 
I. nspection with certainty, is 80%. 109 This does not appear to be the best way of 
eliminating or drastically reducing firms' incentives to offer bribes. We shall see 
in the next sections that having either a fixed fine or a fine proportional to gross 
gain will prove to be more effective in deterring firms from offering bribes. 
11 
'09 Note that if , T= I and ý9=4, then -=-=20%. 1+ ; 7ý0 5 
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3.5.2 Firms' Types are Private Information 
Result B. 2 When firm types are private information, the government official 
is known to be corrupt, and the winning firm may face a fine proportional to 
its bribe, the bribe function for Firm , is a ftaction of the one in the 1+ýýO 
basic model, that is, 
B gi 
f g'[ F(s) ]'-' ds 
11 ... , n. (3.12) + 7T- ýO F(gi) 
Proof The equilibrium strategy is derived using the same approach as that in 
Result A. 2. m 
In the cases reviewed so far, the only implication of the possibility of a 
firm being punished for bribery is to reduce its bribes by an amount proportional 
to the probability of inspection (T ) and the size of the fine (ýo ); the welfare 
imPlications are not altered. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the bribes for the case where the costs are 
uni formly di stributed, gi -U[0,49 ], n-2,7r -- 0.1 and V=2. 
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Figure 3.4: Bribe function with a fine proportional to the bribe 
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3.5.3 Government Official's Type is Private Information 
When the government official's type is private information, the winning 
firin must take into account the fact that if it offers a bribe it will have to pay a 
fine proportional to that bribe in the event of an external inspection, regardless 
of the official being corrupt. Therefore, the result of the basic model, where 
finns offered the same bribes when the government official's type was unknown 
as when there was complete information, does not (always) hold in this model 
with punishment. 
Result B. 3 When the government official's type is private information, and 
the winningfirm may. face afine proportional to its bribe: 
(i) ff thefirm closest to the optimal has no chances of outbribing all its rivals 
e., because it has a lower gross gain), then it will offer a zero bribe; 
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(ii) If it can outbribe all its rivals and -y is below a critical level, 
C (91-92)(1+7rýO) 
ýYB(3) 
gl 
(1+7rA-h , then firms will offer the same bribes as in the case of 
complete information; for -y above the critical level, then the firm closest to 
the optimal will offer a zero bribe. 
Proot See Appendix 3. A. m 
Unlike in the case of the basic model, uncertainty regarding the 
corruptibility of the government official may potentially reduce bribe payments. 
3.5.4 Two Information Asymmetries 
Result BA When the two information asymmetries are present, and the 
winningfirm mayface afine proportional to its bribe, afirm's bribe. 
(i) Is decreasing in the probability -y that the government official is honest; 
(ii) Depends on its position in relation to the optimal-costfirm. 
If cost levels are uniformly distributed on and, therefore, the gross 
gains, gi, are also uniformly distributed on the bribefunctions are: 
If gi =g 
b(g. ) -- 
0- -) )(gl - g) n-1 
[(n 
- I)gi +- g] (3.13) 
ným,: )(g - g) 
n-1 +n ý/)(l +7r(fý ) (gi - g), -, I 
2. if g> g*, 
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b(gz) = 
(i 
- -Y)(91 - 9) 
n-1 [(n 
- I)gz + g] 
n^ý7rýo (-g -g+ 2g* - gi 
) n-1 +n+ 7r" -) (g- _ g)n-I 1ý1 I- 
(3.14) 
If gi < g* and gi > 2g* 
b(gi) 
-y ) (gi - g)'-' (n gi +, g] 
wy7rýp (9 -g- 2g* +i 
)n-1 +n -y) (I + 7ýo)(gj 
(3.15) 
4. 
b(gi) 
If gi < g* and gi 2g* -ý t 91 
++ g) (gi - g) 
n-2+ (1 
7rýo - -y)(n(1 - -fFýo) -yzýo - 1)(n(1 - -(Fýo) + 
(g 
- g) I+np-ý 
(3.16) 
Due to the specifications of the model, if the firm offers a bribe and gets 
caught, the punishment imposed is independent of the awarding procedure. 
Therefore, whenever there is a positive probability that the official may be 
corrupt and the punishment is proportional to the bribe, it is always optimal for 
each fin-n to bribe. 
ProoE See Appendix 3. B. m 
From (3.13). (3-14). (3.15) and (3.16), we can see that when both the 
government official's and fin-ns'types are private information, the bribe function 
is increasing in gross gain, decreasing in both the probability of an external 
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inspection to the winning finn, -F , and the proportion of the 
bribe levied as a 
fine, ýo. Furthermore,, as would be expected, the bribe function is decreasing in 
the probability -y that the govemment official is honest. 
Let us consider that g, -U[ 01 49 ], n=2,7T=O. l and ýo=2. The 
figure below shows how the bribe functions for four specific values of C, 
(namely, 10,20,30 and 40) vary with the probability of a government official 
being honest (-y ). 
Figure 3.5: Bribe functions with a proportional fine and two information 
asymmetries 
B(g) 
18 
16 
14 
12 
10 - 
8- 
6 
4 
2 
0 
- C<C* (10) 
-C=C* (20) 
- C>C* & C<39 (30) 
---- C>C* & C>39 (40) 
From the analysis of the model with a penalty proportional to the bribe 
offered, we are able to draw the following conclusions: 
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(a) As in the basic model, when the government official is corrupt, the economy 
will always suffer from allocation inefficiency (unless the lowest-cost firm is the 
optimal one); 
(b) Bribes are smaller in size compared to the basic model; 
(c) Even in the case of complete information, by choosing appropriate values for 
the parameters 7r and ýo, bribes can, in principle, become a small percentage of 
the bribes in the basic model. However, for the penalty to be effective in 
reducing the bribes, both the probability of an inspection and the proportion of 
the bribe paid as a fine have to assume high values. If we assume ýp =4 
(maximum pennitted by US federal law), then if 7r is very small, the total effect 
on the bribe is not large. Similarly, if 7 is large, but ýo is small, the total effect 
is not large. It is important to note that it will never be possible to reduce the 
equilibrium bribe to zero using this penalty scheme; 
(d) As in the basic model, when the government official is known to be corrupt, 
uncertainty regarding firms' costs leads to lower bribes; 
(e) Unlike the basic model, the results for when the government official's type is 
private information are not always the same as when the official is known to be 
corrupt. In particular, if the firm closest to the optimal has no chances of 
outbribing all its rivals, then it will offer a zero bribe. If it can outbribe all its 
bry C B(3) B(3) 0 
rivals and is below a critical level 
6"c 
>0 and < 6(91-92) 67r,: 
)I 
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then firms will offer the same bribes as in the case of complete information; for 
-Y C fer a zero bribe; . then the firm closest to the optimal will of 
(f) Bribes are smallest in size when information about both the types of the firms 
and the government official is private. This would imply that in the presence of 
proportional fines, when operating in less concentrated markets or in markets 
with differentiated products and in situations of unknown corruptibility of 
officials, firms tend to bribe less than in any other circumstance. 
3.6 Fixed Fine (Model 
In this section,, we introduce another type of punishment for a firm that 
bribes (or attempts to bribe) a government official. The motivation for including 
a fixed fine is twofold. Firstly, as seen in the previous section, a fine 
proportional to the bribe offered by a firm is not sufficient to deter bribery. This 
is particularly relevant, as in this chapter we are concerned not only with the role 
of information and uncertainty in fostering or deterring bribery, but also with 
ways to change the penalty structures in order to reduce incentives for bribery. 
Therefore, we are interested in examining alternative forms of Punishment that 
may prove more effective in deterring bribery. 
Secondly, we are interested in examining the World Bank's blacklisting 
policy for firms that offer bribes to goverrunent officials in govenunent 
procurement contracts. We shall see that, even in a static one-period context, 
this policy is effective in deterring bribery. By adequately selecting the size of 
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the fixed fine, this form of punishment can be equivalent to a firm being 
blacklisted from government contracts. 
With probability 7 there is an external inspection of the firm that wins 
the government contract. If the winning firm is found to have offered a strictly 
positive bribe, ' 10 a fine (f ) is administered with probability one. In contrast to 
the previous section, this fine will be fixed, and shall be denoted by M, so that 
M. Therefore, the expected value of the fine will be E (f )= 7FM. 
The payoff functions for Firm Z when the government official is corrupt 
and when he is not corrupt are (respectively) defined as follows: 
gi - Bi -7TM 
n., 
-L(gi - Bi - 7rM) n 
0 
if Gi > Gj 
if Gi = G, 
if Gi < Gj 
and 
gi - 7FM 
rli LO, 
>O =' -nI- 
(gi 
- 7[M) 
0 
i= 1'..., n ,i 4-- 
i 
if Gi > Gj 
if Gi = Gj Vi=1,..., n 
if Gz- < Gj 
9z 
n -9i 
0 
if Gi > Gj 
if Gi = GjjVi 
if Gi < Gj 
"Olf a firm does not know whether the government official is corrupt or not and offers a strictly 
positive bribe, then even if the official turns out to be honest and the firm does not pay the bribe, 
it will still have to pay the fine if there is an inspection. 
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3.6.1 Complete Information 
Result CA When the government official is known to be corrupt, and the 
winningfirm mayface afixedfine, thefirm that offers the highest bribe wins 
the contract. The bribe function for Firm i is given by 111 
g, - 7FM if gi > gj and g, > 7rM 
Bi gi - 7rM if gi < gj and gi > 7rM Vi n 
0 if < 7Tm 9z 
(3.17) 
ProoL The equilibrium strategy is derived using the same approach as that in 
Results A. I and B. I. but in this case a finn's decision of the bribe to offer is 
the solution to the problem Max HT T- Ci - Bi - 7rM. m Bi 
Figure 3.6 illustrates the case where gi -U[0,49 ], n=2, and the 
expected value of the fine is 5. 
"'Actually, if g, > g,, Firm i offers a bribe of gj -7rM +E to make sure it wins the 
contract. Firm I wants to chooseE as close as possible (but different fi7om) zero. As such an 
c- does not exist, the equilibrium is defined as the limit. 
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Figure 3.6: Bribe function with a fixed fine (complete information) 
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We observe that,, unlike the case of the proportional fine, it is now 
possible to select a fixed fine such that no firm will want to offer a strictly 
positive bribe. If the fixed fine is such that its expected value is greater than the 
gross gain g, of the firm with the smallest cost, i. e., 7rM >T-C, then all 
finns will want to offer a zero bribe,, even though the government official is 
known to be corrupt. This is quite a powerful result, as it shows how such a 
simple punishment can be effective in deterring any incentive for a firm to offer 
a bribe in order to win a government contract. Moreover, it also shows how a 
penalty may appear to be fighting corruption without actually doing so. That is, 
if a government wants to appear to be taking measures against bribery by firms, 
it may impose a fixed fine whose expected value is low. This effectively 
amounts to "truncating" the distribution of the bribes, by removing the lowest 
bribes, while maintaining the higher bribes. By setting a low fixed fine only the t-- 
firrns with a low gross gain will offer zero bribes; but these firms are the losing 
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ones anyway, so the govemment appears to be taking action against bribery, 
without actually doing so. 
As long as the expected value of the fine is sufficiently small, i. e., such 
that some of the firms offer strictly positive bribes, then, as in the case of the 
basic model with no punishment and the model with a proportional fine, the firm 
with the highest gross gain, or equivalently, lowest cost wins. The equilibrium is 
only welfare-optimal if the lowest-cost firm is C*. 
3.6.2 Firms' Types are Private Information 
Result C. 2 When firm types are private information, the government official 
is known to be corrupt, and the winningfirm mayface afixedfine, the bribe 
funciionfor Firm Z is given by 
j g[F(s)]'-lds 
- 7TM if A> 7M 9z F(g, )ln-1 
A 
0 if A< 7M 
= 1,..., n. 
(3.18) 
ProoL The equilibrium strategy is derived using the same approach as that in 
Results A. 2 and B. 2. m 
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Note that, as was the case in the two previous models, bribes are lower 
when this type of information asymmetry is present. Furthermore. in this case a 
given fixed fine will deter more firms from bribing than in the case of complete 
information. 
3.6.3 Government Official's Type is Private Information 
When the govenunent official's type is private information, if the 
winning firm offers a bribe it will have to pay the fixed fine in the event of an 
inspection, independently of the government official being corrupt or not. This 
case is analogous to that of the proportional fine. 
Result C. 3 When the government official's type is private information, and 
the winningfirm mayface afixedfine: 
(i) If thefirm closest to the optimal has no chances of outbribing all its rivals 
(i. e., because it has a lower gross gain), then it will offer a zero bribe; 
(ii) If it can outbribe all its rivals and ý, is below a critical level, 112 
C 91-92 
, then firms will offer the same 
bribes as in the case of 'YC(3) 7rM+91-92 
complete information; for -y above the critical level, then the firm closest to 
the optimal will offer a zero bribe. 
Proof. See Appendix 3. C. 0 
"2 The critical level of -,, in this model xý-ith a fixed fine is different to the one in the model with 
a proportional fine. 
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3.6.4 Two Information Asymmetries 
Result CA When the two information asymmetries are present, and the 
winningfirm mayface afixedfine: 
(i) If a firm offers a bribe, it will offer the same as when only firm types are 
private information and the government official is known to be corrupt; 
(ii) A firm will bribe if its belief that the official is honest, ý, is below a 
critical value, which depends on its position in relation to the optimal-cost 
firm: 
(iii) Firm i 's bribefunction is given by 
fF ds 
gi 7FM 
A 
B(gi) = 
0 
i=1...., n 
(3.19) 
where 
C 
ýC(4) 
f 'q[ F(s) ]n-lds 
701+9 
f q[F(s)]"-lds 
if A> 7rM and < -ýý C(4) 
if A <7rM or A> 7rM and -yý C(4) 
ýi 
f 191 [F (s) ]'- I (Is 
7r. 11[1-F(g')+F(g-)]"-'+, 
gt*[F(s)j'-lds 
ýq 
f 
7rAfF(9)"-1+9 
f 
if gi = g* 
if gi > g* or (gi < g* and gi > 2g* -9 
if gi < g* and g, < 2g* - 
Proof. When both the government official's and firms' types are private 
information, Firm i. must decide whether to offer a bribe, and if so, how 
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much the bribe will be. To ascertain a firm's equilibrium bribe, first we 
maximize its expected profit, given that it offers a strictly positive bribe, 
which is given by (3.10). Thus, the expected payoff to Firm Z from offering a 
bribe b(wi) is given by 
-y ( gi - 7rM)[I - F(g') + F(g-)] n-1 + (I - -y) (gi - 7M - b(wi)) F(wi)'-' 
(3.20) 
We maximize (3.20) with respect to wi. In equilibrium, the derivative of this 
expected payoff with respect to w, should equal 0 when w, equals gi. We 
obtain the first order differential equation, 
b'(gi) + b(gi)(n - 1) 
F'(gi 
-7rM) (n - 1) F(gi) F (gi 
which we solve to obtain the following bribe function for Firm Z 
gi 
f g'[F(s)]"ds 
-7rm 
ifA > 7rM 
[F(gi)]"l 
B(gi) n. A 
0 ifA < 7rM 
(3.21) 
We must then proceed to check under what circumstances Firm Z might 
prefer to offer a zero bribe, that is, for what values of -y a firm will not want 
to bribe. To do this, we compare a firm's expected profit if it offers a bribe 
[E (rIj I B>O )]with its expected profit when it does not bribe [E (rli I B=O )l - 
This procedure is conducted for the four possible positions in which a firm 
may be in relation to the optimal-cost firm. For example, when 
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B=O) > E(rIj I B>O) implies , g, >-I gj --, 7TM 
+ (1 - -, 
) g'[ F(s) 1`1 ds 
9fN 
which in turn implies -ý must be greater than or equal to -1f 
97 
[F(s)]'-lds 
7rM+, 
fg[F(s) I'-' ds 
for Firm i prefer not to bribe. We thus obtain the bribe function (3.19). m 
Let us consider once again the example in Section 3.4.1 with 
U[0,49 and n=2. The expressions for 'ýC(4) become c 
2 
9? 
2 2-g7TM+g, 
2 91 
7rM(2g+4g* -4g, 
)+gi2 
gi 
27rM+g, 
2 
9i 
7TM(2-g-4g* +4g, )+gz 
if gi -= g* 
if gi > g* 
if gi < g* and gi < 2g* - -g 
if gi < g* and gi > 2g* - -g. 
Assume now that 7rM = 5. Consider the case where ý -- 0.5. First, we 
know that firms with gi < 10 will not offer a bribe. After performing 
calculations with the critical value, we see that those are the only firms that will 
not offer a strictly positive bribe. Firms with g, E (10,491 will offer a bribe 
equal to -L - 7rM. If we increase to 0.6 (i. e., firms believe that the 2 
government official is honest with probability of 60%), then firms with 
gi c (22.75,49] will offer a bribe and firms with g, C [0,22.75) will offer a 
zero bribe. As -y increases, the interval of firms offering a bribe will become 
smaller - only the firms closer to the upper bound will remain. 
For the optimal 
c is 0.6474. which means that if ý is firm to prefer to offer a zero bribe, ý C(4) 
greater than this value it will never offer a bribe. 
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From the analysis of the model with a fixed fine, we may conclude the 
following: 
(a) Unlike in the two previous models, it is possible to have allocation efficiency 
even when the government official is corrupt (without having to exclude firms 
with cost lower than the optimal). In order to ensure this, the expected value of 
the fixed fine has to be greater than the gross profit of the firm with the lowest 
cost, or equivalently, the finn with the highest gross profit; 
(b) An appropriate fixed fine can completely deter bribery. This is a significant 
improvement to the previous model, where it was not possible to reduce the 
equilibrium bribe to zero with that penalty scheme; 
(c) As in the previous two models, when the government official is known to be 
corrupt, uncertainty regarding firms' types leads to lower bribes. In particular, 
the expected value of the fixed fine that deters all bribery is lower than in the 
case where there is information about firm types. If there are two firms with 
uniform costs, then for the same probability of inspection, the fixed fine only 
needs to be one half of what it is in complete information; 
(d) When the government official's type is private information, the optimal firrn 
will, under some circumstances, offer a zero bribe. This might happen both 
when the optimal firm does not have the highest gross gain, and when it is the 
lowest cost fin-n, depending on whether the second lowest-cost firm is very close W 
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to it, the fine is very large and the firms' belief of the honesty of the official is 
la, k above a critical value; 
(e) When both types of information asymmetries are present, if a firm decides to 
offer a bribe, it will be of the same magnitude as when only firm types are 
private information. Firms may, however, decide not to offer a bribe. Because 
firms do not know whether the government official is corrupt they must weigh 
the benefits of offering a bribe against the costs. Thus, each firm has a critical 
level for the belief that the official is honest. If -y is above that critical level, 
then a firm will not offer a bribe. Naturally, as firm types are unknown, a firm's 
critical level depends on its cost level relatively to the optimal cost. 
3.7 Fine Proportional to a Firm's Gain (Model D) 
In the previous section, we saw that a fixed fine was capable of deterring 
firms from bribing. In this section, we investigate the effectiveness of a different 
type of punishment scheme, namely, when a firm's penalty upon conviction 
depends on its surplus, or gross gain. The main motivation to examine a further 
penalty scheme is to ascertain whether there exists an alternative to a fixed fine, 
which is equally as effective and perhaps of easier implementation. 
As before, with probability 7r there is an external inspection of the firm 
that wins the goverrurnent contract. If the winning finn is found to have offered a 
strictly positive bribe. 113 a fine (f ) is administered with probability one. The 
1 '-As in the previous model, if a firm does not know whether the government official is corrupt 
or not and offers a strictly positive bribe, then even if the official turns out to be honest and the 
firin does not pay the bribe, it will still have to pay the fine if there is an inspection. 
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fine will be a proportion 0 of the winning firm's gross gain, that is, f= Og, - 
The expected value of the fine will thus be E[f( gi )I= 70g, . 
The payoff functions for Firm i when the government official is corrupt 
and when he is not corrupt are (respectively) defined as follows: 
gZ 7TO) - Bi 
ri. -L (gi (I - 7FO Bi 0=0 n 
0 
and 
gi 70 
I Ili la=l; 
B, >0 11 gi - 7ro 
0 
gi 
n 9z 
0 
3.7.1 Complete Information 
if Gi > Gj 
if Gi = Gj 
if Gi < Gj 
if Gi > Gj 
if Gi = Gj 
if Gl- < Gj 
i= 1'..., n ,i#i 
i= 1'..., n .i#i 
if Gi > Gj 
if Gi = Gj jVi 
if Gi < Gj 
Result D. 1 When the government official is known to be corrupt, and the 
ii, inning firm may face a fine proportional to its gain, the firm that offers the 
highest bribe wins the contract. The bribe function for Firm i is given by' 
" 
114 Actually, if g, > gj. Firm i offers a bribe of g, 0- 7FO) + -' to make sure it ýN ins 
the 
contract. Firm i wants to choose E as close as possible to (but 
different from) zero. As such an 
E does not exist, the equilibrium is defined as the limit. 
189 
yj (I - 70) 
BI, gi (I -7TO 
0 
if gi > gj and7rO <I 
if g< gj and 7rO <1. Vi = 11 , n, 
' ; 2, -, ' 
if ýTo >1 
(3.22) 
Proot The equilibrium strategy is derived using the same approach as that in 
Results A. I !ýB. I and 
C. I. but in this case a firm's decision of the bribe to 
offer is the solution to the problem Max Hi 1,0 = gi (1 -7T-0) - B,. m Bi 
We observe that,, as was the case for the fixed fine, it is now possible to 
select a fine such that no finn will want to offer a strictly positive bribe. In 
particular, if the product of the probability of inspection and the proportion of 
the gain that is fined is at least one, then all firms will want to offer a zero bribe, 
even though the government official is known to be corrupt. 
This penalty scheme is, essentially, one of punitive damages. The 
punitive damages approach focuses principally on the observation that 
punishment levels should be related to the reciprocal of the probability of 
detection. For example, if the chance of detection is 50%, then the total penalty 
must be twice the value of the harm in order to create the proper incentives for 
deterrence on an expected value basis. " 5 
This is quite a powerful result, as it shows how such a simple 
punishment can be effective in deterring any incentive for a fin-n to offer a bribe 
in order to win a government contract. Even if a firm's true surplus is 
115 See Bentham (1962). 
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imperfectly observable, as long as 7TO is sufficiently greater than one, the firm 
will be deterred from bribing. 
As long as the expected value of the fine is sufficiently small, i. e., such 
that some of the firms offer strictly positive bribes, then, as in the case of the 
three previous models, the firm with the highest gross gain, or equivalently, 
lowest cost wins. The equilibrium is only welfare-optimal if the lowest-cost firm 
is C*. 
3.7.2 Firms' Types are Private Information 
Result D. 2 When firm types are private information, the government official 
is known to be corrupt, and the winningfirm mayface afine proportional 
to its gain, the bribe function for Firm i is given by 
B(gi) 
If 
"'[F(s)]"-lds 
7TO ) 9z 
[ F(g, )ln-1 
I 
if 7TO <I 
if 70 >1 
= 1,..., n. 
(3.23) 
Proot The equilibrium strategy is derived using the same approach as that in 
Results A. 2,, B. 2 and C. 2. m 
Note that, unlike the case of the fixed fine, where a given fixed fine 
would deter more firms from bribing in the case of this type of information 
asymmetry than in the case of complete information, in this case the 'cut-off 
point for deterrence (i. e.. 7rO =I) is the same as in complete 
information. 
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3.7.3 Government Official's Type is Private Information 
When the govenu-nent official's type is private information, if the 
winning firm offers a bribe, it will incur the punishment in the event of an 
inspection, independently of the government official being corrupt or not. 
Result D. 3 When the government official's type is private information, and 
the winningfirm mayface afine proportional to its gain: 
(i) If the firm closest to the optimal has no chances of o utbrib ing all its rivals 
(i. e., because it has a lower gross gain), then it will offer a zero bribe; 
(ii) If it can outbribe all its rivals and -y is below a critical level, 
C (-ql-92)(1-7rO) 116 then firms will offer the same bribes as in the case 7YD(3) = 
-ql-92(1-7rO) 
' 
of complete information; for -y above the critical level, then the firm closest 
to the optimal will offer a zero bribe. 
Proot The proof is analogous to that of Results B. 3 (Appendix 3. A) and C. 3 
(Appendix 3. C). m 
116 The critical value for this model is lower than the one for the model with a fine proportional to 
the bribe if 0> 
92 (P 
-. It is smaller than the critical value for the model with a -il ( -17 w+g-, g(p 
fixed fine if 0>ý, 17 WII+ 
192 
3.7.4 Two Information Asymmetries 
Result DA When the two information asymmetries are present, and the 
winningfirm mayface afine proportional to its gain: 
(i) If a firm offers a bribe, it will offer the same as when onl firm types are Y 
private information and the government official is known to be corrupt; 
(ii) A firm will bribe if its belief that the official is honest, -y, is below a 
critical value, which depends on its position in relation to the optimal-cost 
firm; 
(iii) Firm % 's bribe function is given by 
B(g) 
7ro) gi - -1 
f 92 [ F(,,; ) ]'-' ds 
if 7rO <I and -y < -yý D(4) 
i 
= 1,..., n 
if 7rO >I or 7rO <I and -y ý! -yý D(4) 
(3.24) 
where 
c 'YD(4) 
(1-70). f gi[F(. q)]'-lds 
7rO +(1- 719 
f g, [F (s) ds 
if gi = g* 
(1-7rO), 
f"' 
[ F(s) I'l ds 
if gi > g* or gi < g* and gi > 2g* 
qf 
q'[F( 
g, [1-F(g+)+F(g-)]"-'+(1-7rO) ds 
,f 
'Q'[ F (,,; ) ]" -1d, ý 
g, 7rOF(g)"-'+(1-7rO)., 
fg'[F(s)]'-lds 
ProoL Analogous to the proof of Result C. 4. m 
if g< g* and gi < 2g* -ý 19 
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From the analysis of the model with a fine proportional to gain, we may 
conclude the following: 
(a) As in the model with a fixed fine, it is possible to have allocation efficiency 
even when the government official is corrupt (without having to exclude firms 
with cost lower than the optimal). For this to be true, all firms must be deterred 
from bribing. This can be achieved by setting the punishment level, 0, equal to 
the reciprocal of the probability of an external inspection, ýT . This appears to be 
simpler than setting the expected value of the fixed fine at a value greater than 
the gross profit of the firm with the lowest cost; 
(b) As in the previous models, when the government official is known to be 
corrupt, uncertainty regarding firms' types leads to lower bribes. Unlike the case 
of the fixed fine, deterring firms from bribing does not involve changing the 
'cut-off point for deterrence (i. e., the product of 7r and 0 must be at least equal 
to one); 
(c) When the government official's type is private information, the optimal firm 
will,, under some circumstances, offer a zero bribe. This might happen both 
when the optimal firm does not have the highest gross gain and when it is the 
lowest cost firm, depending on whether the second lowest-cost firrn is very close 
to it, the expected fine is large and finns' belief of the honesty of the official is 
above a critical level: 
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(d) As in the case of a fixed fine, when both types of information asymmetries 
are present, firms do not always bribe, even if 7rO < 1. This occurs because, as 
firms do not know whether the government official is corrupt, they must weigh 
the benefits of offering a bribe against the costs (namely, attempting to bribe an 
honest official and paying a fine that could have been avoided by not offering a 
bribe). If a firm decides to offer a bribe, it will be of the same magnitude as 
when only firm types are private information. Firms may, however, decide not 
to offer a bribe - each firm has a critical level for the belief that the official is 
honest. If -y is above that critical level, then a firm will not offer a bribe. As 
finn types are unknown, a firm's critical level depends on its cost level relatively 
to the optimal cost. 
3.8 The Case of Foreign Firms 
The previous sections looked at the behaviour and bribe functions of 
national firms competing to win a government contract. The case of competition 
between foreign firms has not yet been examined. As this research aims to look 
particularly at developing countries, where the need for large government 
projects usually attracts foreign investors, it is highly appropriate that foreign 
firms be considered. 
The assumptions regarding firm characteristics, namely, differences in 
cost translated into differences in quality by the function V, =a In C2 ,a>0, i 
with V' >0 and V" < 0. mean that the optimal firm (in ten-ns of social 
welfare) will depend on whether national or foreign firms are competing. A 
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benevolent or honest government official would award the contract to the 
national finn with Q= 2a, whereas it would choose the foreign firm with 
CF :: -- C (See Result 1). This has implications regarding some of the results 
obtained, as clearly the optimal foreign firm is the one with the lowest gross 
gain. Some of the results are the same as in the case for national firms. 
3.8.1 Results that are Maintained 
* All the results for model A remain the same in the case of foreign firms. As 
there is no punishment for bribing or attempting to bribe, when there is some 
probability that the govemment official is corrupt firms will always offer a 
bribe, which will be proportional to their gross gain. Note that, unlike in the 
case of national finns where a pre-qualification of bidders (firms with cost 
lower than C* not allowed to compete) could both ensure welfare efficiency 
and lower bribe levels (abstracting from any potential further problems of 
bribery associated with this measure), there is no equivalent measure for the 
case of foreign firms. 
e Models B, C and D entail a penalty scheme for firms that bribe or attempt to 
bribe an official. As such, the results that do not depend on uncertainty 
regarding a govern-ment official's corruptibility will remain unaltered. Such 
results are B. 1, B. 2, C. 1, C. 2, D. I and D. 2. 
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3.8.2 Results that are Different 
9 Government official's type is private information 
In the case of foreign firms, the socially optimal firm is the one with the 
highest quality and thus the one with the highest cost. As it has no chances of 
outbribing any of its rivals, it will offer a zero bribe. This is true for models B, C 
and D. What differ between the three models are the bribes offered by the 
remaining firms. 
91 > 92 > ... > gn 
(*) 
Model B B, = B2; A=ý, gi, n-1; B, 1+7ý0 
Model C B, = B2; Bi = gZ - 7rM, Z=2,..., n-1; B,, - 
Model D B, = B2; Bi = gZ(I -7rO), Z -2,..., n-1; B, - 0. 
* Two information asymmetries 
Firm i must maximise (3.10) as before, but Pr (winning Ia= 1) becomes 
Pr(Vi > Vj) -- Pr(Ci > Cj) = Pr(gi < gl) = [I - F(gi 
)]n-1, so that (3.10) 
can be expressed as 
F(g n-I + (I - -y)rIi'=OF(gi) 
n-I (3.10) 
Model B Maximizing the expected profit function (3.10') yields the 
differential equation 
b'(gl) + b(g 
7)(1 + 7ýo)(n - I) F(gl)'F(g? )n -2 giQ- (3.25) 
+ 7(, -ý)F(g7 + 
F(gi 
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Solving (3.25) yields the bribe function for Firm i. Unlike the case of 
national firms, this bribe function does not depend on the position of Firm z in 
relation to the socially optimal firm. The bribe function is increasing in gross 
gain, g, decreasing in both the probability of an external inspection to the 
winning firm, 7r , and the proportion of the bribe levied as a fine, ýo. 
Furthermore, as would be expected, the bribe function is decreasing in the 
probability -y that the government official is honest. 
Let us consider that g, -U[0,49 ], n=2,7r=O. l and ýo=2. The 
figure below shows how the bribe functions for three specific values of -ý 
(namely, 0.1,0.5 and 0.9) vary with a foreign firm's level of gross gain. 
Figure 3.7: Bribe functions with a proportional fine - The case of foreign firms 
and two information asymmetries 
B(g) 
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Model C 
B(gi) 
Result CA applies, but Firm Ps bribe function is given by 
gi 
f g' [F(s) ]" ds 
-Irm 
if (i) 
[F(g, )]" 
A 
0 if (ii) 
where WA> 7rM and -ý < -yC'(4)'; 
(ii) A <7rM or A> 7TM and -y > -YC'(4)' ; 
and -y' 9 C(4)' 
-7rM[I-F(g, )]"-'+gfgi[F(s)]'-lds 
Model D Result DA applies, but Firm Ps bribe function is given by 
7TO ) gi -f 
gi [F(s)]'-lds 
if 
[F(gi)]"-l 
B(gi) 
0 if 
where 7T-0 <I and -y < 7c D(4)'; 
7rO >I or 7rO <1 and >c (4)'; 7D 
and -y' 
(1 - 7rO), g 
f 9i [ F(s) ]'-' ds 
D(4)' (1-7rO)[1-F(g, )]'-'+g, irO[1-F(g, )]'-l 
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3.9 Concluding Remarks 
The main goal of this chapter is to explore the supply side of bribery. In 
particular, we employ a framework that studies this aspect of corruption in 
government procurement contracts. The approach we adopt involves studying 
the role of information available to firms who bid in public tenders. Firms are 
typically faced with uncertainties such as not knowing the type of government 
official that is in charge of the contract awarding process (that is, whether or not 
he is corrupt), as well as sometimes having limited information regarding their 
rivals' characteristics. This analysis aims to determine how the interaction 
between these types of uncertainties affects the bribes offered by finns. The 
illegal nature of bribery is also explicitly taken into account, and three different 
types of punishment are considered. This analysis is useful in pinpointing the 
factors that are significant in the determination of the private sector's willingness 
to pay bribes. This, in turn, enables the design of policies that specifically 
address those factors that provide incentives for bribery, thereby enabling more 
effective anti-corruption reforms. 
Unless the govermnent official is known with certainty to be honest, 
bribery will always take place. The only exceptions are the case of a sufficiently 
large expected fixed fine (i. e., a fixed fine such that 7rM >9), or if a firm's 
expected punishment is more than proportional to its gain. Moreover, as long as 
bribery occurs, there will generally be no welfare efficiency. For the first two 
models (A and B), the only case where there will be welfare efficiency is when 
the lowest-cost firm bidding for the government contract is the socially optimal 
one. 
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This result contrasts strongly to the results obtained in similar studies 
[see Beck and Maher (1986), Lien (1986,1987,1990), Clark and Riis (2000)]. 
The reason for this disparity lies in the assumption of those models, where either 
all firms can carry out the project at the same quality, or the lowest-cost firm is 
always the highest quality one. In these cases, bribing entails no loss of 
efficiency, and bribes merely represent a wealth redistribution, whereby they are 
transfers from the firms to the official. Because in our model quality is 
increasing in cost (V' > 0; V" < 0), the optimal firm is, therefore, not the one 
with the lowest cost. 
This result of lack of welfare efficiency seems particularly important in 
the case of developing countries. These countries typically have strong needs in 
terms of the construction of infrastructures, where quality will make a 
difference. Furthermore, such poorer countries do not customarily make big 
investments in the maintenance of infrastructures, and as such,, it is even more 
imperative that they should be of good quality. To compound the problem, these 
are usually countries where there are high levels of corruption. This is 
especially true in the case of sub-Saharan Africa. 
For model C, it is possible that the fixed fine will completely deter all 
firms from offering strictly positive bribes. For this to happen, the expected 
value of the fixed fine must be such that all firms will never find it profitable to 
bribe, even though they may know the government official to be corrupt. An 
initiative equivalent to such a fine is the World Bank's policy of blacklisting 
firrns that bribe foreign goverranent officials in order to be awarded a 
government contract. In that case, the fixed fine can be interpreted as the present 
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value of all future World Bank contracts. (We can see that a finn for which 
future projects represent a substantial value will prefer not to offer bribes. ) From 
our analysis, this seems to be one of the right directions for policies designed to 
combat corruption. 
The other penalty scheme found to be effective is that of punitive 
damages - if a firm is fined a proportion of its gain, then it will be completely 
deterred from bribing if the fine is greater than or equal to the reciprocal of the 
probability of detection. 
In general, it is the availability of information about their rivals that 
permits firms to offer higher bribes. Transparency in terms of firms' rankings of 
capacity to bribe does not appear to be helpful in decreasing the incidence of 
corrupt dealings. This is a direct consequence of the simplifying assumption in 
our model that a firm's capacity to bribe depends on its cost. It is unlikely that in 
the real world firms determine their bribes solely by the difference between their 
costs and the fixed price contract - there are usually other factors at play, such as 
revenues from other projects or departments within the company. This naturally 
makes it more difficult for competing firms to gauge their rivals' capacity to 
bribe. This would contribute to greater uncertainty with regards to rival firms, 
and, therefore, lower bribes. The market in which firms are competing is also 
likely to influence whether firms' ability to bribe is private information. For 
example, firms in less concentrated markets are likely to have greater 
uncertainty regarding their rivals, as are firms that compete in markets for more 
differentiated and/or technically complex products. Firms that frequently 
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compete against each other for public procurement contracts are likely to know 
each others costs better than firms competing for the first time. 
The only cases where information about rival firms is irrelevant are 
when bribery is effectively eliminated, that is, either when the fixed fine is 
sufficiently large to deter all firms from bribing, or when firms are penalized by 
more than their gains. 
Given that it is better for firm types to be private information, then, 
except for the case of no penalties (where it is indifferent), it is also always 
better for the govermnent official's type to be private infonnation. Therefore, 
transparency increases the sizes of equilibrium bribes. If it cannot be ensured 
that a government official is honest, then in terms of the magnitude of bribes it 
is better for firms not to know whether the official is corrupt. For example, this 
would suggest that public tenders with foreign finns, which are less likely to 
know the official's type, could result in bribe levels lower than public tenders 
where domestic firms compete, ceteris paribus. It could also be the case that 
countries with more political instability (and consequently, a greater turnover of 
officials) have lower bribe levels. 
One of the features of our model that is relevant in terms of policy 
implementation is that we assume the inspection is made by an external agent. 
As we are considering government procurement of goods and services that are 
usually the preserve of high-level officials, the main question is who will be in 
charge of the monitoring. That is, the entity that performs the auditing must be 
independent and corruption-free. so that further problems of corruptibility are 
avoided. This entails a strong commitment to ensure that external and 
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independent monitoring is credibly carried out. Indeed, the probability of an 
external inspection plays a crucial role in the expected value of a fine in our 
models with a penalty scheme (namely, B, C and D). In the model with a 
proportional fine (B), if we assume that the proportion of the bribe that is levied 
as a fine is two (ýo = 2), then depending on the magnitude of the probability of 
inspection, the expected value of the fine can range from zero to two times the 
bribe. This is a big variation and will certainly have an impact on firms' decision 
of how much to offer as a bribe. In model C, although the expected value of the 
fine can be made as large as desired by choosing a very large fixed fine (as long 
as the probability of inspection is strictly bigger than zero), if the probability of 
inspection is very small, the fixed fine may have to be set at an absurdly high 
value. Similarly, in the case of model D, if the probability of inspection is very 
small, as the fine must be greater than or equal to the reciprocal of the 
probability of inspection, then it may have an unrealistically high value (for 
example, if 7r - 0.01, then 0= 100). This compromises the credibility of the 
enforcement of the fine. 
This highlights a further need for a credible commitment for not only 
imposing the fine, but also to ensure prosecution and conviction of corrupt 
firms. There must be an effective legal system in place, as well as political will. 
For example, expectations that the FCPA would involve aggressive enforcement 
did not materialise. In over 20 years there have been only 30 prosecutions under 
the FCPA.. There are three main reasons for this: the split in enforcement 
between the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission; the fact that transnational bribery is a complex and difficult 
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offence on which to gather evidence; and the fact that bargaining may go on 
after charges have been laid. ' 17 If in such a developed country as the US there 
are prosecution and enforcement problems, then this is a particularly relevant 
question for developing countries, where corruption is widespread and occurs at 
many levels of government. The existence and good functioning of an 
independent national body to serve as a 'watchdog' may prove problematic in 
these countries. This calls attention for the role of international organisations, 
mainly when there are foreign firms bidding for the government contract and/or 
when there is funding or loans to the recipient country to carry out, say, an 
infrastructure project. 
For example, there may be "defining down of deviance". by which there is a significant 
reduction in the seriousness of charges. 
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Appendix 3. A 
This appendix contains the proof for Result B. 3. In order to derive the 
equilibrium bribes, we shall consider three different cases. 
Case A 
Suppose that C1 'ýý C2 "-' --- `ý 
cn 
ý or, equivalently, that 
91 ýý' 92 ýý' --- ýý' gn - Suppose also, that Finn I is the closest to the optimal 
(which we shall denote by g, (*)). Firm I has an advantage over the other finns 
in two dimensions, namely, it will win if the government official is honest, and 
if he is corrupt, Firm I has a greater gross gain and, therefore, capacity to bribe 
and win. Firm 1, by offering a bribe just a bit more than T-, ' , can guarantee 1+ 7ý0 
that it will win the govermnent contract and have a strictly positive expected 
payoff of (91 - 92 )+ ýY 
q2 
. However, by offering a zero bribe, Firm I will I+ 7Fj: ' 
have an expected payoff of -ygl. Finn I will prefer to offer a bribe if its 
expected payoff from offering a strictly positive bribe exceeds that of not 
offering a bribe, that is, if -y < -yý 
(91 -92 )(1+7rV) 
. Note that >0 and B(3) = 91 (1 + 7rP) - 92 6(91 -92 ) 
that < 0. We can, therefore, see that the equilibrium will depend on (S 7Tt: ' 
ýy 
118,119 
... Note that ý, the probability of the government official being honest, is common to all firms. 
'19A simple numerical example may be useful. Assume that 7=0.1, ý9 =2 and g, = 49. If 
92 = 4S. 9 . then ýI=0.012 . 
If 92 = 10, then ý' = 0.96 . If the 
difference between gland 
92 is small, then Firm I will only want to offer a bribe if it is very like]y that the official is 
corrupt. 
'106 
if -Y < -Y c- 
Oql-92)(1+7''tý) 
then b, -Q2 and B(3) - 91(1+7rV)--92 ý+-, -, 
bi 9? z= 21 ... ,n. whereas 
if > 
91 - -q2 
+ 7r(P) Firm I will offer 1+7ý0 B(3) 91(1+7r47)-92 
a zero bribe. The bribes offered by the remaining firms will depend further on 
C/f (91-93 )(1+7r(P) 
another critical value. If 'YB(3) 'ýý "Y where then c -YB(3) B(3) - 91 (1 + 93 
the bribes are bi - 91 n. C' then 1+7rýo 
If 7 ýý "YB(3) 
b2 h b. Ii= 31 T+77 1+7ý0 
It is easy to see that this constitutes an equilibrium. Consider the case 
where -y < 
(-ql -92 )(1+7rO. Given that Firms I offer a bribe of -q' , Firm I 91(1+7rA-92 I+mp 
does not want to increase its bribe offer as it would not increase its probability 
of winning (i. e., already one) and would only serve to decrease its expected 
profit. Similarly, Finn I does not want to decrease its bribe offer, as it would 
worsen its probability of winning the contract and decrease its expected profit. 
Given that Firm I offers a bribe of ; 17ý' , Firms j :; ý-- I are indifferent between 1+ 7ý0 
I 
9j and decreasing their bribes, as they would still have a zero expected T+7y 
payoff. Note that Firms 1 ; i-- I would never increase their bribes more than 
9j 
ý, , as 
this would yield a negative expected profit. The same reasoning 7+-, 
applies for the case where ý> 
(91 -92)(1+7rO 
91 (1+7r, ý)-lq2 
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Case B 
Suppose that g, `ý 92 --- "ý 9M (*) < ... < g,, - ,<g,. 
In this case, the 
equilibrium bribes are b= n 9"-1 1+7ý0 b M =0 and 
bi - 92 1 gm-11 gm+ll ... i gn-1 1+7rýP 
Given that all firms other than m are offering the above bribes, then 
Finn m's best response is to offer a zero bribe. As Firm m is not the one with 
the greatest gross gain, it will not be able to outbribe the other finns and win if 
the official is corrupt. However, Fin-n m is the closest to the optimal, which 
means that if the government official is honest, it will win the contract. 
Therefore, Firm m prefers to offer a zero bribe and not incur a penalty. 
Given that Firm m offers a zero bribe and that firms 
offer bribes of bi - T-, ' Firm 1+7r(P 9 n's best response 
is to offer b,, = 1-1 (plus a little more). This guarantees that Finn n will win 1+7rýO 
if the official is corrupt and does not affect its chances of winning if the official 
is honest (which are nil). Firm n does not want to increase its bribe offer as it 
would not increase its probability of winning (i. e., already one) and would only 
serve to decrease its expected profit. Similarly, Firm n does not want to 
decrease its bribe offer, as it would worsen its probability of winning the 
contract and decrease its expected profit. 
Given that Finn n offers a bribe of and that Firm m offers a zero 1+ 7r,, ý' 
bribe, the remaining 
bi gl 1+777ý9' 
firms are indifferent between 
and decreasing their bribes, as they 
would still have a zero expected payoff (xvill not win whether the government 
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official is honest or corrupt). They do not want to increase their bribes, as that 
would give them negative expected payoffs. 
Case C 
Suppose that 91 92 ýý' ... ýý' -gn(*). 
In this case, Firm n is the closest 
to the optimal, but it has the lowest gross gain. On the other hand, Firm I is the 
farthest from the optimal but has the greatest gross gain. If Firm I offers a bribe 
of -q2 plus a little bit, it can guarantee it will win if the government official is 1+7ý0 
corrupt. If the official is honest, Firm I does not lose anything by having offered 
a strictly positive bribe, as it would never win. Firm n will offer a zero bribe, as 
it cannot outbribe any of the remaining firms and can increase its expected 
payoff if it does not offer a strictly positive bribe. This case is almost identical to 
the previous one, with the difference that there are no finns with lower gross 
gain than the one closest to the optimal. Therefore, the equilibrium bribes are 
b, - . 
92 b, =0 and bi = g' Ii= 21 n-1. 1+ýw I 1+7rýo 
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Appendix 3. B 
This appendix contains the proof for Result B. 4. 
When both the government official's and firms' types are private 
information, Firm Z's expected profit is given by 
YIFI a=l Pr(wiming Ia= 1) + (1 _ )Ila=O Pr(whýngja =0 
In contrast to the basic model, if the winning firm offers a bribe it will have to 
pay a fine if the governinent official is honest. Therefore, its expected profit 
becomes 
y(T-Cj-irTbj)Pr(jC, -C*j < lCj-C*1)+ (I -y)(T-C, - (I +irT)b, )Pr(b, > B, ). 
We may write 
Pr(whiing I a= 1) = Pr(ICi-C*1 < lCj-C*1) 
Pr(Igi - g* I< Igj - g* 1) 
[I - F(g* + Igi - g* 1) + F(g* _ Igi _ g* 1)]n-I 
[I- F(g+) + F(g-) ] n- 1. 
Suppose that, when Finn Ps gross gain is actually gi, it offers a bribe 
equal to b(w, ) . The probability that the 
bribe b(wi) will be the highest is 
F(wi)'-'. Thus, the expected payoff to Firm Z from offering a bribe b(wi) 
would be 
+F (g- 
n-I + -y)(g, - (I + 7r, -ý) 
b(wi)) F(wi)'-'. 
(3.26) 
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However, by the definition of an equilibrium, the optimal bid for Firm 2 
with gross gain gi should be b(g, ). So the derivative of this expected payoff 
with respect to wi should equal 0 when wi equals gi. That is, 
b'(gi) 77ý0 [ 1- (F(g' )- F(g-)) ] n-1 + (I - -ý)F(gj)n-l 
I+ 
b(gi) (I - -y) (I + iy) F(g, ) (n - 1)F(gi)n-2 (3.27) 
n-2 gi (I - -y)F(gi)(n - 1)F(gZ) 
When solving the differential equation (3.27) we need to consider the 
different cases for Ci, or, equivalently, gi. 
o When ci = C* (gi - g*)ý then 
Pr(ICi-Cl<lCj-Cl)=Pr(Igi-ý*I<Igj-_q*l) is equal to one and (3.27) 
becomes 
b'(g, ) + b(g, ) 
(1 - -y)(1 + 7rýo)P(q, )(n - 1)F(-qi )n-2 (I - -y) F'(g, ) (n - I)F(g, ) n-2 
-y7y + (1 - -ý) (1 + 7y) F(g, )"-' -y7y + (1 - 7) (1 + 7ýo) F(g, )" 
(3.28) 
Solving (3.28) yields the bribe function 
(gz- )= 
fg'[F(s) ]n -1 ds 
-y7r(p + (I - -y)(1 +7y) F(gi)'-' 
(3.29) 
If cost levels are uniforrnly distributed on [C, C], and, therefore, the 
gross gains, gi , are also uniformly 
distributed on [g, g], the bribe function (3.29) 
becomes 
b(g )=-(I- 
-Y ) (gi g) n-1 
1 (-9 g) n-I (I 
I)gz 
)(1 + )(g7 n-1 
. (3.30) 
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9 When 
For the case of uniformly distributed cost levels, the bribe function is 
Ci <C* 
Pr(I g- #'I <I gj - 4'1) =[1- F(g, ) + F(2#' - 9. ) ]n-l and (3.27) becomes 
then 
b'(gi) + b(gi) 
(I -, y)(I + irT)F'(gj)(n - I)F(gi 
) n-2 
y7r(p[l - F(g, ) + F(2g* _ gi)]n-I +0- r)(I + 7rT)F(g, )n-I 
a- 
0- y)F'(gi)(n - 1)F(g, )n-2 
61 y7r(p[l - F(gi) + F(2g* _ gi)]n-I + r)(I + ir(p)F(g, )n-I 
(gz- )= 
(gi - g), -' 
[ (n gi +g 
n-y7ýo (g -g+ 2g gi 
) n-1 +n+ 7ý0)(gj _ g)n-1 
(3.31) 
When C, > C* (gi. < g*), we need to consider two further cases. There 
are some cost levels for which 2C* - Ci is smaller than C (or, equivalently, 
there are some levels of gross gain for which 2g* - g, is greater than j ). In 
those cases, F(2C* - C, ) =0 and F(2g* - g7) =I- 
When Ci > C* and Ci < 2C* -C (gz < g* and gi > 2g* - 9), (3.27) 
becomes 
+ (gi ) 
(I- 
, y7ýo [I + F(gi) 
(i 
-y) (1 + 7Týo) F'(gl) (n - I)F(gi )n-2 
F(2g* - gi)ln-l + (I - 
-y) F'(g, ) (n - I)F(gi )n-2 97 
-y7rV [I + F(gl) -F (2g* - gi 
+ 
(gi > g*)ý 
(I + 7ýo)F(gi)" 
For the case of uniformly distributed cost levels, the bribe function is 
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b(gi) 
0- -Y ) (gz - g) n-I (n gi +, g (3.32) 
n-(xýp (g -g- 2g* +i 
)n-1 +n+ (gz - g)'-' 
When Ci > C* and Ci > 2C* - (g < g* and gi < 2g* - ý), (3.27) Cz9 
becomes 
b'(gi) + b(g) y) 
(I + irT)F'(gi)(n - I)F(gi 
) n-2 
(I + irT - y)F(gi)n-I 
gi 
(I -, y)F'(gi) (n - I)F(g, ) n-2 
(I + 7r(p - Y)F(g, )n-I 
For the case of uniformly distributed cost levels, the bribe function is 
b(gi) = 
-Y) ( gi n -fFýO) + -YFýO -+ g) (gi - g) 
+ 7y - y) (n -yFýo) + -ý7y - 1) (n(l - -y7rýo 
+ -Fýo -9 - g) 
n-2 
(3.33) 
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Appendix 3. C 
The proof for Result C. 3 is analogous to the proof for Result B. 3 (see 
Appendix 3. A). We present the equilibrium bribes for three different cases. 
Case A 
If 91 (*) > 92 X--> 9n, then the equilibrium bribes will be the 
following. if -Y <- -Y c= 
91-92 
7rM+-ql-, q2 
92 - 7T-M and 
b. = gi - 7TM, Z=2,..., n. If -y > 
91-92 b, = 0. If -ýc <<c 7rM+91-92 
where -y' 
91-93 
then the bribes are bi gz -7T-M, i= 21 ... n. If 7rM + 91 -. 93 
I 
-Y > -yc , then b2 :: -- 93 - 7rM, bi = gl. -7rM, i 
Note that, as expected, 6-, r. >0 and that ±L <0- Note also that a firm only 6(91-. 92) 671, p 
offers a strictly positive bribe if gi > 7rM - 
Case B 
If 91 `ý 92 ":: ý --- '< -9rn 
(*) < ... < g,, -, < g, 
the equilibrium bribes are 
as follows: b,, - I- 7rM, 
bm =0 and 
bi = gz - 7TM, Z -qm- 1ý 9m+1 i 
gn- 1- 
Case C 
Suppose that 
-ql 
> 
-q2 
> ... > -qn(*). 
The equilibrium bribes will be 
= g, 
-q2 - 7rM, 
b, =0 and b, 
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Chapter 4 
An Empirical Study of Aggregate Aid Receipts in Sub-Saharan Africa - 
How Taxing'is Corruption? 
4.1 Introduction 
Many foreign assistance programmes not only claim to target poverty 
reduction, but also to reward good policies and favour reforming and honest 
governments. However, there appears to be no evidence that countries pursuing 
good policies are rewarded with greater levels of aid [Bumside and Dollar 
(2000), Collier and Dollar (2002)]. Furthermore, the few studies that examine 
the impact of corruption on foreign aid levels find that countries perceived as 
less corrupt do not necessarily receive more aid [Alesina and Weder (2002), 
Svensson (2000), Neumayer (2003b, 2003d)]. This result is somewhat puzzling, 
begging the question of whether there are specific characteristics inherent in 
corruption and its interaction with aid that provides an economic rationale for 
the pattern of donors' aid flows. 
We develop a simple and intuitive model that looks specifically at donor 
preferences when giving aid, as well as the interaction between corruption and 
aid. We consider a donor that derives wellbeing from projects carried out in 
developing countries (for example, building a new school). The amount of aid 
that the donor disburses to a recipient country is its expenditure on the foreign 
projects. Corruption increases the price of each project, as corrupt government 
officials divert funds from the economy to their private use. Corruption, 
therefore, acts as a tax on aid. This framework produces a source of ambiguity 
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regarding aid flows and corruption. This derives from the donor's price 
elasticity of demand for foreign government projects. If the donor's demand for 
government projects in recipient countries is price inelastic (say, because the 
project is to provide basic health conditions), then more corrupt countries will 
receive more aid. If, on the other hand, the donor's demand for government 
projects in recipient countries is price elastic, then more corrupt countries will 
receive less aid. Finally, if price elasticity is -1, then there will be no 
relationship between corruption and aid. However, although this framework has 
some attractive features, most notably its simplicity, it suffers from some non- 
negligible limitations. In particular, the focus on price elasticities makes it ill- 
suited for empirical application. So, whilst our simple theoretical framework 
motivates our analysis, we are not able to empirically test it. 
We examine empirically the relationship between perceived corruption 
levels in recipient countries and their aggregate bilateral aid receipts. We focus 
on sub-Saharan Africa. The countries of sub-Saharan Africa are not only 
disproportionately among those receiving the most foreign aid in the world, they 
are also among the most corrupt. Since this group of countries is typical of the 
problem being analysed, this seems like a more relevant sample than all 
countries. We use a panel data set of 32 sub-Saharan African countries and four 
four-year time periods from 1982 to 1997. We consider bilateral aggregate total 
aid flows, as well as sector-specific flows. The rationale is that, following the 
focus of the UN Millennium Development Goals on certain sectors, sector- 
specific aid flows might permit a clearer indication of price elasticities than total 
aid (even if we are unable to effectiN, ely empirically verify it). For example, if 
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donors are especially concerned about levels of primary education of the 
population, then they might consider those projects as a basic need, making their 
demand price inelastic. Donors would then give higher levels of aid for 
education to countries that are more corrupt. 
At first glance our results on bilateral total aid are very striking - we find 
strong evidence that countries that are perceived to be more corrupt receive less 
aid. This result is in stark contrast to those in the existing literature. Our results 
are robust to several sensitivity checks, including different measures of aid and 
also to taking into account the ordinal nature of the corruption measure. 
However, on closer inspection, and taking into account potential endogeneity 
problems, we find that we are unable to robustly assert that perceived corruption 
has a causal effect on aid receipts. 
As our primary results (that is, those obtained before addressing potential 
endogeneity problems) differ importantly from those of Alesina and Weder 
(2002), we explore these discrepancies in detail. Alesina and Weder (2002) 
examine total aid flows to 180 countries in the period 1975-1994. We replicate 
their results for the whole sample and we also examine aid receipts by region. 
Using their data, we find only weak evidence that in sub-Saharan Africa 
countries perceived as more corrupt receive less aid. However, when we update 
the data set for sub-Saharan Africa, 120 we again find that there is indeed a strong 
relationship between perceived corruption and aid receipts. As was the case 
120 Our updating exercise consisted of collecting data for the same time periods as Alesina and 
Weder (2002), from the same (updated) sources for the countries of sub-Saharan Aftica. The 
only source that is different is the one for UN voting similarity, as we could not access the 
original source. Note that we do not update the data set for the original 180 countries, as our 
main interest is in the region of sub-Saharan Africa. 
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with our main results, this correlation is robust to taking into account the ordinal 
nature of the corruption measure, but it is not robust to endogeneity issues. 
We also examine the impact of perceived corruption on sectoral aid 
receipts. Due to data limitations, we are unable to use the same time period 
(1982-1997) as for bilateral aggregate total aid. Unfortunately, there is only 
limited information about the evolution of sectoral aid over our time period - 
data is available for 1993-1994 and for only a few sectors. We find no evidence 
that aid receipts across sectors may be driven by paternalistic concerns of 
donors. It seems that a country's perceived corruption level is not significantly 
related to how aid receipts are distributed, in aggregate terms, across sectors. In 
addition, it seems that donors do not care disproportionately about improving 
basic health and education conditions. However, given the limited data 
available, this result may be driven by insufficient observations, in addition to 
other data limitations. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 summarizes some 
important results of the relevant literature on foreign aid allocation and aid 
receipts. Section 4.3 describes the theoretical framework that motivates our 
empirical analysis. Section 4.4 describes our data set. Section 4.5 provides 
evidence on bilateral aggregate total aid receipts. Section 4.6 explores the 
difference in our results compared with those obtained in Alesina and Weder 
(2002). Section 4.7 describes the results for bilateral aggregate aid receipts 
specific to different sectors, such as education and health. The last section 
contains concluding remarks. 
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4.2 Literature Review 
There is a very large literature on the reasons why foreign aid is given. 
Typically, studies focus on individual donor countries in order to explain their 
aid allocation decisions. However, some studies look at aid levels aggregated 
over several donors, therefore effectively studying the determinants of aid 
receipts by recipient countries, rather than aid allocation by donor countries [see. 
for example, Neumayer (2003c)]. Aid allocations are distinct from aid receipts, 
as the former relates to essentially individual donors' decisions, whereas the 
latter refers to aid funds received by recipient countries, and are aggregated, 
either by bilateral, multilateral donors, or both. Although aid receipts are 
implicitly based on aid allocation decisions, aggregate aid receipts can 
potentially mask different aid allocation decisions by different donors. 
The purpose of this section is not to comprehensively review this wide 
literature (which mostly focuses on aid allocation). Rather, its purpose is to 
enable an identification of the key broad objectives that are pursued when 
disbursing aid, and therefore which main variables (in addition to our main 
variable of interest, namely (perceived) corruption) should be included in an 
empirical analysis. Also, as one of the main purposes of this chapter is to relate 
our results to those of Alesina and Weder (2002), we do not attempt to 
comprehensively review the literature on aid allocation-' 21 
Foreign aid is a post World War 11 phenomenon. From the start of aid 
giving. the allocation of aid among countries reflected multiple objectives, such L- 
as meeting humanitarian objectives, rebuilding post-conflict societies or 
12 ' Reviews on the aid allocation literature can be found in, among others, White and 
McGillivray (199-3), McGillivray (200' 3b). McGillivray (2004). 
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supporting the strategic interests of the donor country. However, among the 
many different reasons for disbursing aid, two core objectives have been 
identified, namely, developmental and strategic. 
The first objective promotes poverty reduction and long-term economic 
growth in developing countries. The motivation for this objective has been 
stated as a combination of altruism, whereby the reward for aid donations is the 
4cwarm glow" from giving to people in need, and a self-interested concern that 
the growth of poorer countries would, in the long term, benefit the donors' 
economic and political security. If the purpose of aid is to meet the objective of 
poverty reduction, then it is necessary to control for recipient need in explaining 
aid allocation. As concerns recipient need, most studies focus on the recipient 
country's income level. Whilst some studies find that most donors give more 
aid to poorer countries [see, for example, Burnside and Dollar (2000), World 
Bank (1998a), Alesina and Weder (2002), Gates and Hoeffler (2004)], others 
find that poorer countries often tend to receive little aid [e. g., Maizels and 
Nissanke (1984) 122 , Boschini and 
Olofsgard (2001)]. Other studies find 
evidence of a 'middle-income' bias,, or a curvilinear relationship, i. e., that the 
amount of aid received is increasing in income but at a decreasing rate [e. g., 
Alesina and Dollar (2000)]. 
The existence of a negative relationship between aid and income should 
not be taken to indicate an anti -humanitarian bias in aid allocation. A more 
It should be noted, however, that the late 1970s and early 1980s empirical research tended to 
separately estimate recipient need and donor interest models (rather than allowing for a 
specification where both groups of variables where included). Subsequent studies that have 
corrected this methodological flaw [for example, McGillivray (2003a). McGillivray and 
Ozcowski (1991,1992), Berth6lemy and Tichit (2004)], have mostly found that aid is directed to 
poorer countries. 
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plausible explanation may be that aid tends to favour countries with adequate 
infrastructures (and thus at higher levels of economic development) that may be 
able to use such aid more efficiently than poorer countries. If this is the case, 
then perhaps the aid objective fits better with political and strategic interests 
rather than poverty reduction. 
In some studies, recipient need is interpreted more broadly to include 
other aspects of human development needs. Trumbull and Wall (1994) find that 
a higher infant mortality rate leads to greater bilateral and multilateral aid flows 
if both recipient and period specific factors are controlled for (i. e., in a panel set- 
up), but not if only period effects are considered (i. e., in a pooled cross-section 
set-up). McGillivray (2003a), using US data for 1980 and 96 developing 
countries, finds that aid allocations are not related to infant mortality rates. This 
result is robust to several modelling techniques. Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 
(1998) look at aid flows in the 1980s from the US, France, Japan and Sweden to 
36 African countries. Although they find that all donors give more aid to poorer 
countries, they also find that indicators reflecting more humanitarian needs, such 
as caloric intake and life expectancy, test insignificantly for all donors (except 
life expectancy for Japan). 123 Berthelemy and Tichit (2004) using a very rich 
data set covering 20 years (1980-1999), 22 donors and 137 recipients, and 
employing limited dependent variable techniques (estimating a Tobit model), 
find evidence that infant mortality rates (as well as primary school enrolment 
rates) tend to be considered by donors as a major indicator of recipient needs, 
rather than as a social perfon-nance variable. 
123, Note that Schraeder, Hook and Taylor (1998) use income primarily as a measure of economic 
potential. 
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The second objective promotes the short-term political and strategic 
interests of donors, where aid is primarily channelled to donors' political allies. 
McKinley and Little (1977) was one of the earlier contributions to the strand of 
literature that argues that foreign aid has also been used for the donors' own 
foreign policy interests. Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that recipient countries 
get more aid if voting in line with donors in the UN General Assembly, and that 
aid allocation is greatly influenced by fonner colonial status. Neumayer (2003a) 
confirms the finding with respect to former colonial status, finds that some 
donors give more aid to geographically closer countries and that almost all 
donor countries favour recipients that import a higher share of their (donors') 
exports. Neumayer (2003c) confirms the positive effect of colonial experience 
on both bilateral and multilateral aid flows. Other examples of studies where 
donor interest is key in the allocation of aid include Maizels and Nissanke 
(1984), who find total aid flows to be positively related to transfers of arms from 
the major donors in 1969-1970 and 1978-1980, and Boschini and Olofsgard 
(2001) who also find evidence that aid is used strategically. McGillivray 
(2003a) finds that anns transfers are a significant factor in explaining US aid 
allocation in 1980. McGillivray (2005), examining aid receipts of four African 
countries (Egypt, Morocco, Kenya and Tanzania) using 1968-1999 time series 
data, finds that the estimates attached to the donor interest variables are largely 
as expected. 
Recently, several bilateral donors have made democracy an explicitly 
stated goal of foreign assistance. As such, attention has been given to a third 
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objective in aid allocation, namely, that of good governance. 124 Most of the 
existing literature looks at the role of political and civil rights and personal 
integrity rights, focusing on aid allocation by the US [see, for example, 
Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985), Carleton and Stohl (1987), Poe (1992), 
Abrams and Lewis (1993), Poe and Sirirangsi (1994), Poe et al. (1994), 
Apodaca and Stohl (1999)]. Despite differences in data sets, time periods and 
estimation techniques, most studies conclude that countries with more respect 
for political freedom and, less clearly so, more respect for personal integrity 
rights receive more US aid. 
Fewer studies examine the effect of good governance on aid allocation 
by other donor countries. Svensson (1999) studies the influence of democracy 
in aid allocations by various donor countries, using a two-stage selection 
model. 125 He finds that in the first stage, more democratic countries (as 
measured by political and civil rights) positively impact the likelihood of 
receiving aid from Canada, Japan and the US, but not from Denmark, France, 
Gen-nany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the UK. In the second stage, the findings 
are that political and civil rights lead to the receipt of higher aid flows from 
Canada, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, but not from the remaining countries. 
It is suggested that for Gennany, Japan and the US pursuing political and 
strategic goals are more important and that for France and Italy it is colonial past 
rather than democracy that dictates who gets more aid. Alesina and Dollar 
(2000) find that aggregate bilateral aid flows reward democracies (as measured 
12' Note that, although the emphasis on democracy is relatively recent, McKinley and Little 
(1977) examine the effect of political stability and democracy on aid allocation. 
125 Note that Svensson (1999) assesses the partial correlation between aid flows and level of 
democracy but does not provide a detailed description of the patterns of allocations of aid. 
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by political rights). Furthermore, their results suggest that donors pay more 
attention to democratic institutions strictly defined rather than to a broader 
definition of civil rights or law enforcement. In their donor by donor results, 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that all the countries studied except Austria, 
Belgium, France and Italy allocate more aid to more democratic countries. 126 
Neumayer (2003a) analyses the role of human rights in aid allocation of 
the 21 countries that form the OECD's Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC). He finds that respect for political and civil rights plays a significant role 
for most donors at the aid eligibility stage, whereas personal integrity rights 
have a positive impact for few donors. At the level stage (i. e., when donors 
decide how much aid to allocate to eligible countries), most donors fail to 
consistently reward respect for human rights and often give more aid to 
countries with a poor record on either political/civil or personal integrity rights. 
Furthermore, no systematic difference is apparent between the like-minded 
countries,, 127 commonly regarded as committed to human rights, and the other 
donors. 
These results are confinned by Neumayer (2003b), who focuses on aid 
allocation in the 1990s. Gates and Hoeffler (2004) compare aid allocations of 
Nordic donors (Demnark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) to those of other 
bilateral donors during the period 1980-1999. The four Nordic countries, both 
in aggregate and individually, provide more aid to democracies. The evidence 
on human rights record is less clear-cut - in aggregate, Nordic countries do 
126 The other countries included are the US, the UK, Japan, Germany. Australia, the Netherlands, 
Canada and the Scandinavian countries lumped together. 
12' Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. 
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reward a good human rights record with more aid, although Denmark is the only 
individual Nordic country to do so. Other countries favouring good human 
rights are Canada and Japan (although the latter is only significant at the 10% 
level). 
We turn now to the main interest of this chapter, namely, the impact of 
corruption on aid flows. Here the literature is sparser, with, to our knowledge, 
only four studies specifically considering corruption (as opposed to other 
measures of governance) in aid allocations or aid receipts. Svensson (2000) 
develops a game-theoretic rent-seeking model to explore the relationship 
between the widespread level of corruption and other types of rent-seeking 
activities and concessional assistance. He provides some preliminary evidence 
in support of the hypothesis that foreign aid and windfalls are, on average, 
associated with higher perceived corruption in countries that are more likely to 
suffer from competing social groups. No evidence is found to support the 
hypothesis that countries perceived as less corrupt systematically receive more 
aid. 
Alesina and Weder (2002) find no evidence that aggregate bilateral or 
multilateral aid goes disproportionally to govermnents perceived to be less 
corrupt. This result holds both for their entire sample period of 1975-1994 and 
for the periods 1980-1989 and 1990-1994. In tenns of specific donors, they find 
that Australia and Scandinavia give more aid to governments perceived as less 
corrupt, although the US does not punish perceived corruption with less aid. 
They find no relationship between perceived corruption and multilateral aid 
flows. 
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Neumayer (2003b, 2003d) examines the pattern of aid giving in the 
1990s, with a particular emphasis on the role of good governance. Neumayer 
fails to find evidence that countries with lower perceived corruption are 
systematically rewarded with higher aid. This is true of both aggregate bilateral 
and multilateral aid,, as well as in terms of specific donors (except for Japan, 
who gives more aid to countries perceived as more corrupt, and Sweden, who 
gives more aid to governments perceived as less corrupt). 
The papers mentioned above fail to provide a theoretical framework for 
the relationships (or lack of relationships) they find between perceived 
corruption and aid. This is true for both aggregate and specific donors. The 
only exception is Svensson (2000), though the theoretical model developed 
seeks to explain the effect of aid on corruption instead of the reverse. There is 
also a tendency to ignore the heterogeneity of the countries included [with the 
exception of Neumayer (2003b, 2003d)]. We believe that this is an important 
aspect to explore, as explicitly taking into account the panel nature of a data set 
has several advantages (as referred in Chapter 2, Section 2.6). Also, these 
studies do not consider how the effect of perceived corruption in explaining aid 
allocations or aid receipts differs by region, particularly for regions that are 
especially afflicted by corruption. At most, some studies include a dummy 
variable for certain regions. This is useful for knowing whether those regions 
receive more or less aid, but this approach is not useful in terms of ascertaining 
the effect of corruption by region. 
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4.3 Theoretical Framework 
Consider a donor country that derives utility from two (groups of) goods, 
namely, domestic government consumption goods and foreign government 
projects. Domestic government consumption goods denote goods (and services) 
that the donor country believes will enhance the well-being of its population, 
such as hospitals and an effective transport network. Foreign goverranent 
projects may reflect developmental objectives such as helping to meet 
humanitarian needs, rebuilding post-conflict societies, or promoting strategic 
interests of the donor. Each of the two goods, domestic consumption (D) and 
foreign government projects (F), has a price (PD and PF, respectively) and the 
donor has a limited amount of money (M) to spend. Consider also that the 
recipient country has potentially corrupt government officials. Corrupt 
government officials divert funds from the donor's flows to their private use. 
Corruption acts as a tax (c) on donor flows, therefore, increasing the price of 
foreign goverrunent projects. The donor country is aware of the corruption of 
the officials in the recipient country, i. e., it knows about the existence of the 
corruption tax. The amount of aid that the donor disburses to a recipient country 
is given by PF F. 
Assume,, without loss of generality, that PD=p and pF=p+c. The donor's 
choice of how much aid to give is a standard demand problem. The donor will: 
Max U(D, F) 
S-t- PDD + PFF:! ý M. 
The first-order conditions are given by 
avaD 
PD 
VaD 
-P 
PF P+C, aVOF '3 YýF 
2-27 
We are interested in the comparative statics on aid of a change in the 
corruption tax. That is, we are interested in how total expenditure on F changes 
when its price changes, which is given by 
apý, F 
. 
Since F is itself a function of 
C9PF 
p,,, differentiating pFF with respect tO PF yields 
aPFF(pF) 
=F+PF . 
W. 
apF aPF 
Dividing both sides by F, we have 
aPFF1 
aF PF / aPF +-1+ CF, 
pF F aPF F 
Since F is positive, the sign of aPF will 
depend on whether EF, pF 
is 
greater than or less than - 1. If cF, PF >-I, demand is inelastic and the derivative is 
positive. The corruption tax and aid move in the same direction. lf CF, PF <-I !I 
demand is elastic and the derivative is negative. In this case, an increase in 
corruption will decrease aid. Note that if demand is unit elastic, then the 
corruption tax will have no impact on aid. 
Note that, for simplicity, we have assumed that D is the aggregate of all 
domestic projects and that F represents the aggregate of all foreign projects. 
The analysis extends easily to the case where multiple projects/sectors are 
explicitly considered. 
We have assumed that corruption acts as a quantity tax. However. it is 
possible that corruption may also act as a lump sum tax (C). That is, donors 
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must pay to have access to the recipient country. 128 In this case, aid is given by 
PFF(PF i, 
C) +C- 
By applying standard concepts of demand theory we are able to provide 
a plausible explanation for aid allocation choices by donor countries. 
If the donor's price elasticity of demand for foreign government projects 
is less than -1, then countries that are more corrupt will be allocated less aid. if, 
on the other hand, the donor's price elasticity of demand for foreign government 
projects is more than -1, say because the project is eradicating extreme hunger 
and poverty 129 or because the recipient is considered as an overall needy 
country, then the donor will allocate more aid to countries that are more corrupt. 
The main predictions of the model may be surnmarised as the following: 
1. Corruption acts as a tax on aid; 
2. Donors with interests in helping to promote projects that provide basic needs 
in recipient countries will allocate more aid to more corrupt countries; 
2'. Donors with interests in helping recipient countries they believe are in 
extreme need of assistance overall will allocate more aid to more corrupt 
countries; 
3. Donors who are interested in generally contributing to government projects 
in recipient countries, but don't consider any to be particularly essential, will 
give more aid to less corrupt countries. 
128 A donor might wish to provide aid to a given country or region as a signal to the international 
community that it cares, or because of potential new business, if the aid it gives is "tied", so that 
the recipient must buy/procure goods and/or services from finns fi7om the donor country. 
129Halvina poverty and hunger by 2015 is one of the eight UN Millennium Development Goals. 
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Note how this model can be applied generally to cases where aid is 
diverted from the donor's intended use, whether or not the diverted funds go 
into the pockets of government officials. For example, a donor might earmark 
aid funds for education,, but the recipient might want to use some of the aid for 
building roads, rather than using it all for education. Diverting funds for 
personal gain (i. e., corruption) is an extreme case in the more general model. 
Another case that can be studied by the model is, for example, when some funds 
are diverted for corruption and some for purposes/sectors other than those 
intended by the donor. 
Although this model has some appealing features, most notably its 
simplicity, it suffers from some non-negligible limitations in terms of its 
empirical applicability. It should be noted that aid allocation decisions are made 
by each donor individually. Each donor has an aid budget, which it will allocate 
across all potential recipient countries. So for each donor there is an inter- 
recipient allocation decision. In terms of empirical modelling of aid allocations, 
this means that each donor should be considered individually, and that even if 
one is interested in only one specific region or group of countries (in our case, 
we are only interested in sub-Saharan Africa), there is a need to take into 
account all potential recipients. 
Even in terms of modelling aid allocations, the focus of our framework 
on a donor's price elasticity of demand for foreign projects is too limited for 
empirical application. Consider the aid allocation decision of a given donor. 
Decisions of how much aid to allocate to recipients are made on the basis of 
several factors. As an illustration of this. one has only to think of the amounts 
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of aid that the US have directed towards Iraq since 2003. Furthermore, donors 
are not able to measure the unit price of a project. This means that donors' 
decision variables tend to be how much aid to allocate to a recipient country, 
and then, within that country, how much to allocate to each sector. Adding 
further complexities to aid allocation decisions, donors may instead decide to 
allocate aid firstly across sectors and only then across recipient countries. In 
addition, it is unlikely that a given donor will have the same price elasticity of 
demand across recipients. This might happen, for example, because aid to some 
recipients may be "tied", i. e., where procurement of goods or services is limited 
to the donor country (and so donor demand may be more inelastic in these 
cases). In addition, different donors may have a different elasticity for the same 
recipient. This may occur because different donors have different perceptions 
of corruption, or because donors have different preferences across recipients (for 
example, due to colonial ties). A related issue is that different donors may have 
different preferences across sectors. These different preferences may due to 
differing perceptions of how easy and/or frequent it is for government officials 
to extract bribes in certain sectors, or due to preferences unrelated to corruption 
levels, but instead related to other motivations (such as claiming that it was a 
major contributor, through its aid transfers, towards achieving the Millennium 
Development Goal of achieving universal primary education, for example). The 
elasticities may also change over time, as donors may become more aware of 
problems of corruption generally (for example, due to a more aggressive stance 
against corruption adopted by international institutions, such as the World 
Bank), or because better monitoring mechanisms may become available, so that 
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it may be easier to identify potential areas where they may be scope for corrupt 
activities. Finally, it may be the case that donors are not able to effectively 
distinguish between small differences in levels of corruption in different 
recipient countries (in the extreme, donors may even view recipients as simply 
either corrupt or not), so that donors' perceptions of corruption may not impact 
their aid allocation decisions. 
All of these limitations are compounded by the lack of measures on 
corruption that are able to capture these different factors (for example, that 
different donors may have different perceptions of corruption levels in the 
recipient countries). Indeed, data on corruption is generally available in the 
form of subjective, perceptions-based indices. These indices tend to capture 
several aspects of corruption, such as bribes paid in relation to police protection, 
obtaining import and export licenses, and so are not a true measure of the tax on 
aid flows. Indeed, corruption indices are subject to other limitations, as 
described in detail in Chapter 2, Section 2.4. In addition, there are no country 
(donor)- or sector-specific measures of corruption, or even of perceived 
corruption. 
Another limitation that should be highlighted is that, even if the simple 
theoretical model were able to explain how corruption (or perceptions of 
corruption) was factored into aid allocation decisions, it might not necessarily 
fully explain the link between corruption levels and aid receipts. Even though 
aid receipts are inherently/implicitly based on aid allocations, a focus on 
aggregate aid receipts can potentially mask different aid allocations decisions by 
different donors. So the estimated coefficient on percei,, 7ed corruption xvill be 
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capturing a weighted average elasticity. As N\c are interested in whether 
corruption in sub-Saharan Africa has impacted on the aid flows it receives (that 
is, we model aid receipts). this theoretical framework can provide a flavour of 
some of the forces that may be at work in aid allocations (subject to the 
limitations identified above). but cannot really be empirically tested and it is 
important to bear this in mind when examining the empirical results in this 
chapter. 
4.4 Data 
We have data for 32 sub-Saharan countries for the period 1982-1997.130 
We divide the sample period into four four-year periods, namely. 1982-1985, 
1986-1989ý 1990-1993 and 1994-1997. Thus, each country has four 
observations, data permitting, and our data set consists of panel data. ' 31 
Dividing the sample period into either four- or five-year periods is common in 
the literature, as it smoothes annual variability in the aid variables (as Bulir and 
Hamann (2003) point out, aid flows tend to be quite volatile), allows for an 
increase in the size of the sample (as it allows the inclusion of countries that 
have missing observations for some years), whilst also allowing to explore the 
time dimension in the data. 
The dependent variable - aid 
130 The countries in the sample are: Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo 
(Republic), Cote d'lvoire, Ethiopia, Gabon. Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau. Kenya, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi. Mali. Mozambique, Namibia, Niger. Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(formerly Zaire), Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
13 ' Refer to Appendix 4. A for more details on the sample, including outliers. 
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The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD is the 
main source of comprehensive and internationally comparable data on aid flows. 
The OECD defines aid 132 as non-military grants and concessional loans that 
have at least a 25% grant component. Data on both commitments and 
disbursements are available. Commitments represent firm written obligations 
by the donors, backed by the appropriation or availability of the necessary 
funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under specified financial terms 
and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of a recipient country 
or a multilateral agency. As such, commitments measure donors' intentions 
during a reporting year. On the other hand, disbursements refer to the release of 
funds to - or the purchase of goods or services for -a recipient. Disbursements, 
therefore, refer to the amount spent, that is, the actual international transfer of 
resources. So, whereas commitments refer to donor intentions of funds 
transfers, disbursements refer to actual transfers. 
Disbursements differ from commitments for a variety of reasons. 
Firstly, recipients may not actually draw upon all the commitments [White and 
McGillivray (1993,1995)]. Secondly, sudden emergencies (such as natural 
disasters or a severe famine) can affect disbursements. Thirdly, aid 
disbursements could be linked to performance in terms of results, or fulfilment 
of conditionalities. 
When studying aid allocation, aid commitments rather than actual 
disbursements are a better candidate for the dependent variable, as the former 
13,2 Aid to Part I recipients (developing countries and territories) is denoted by Official 
Development Assistance, whereas aid to Part 11 recipients (countries and territories in transition) 
is denoted by Official Aid. 
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better reflects the donors' decision making. Note that we model aid receipts 
rather than aid allocations, so that data on aid disbursements could be used. 
However, as donor allocation decisions are implicit in the modelling of aid 
receipts, we primarily use data on commitments. We also perform sensitivity 
tests using data on disbursements, to ascertain whether the choice of 
commitments versus disbursements affects the results (we find it does not). 
In terms of donor practices regarding aid expenditures, although donors 
work with annual aid budgets, budgetary planning tends to be multi-year 
(typically 3-5 years) [OECD (2007)]. That is, although annual aid commitments 
are made, donors tend to have multi-year aid commitments frameworks with 
recipients. In principle, the annual aid commitments should be disbursed within 
the year, although that may not always be the case, for some of the reasons 
referred to above. 
Aid is also characterised by whether it is bilateral or multilateral. 
Bilateral transactions are those undertaken by a donor country directly with an 
aid recipient. Bilateral assistance is administered by agencies of donor 
governments (such as the US Agency for International Development or Japan's 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund). Multilateral assistance is funded by 
contributions from donor countries and administered by agencies such as the 
United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank. 133 We focus on 
bilateral aid. Our objective is to estimate a full model of aid receipts so that we 
13 1 Note that in the case of a multilateral aid agency, if any donor country contributing to it 
effectively controls the disposal of the funds by specifying the recipient or other aspects of the 
disbursement (e. g. purpose, terms, total amount, reuse of any repayments), then the contribution 
should be classified as bilateral. It is crucial that a multilateral agency pools contributions so 
that they lose their identity and become an integral part of its financial assets. 
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can see the relative importance of corruption in the recipient country versus 
poverty, institutions and policy, as well as the political -strategic interests of 
onors. 134 Furthermore, most authors find that the determinants of bilateral and 
multilateral aid are quite different. 
135 
As well as examining total aid flows, we are also interested in the 
sectoral breakdown of aid. Analysing sectoral aid receipts will provide some 
indication of the donors' (albeit aggregate) beliefs of the relative importance of 
certain sectors. For example, it is plausible that donors will be concerned about 
the level of primary education in the recipient country. Indeed, one of the eight 
Millennium Development Goals is to achieve universal primary education by 
2015. Although the annual reporting in the DAC tables is insufficiently detailed 
to produce all the data required for consideration of specific policy issues, it is 
supplemented by reporting on individual transactions in the Creditor Reporting 
System (CRS). 136 
The CRS sector classification contains the following broad categories: ' 37 
- social infrastructure and services (covering the sectors of education, health, 
population, water, government and civil society); 
- economic inftastructure and services (covering transport, comrnunications, 
energy, banking and finance, business services); 
134 Note that although we model aid receipts, rather than aid allocations (i. e., the donors' 
essentially bilateral decisions), donors' allocation decisions are implicit in aid receipts. 
1 335 See Maizels and Nissank-e (1984) on the difference between bilateral and multilateral aid. 
Frey and Schneider (1986), among others, study the determinants of multilateral aid. 
136 The definitions used in both reporting systems are consistent. 
1 337 Please refer to Appendix 4.13 for greater detail on the sectoral breakdown contained in the 
CRS. 
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- production (covering agriculture, forestry, fishing. industry, mining, 
construction, trade, tourism); 
- multisector1cross-cutting (covering general environmental protection, women 
in development, other multisector including urban and rural development); 
and 
- non-sector allocable (for contributions not susceptible to allocation by sector 
such as balance of payments support, actions relating to debt, emergency 
assistance and internal transactions in the donor country). 
As in the case of total aid flows, we are interested in bilateral sector- 
specific aid. Finally, all aid variables are converted into purchasing parity 
constant 2000 US$ using deflators in OECD (2005a) and then divided by the 
recipients' real (PPP) GDP, using GDP figures from the World Bank's (2005a) 
World Development Indicators. The aid variables are then logged to render 
their distribution less skewed. 
It is worth elaborating on the choice of scaling the aid variables, 
and in particular, of scaling by GDP rather than by population. On the choice of 
scaling the aid variables, this is so that we capture a measure of the value of aid 
receipts, that is, of the relative importance of aid flows to the recipients. 
Although some papers in the literature (whether they consider aid allocation or 
aid receipts) use measures of aid per capita, this is conceptually inappropriate. 
Firstly, it does not provide a good approximation to donors' aid decision-making 
process in practice. Donors' decisions typically involve distributing aid from a 
predetermined pool of funds, and distributing aid in per capita terms would be. 
as McGillivraN7 and Oczkowski (1992). and White and McGillivray (1993) point 
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out, "both a difficult and cumbersome task ". Secondly, aid per capita is not the 
measure of the relative importance of aid flows that recipients focus on. Indeed, 
aid flows are just a component of funds flows to recipients Oust think of foreign 
direct investment) and these are typically considered as a proportion of GDP, 
not in per capita terms. In addition, a focus on aid per capita ignores biases in 
the cross-country patterns of aid receipts. Even early studies, such as Isenman 
(1976), argued that the use of per capita aid gives "too much weight" to small 
countries. The pattern of cross-country aid per capita receipts differs from that 
of aid as per cent of GDP receipts. The existence of systematic biases must be 
acknowledged. These biases are that relatively rich countries with small 
populations tend to have low aid as per cent of GDP, but high aid per capita; 
whereas very poor, yet populous countries will tend to have high aid as per cent 
of GDP and low aid per capita. Depending on the countries included in a given 
sample, these biases may distort the results obtained. To test whether our choice 
of aid as per cent of GDP affects the results, and mainly to compare our results 
with other studies [in particular, Alesina and Weder (2002)], we also include 
results obtained by estimating our model of aid receipts using aid per capita. 
The main explanatory variable - perceived corruption 
138 
Our main objective is to explain whether less corrupt countries in sub- 
Saharan Africa receive more aid from bilateral donors (in the aggregate). 
Although corruption is difficult to measure, several indices that attempt to 
measure some facets of corruption are available. Some of the indices are based 
138 Note that the corruption index we use measures perceived corruption. 
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on polls of experts, some on surveys of entrepreneurs, whereas others 
incorporate/aggregate several independent sources. Therefore, these are indices 
of perceived corruption. Some examples of sources of these subjective indices 
are the Economist Intelligence Unit, Political Risk Services, Business and 
Environmental Risk Intelligence, Transparency International and the World 
Bank. Fortunately, as detailed in Mauro (1995), the data for the various 
indices, including measures of various aspects of bureaucratic efficiency, are 
highly correlated. 
As we are interested in examining aid flows to sub-Saharan African 
countries, our choice of corruption index hinges primarily on the availability of 
data for these countries and secondarily on the longest time-series. As in 
Chapter 2, we opt for the index of corruption drawn from the ICRG, 139 compiled 
by Keefer and Knack (1998) and distributed by the Institutional Refon-n and 
Informal Sector Centre at the University of Maryland, as it is available for the 
time period 1982-1997 for 37 African countries, 32 of which are sub-Saharan. 
Moreover,, it is the only measure of perceived corruption that is comparable over 
time. 
The ICRG corruption index, based on polls of experts, is scored from 
zero to six, where low scores indicate "high government officials are likely to 
demand special payments " and "illegal payments are generally expected 
throughout lower levels of government" in the form of "bribes connected with 
import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy 
protection, or loans " [Keefer and Knack (1995)]. As in Chapter 2, we transfonn 
139Described in detail by Keefer and Knack (1995). 
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the ICRG corruption index so that 0= least corrupt; 10 = most corrupt. Further 
details on the ICRG corruption index can be found in Chapter 2, Section 2.4. 
It is important to bear in mind that the subjective nature of corruption 
measures has implications in terms of the conclusions and assertions that may be 
made in empirical studies employing these measures as if they had cardinal 
meaning. So, as in Chapter 2, we perform sensitivity tests by reclassifying the 
corruption index into bands or categories, and using these bands instead of the 
index. 
The remaining explanatory variables 
We control for other determinants of receipts of foreign aid. We use 
variables measuring recipients' humanitarian need, their size, the quality of their 
institutions and policy, as well as variables capturing the strategic interests of 
donors. 
Our measure of recipient need is its level of income, as measured by 
GDP per capita in purchasing parity constant 2000 US$ from the World Bank's 
(2005a) World Development Indicators. This is the single most common (and 
frequently only) variable of recipient need included in studies of aid 
allocation/receipts. In terms of variables measuring the quality of the political 
system, we include a measure of whether the recipient country is a democracy, 
as donor countries may discriminate against non-democratic governments. We 
use the variable POLITY 140 from the Gurr, Jaggers and Marshall (2003) Polity 
140 The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score fi7om the DEMOC score. 
The AUTOC variable measure institutionalized autocracy in an additive eleven-point scale (-10 
to 0), whereas the DEMOC variable measures institutionalized democracy also in an additive 
Footnote continues on ncxl page. 
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IV data set, rescaled so that it ranges from 0 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly 
democratic). 
We also include a variable measuring respect for personal integrity rights 
with data from the Purdue Political Terror Scales (PTS) [Gibney (2005)]. 141 
One of the two PTS is based on information from Amnesty InternationaYs 
annual human rights reports, whilst the other is based on information from the 
US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Both 
measures report on a scale of I (best) to 5 (worst). We rescale the PTS such that 
I means worst and 5 means best human rights perfon-nance. We use the US 
Department of State PTS, but results are unaffected by using either the Amnesty 
International PTS, or an average of the two. 
Some researchers use the Freedom House index of civil and political 
freedom to measure countries' human rights records. Yet there has been some 
confusion as to whether these indices should be considered measures or 
determinants of human rights. Indeed, the index has been used by researchers 
both as a measure of the human right to civil and political freedom and as a 
measure of democracy (which is considered to be an important determinant of 
human rights practices) [Vanhanen (2000)]. 
We control for historical, political and strategic links with donors. 
Former colonial powers usually have remaining political, economic, cultural and 
other interests in their former colonies. As such, a variable measuring the 
eleven-point scale (0 to 10). Note that the two scales do not share any categories in common. 
The POLITY score originally ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly 
democratic). 
"' The PTS were originally developed by Michael Stohl and were updated under the 
management of Mark Gibney. both from Purdue University. The PTS data set is available at 
http: ///xN, NN,, \N,. unca. edu/politicalscience/images/Colloquium/faculty-stafflgibney. html. 
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number of years a recipient country has been a colony since 1900 is used. This 
variable is constructed using information from the CIA (2005) World Factbook. 
As a measure of donor strategic interests we use a political similarity variable 
that draws from voting behaviour in the UN General Assembly [Gartzke 
(2006)]. Values for the Affinity data range from -1 (least similar interests) to I 
(most similar interests). We rescale the Affinity data to show the percentage of 
times the recipient country voted in the same way as country X. Alesina and 
Dollar (2000) and Alesina and Weder (2002) argue that UN voting patterns may 
be an accurate signal of alliances and common interest. We also include another 
measure of strategic importance, namely, arms imports as a proportion of GDP. 
This measure reflects the assumption that donors interested in promoting their 
security would favour recipients that maintain relatively large military 
establishments and would,, therefore, be able to act as surrogates for the donor 
within their specific regions. 
Finally, we control for economic policies in the recipient countries by 
using a measure on openness. Our measure of openness is a zero-one index 
developed by Sachs and Warner (1995), and updated by Easterly, Levine and 
Roodman (2004). According to this measure, a country is classified as "closed" 
if at least one of the following five criteria apply: (i) nontariff barriers cover 
40% or more of trade; (n) average tariff rates are 40% or more; (iii) the black 
market exchange rate is depreciated by 20% or more relative to the official 
exchange rate, (iv) the country has a socialist economic system; and (v) the state 
holds a monopoly on major exports. As we are more interested in an indicator 
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of policy stance rather than openness strictly defined, we favour this index over 
a simple measure of trade, such as imports and exports as a proportion of GDP. 
It should be noted that some of the variables do not vary greatly over 
time or by country. Two examples are the number of years a recipient country 
has been a colony since 1900 and the Sachs and Warner openness measure. 
Most of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa became independent in the early 
1960s, so that our variable will cluster around 60-65. The openness measure 
will also tend to cluster around "not open" until the late 1980s to early 1990s. 
These limitations will have implications on the ability of the variables to control 
for different country characteristics and over time. 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the variables used (including for the 
sensitivity checks). Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics and Table 4.3 
reports the correlations between the main variables. We also present a 
scatterplot of aid against long-run perceived corruption (Figure 4.1) and 
graphically present how aid has evolved by period, for countries with lower and 
higher perceived corruption (Figure 4.2). The raw data seems to indicate that 
sub-Saharan African countries perceived as more corrupt receive less aid. 
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Table 4.1: Description and sources of data 
Variable Description Source 
Log(DAC bilateral aid Natural Logarithm of Bilateral Official OECD (2005a) 
commitments, as per Development Assistance by DAC donors, 
cent of GDP) as per cent of GDP - commitments 
Log(DAC bilateral aid Natural Logarithm of Bilateral Official OECD (2005a) 
commitments p. c. ) Development Assistance by DAC donors 
per capita - commitments (2000 US$) 
Log(DAC bilateral aid Natural Logarithm of Bilateral ODA OECD (2005b) 
commitments to sector commitments by DAC donors for sector X, 
X, as per cent of GDP) as per cent of GDP 
Corruption ICRG Corruption index Keefer and Knack 
Originally, 0-most corrupt; 6-least corrupt. (1998) 
Transformation: 0-least corrupt; 10-most 
corrupt 
Democracy Measure of democracy, polity. Originally, Gurr, Jaggers and 
ranged from -10 (strongly autocratic) to Marshall (2003) 
+10 (strongly democratic). 
Transformation: 0 (strongly autocratic); 10 
(strongly democratic). 
Years as a colony Number of years as a colony since 1900 CIA (2005) 
Openness Proportion of years in the period in which Sachs and Warner 
the country is open (1995); Easterly, 
Levine and 
Roodman (2004) 
Log(GDP per capita) Natural Logarithm of Real (PPP) GDP per World Bank 
capita, 2000 US$, beginning of period (2005a) 
Human rights Measure of respect for human rights, PTS - Gibney (2005) 
US Department of State 
Originally, ranged from I (best) to 5 
(worst). 
Transformation: I-worst and 5-best human 
rights perfon-nance. 
Arms imports Arms imports as % GDP World Bank 
(2005a) 
X-UN_friend Measure of UN voting similarity with Gartzke (2006) 
country X. 
Originally, ranged from -1 (most dissimilar) 
to I (most similar). 
Affi. nity data rescaled to show the 
percentage of times the recipient country 
voted in the same way as country X. 
Log(Population) Natural Logarithm of Population (millions) World Bank 
(2005a) 
Log(DAC bilateral aid Natural Logarithm of Bilateral ODA by OECD (2005a) 
net disbursements, as DAC donors, as per cent of GDP - net 
per cent of GDP) disbursements 
Log(Bilateral EDA, as 
- Natural Logarithm of Bilateral Effective Chang et al. (1998) 
per cent of GDP) Development Assistance by DAC donors, 
as per cent of GDP - disbursements 
Log(Multilateral/Total Natural Logarithm of Multi I ateral/Total OD OECD (2005a) 
aid commitments, as - commitments, as per cent of GDP 
per cent of GDP) 
Log(Multilateral/Total Natural Logarithm of Multi I aterah'Total OECD (2005a) 
aid net disbursements, ODA - net disbursements, as per cent of 
as per cent of GDP) GDP 
214 4 
Variable Description Source 
Log(Multilateral/Total Natural Logarithm of Multilateral/Total Chang et a]. (1998) 
EDA, as per cent of Effective Development Assistance- 
GDP) disbursements, as per cent of GDP 
Years as an Number of years as an independent country CIA (2005) 
independent country since 1900 
Log(Infant mortality) Natural Logarithm of Mortality rate, infant World Bank 
(per 1,000 live births) (2005a) 
Military expenditure Military expenditure (% of central World Bank 
government expenditure) (2005a) 
Political Rights Measure of political rights, recoded as: I Freedom House 
(lowest degree of freedom), 7 (highest (2005) 
degree of freedom) 
Civil Liberties Measure of civil liberties, recoded as: I Freedom House 
(lowest degree of freedom), 7 (highest (2005) 
degree of freedom) 
Trade Trade (imports + exports) as % GDP World Bank 
(2005a) 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DAC bilateral aid 
commitments, % GDP 116 2.8 2.1 0.01 8.9 
Population 128 14.7 18.8 0.7 112.9 
GDP p. c. 116 2014.4 2175.2 480.9 11071.1 
Openness 111 0.2 0.4 0 1 
Democracy 125 3.3 2.5 0.5 9.5 
Human rights 128 3.2 1.0 1 5 
Corruption 126 5.4 1.9 0 10 
Arms imports 123 8.7 29.7 0 281.1 
US-UN_friend 126 50.1 13.0 37.9 100 
JAPAN_UN_ friend 126 91.2 3.4 83.4 100 
UK_UN_ friend 126 75.7 6.2 67.6 100 
FRANCE_LJN_friend 126 80.9 5.4 74.1 100 
Years as a colony 128 58.1 19.1 0 90 
DAC bilateral aid 
commitments p. c. 126 36.1 28.0 0.39 147.6 
DAC bilateral aid net 
disbursements, % GDP 116 2.6 2.0 0.01 8.3 
EDA aid, % GDP. 106 2.0 1.6 0.02 7.5 
Multilateral aid 
commitments, % GDP. 116 1.9 1.8 0.01 11.2 
Multilateral aid net 
disbursements, % GDP. 116 1.6 1.5 0.01 7.4 
Multilateral EDA aid, % 
GDP 106 1.5 1.6 0.03 12.7 
Total aid commitments, % 
GDP 116 4.8 3.8 0.02 21.3 
Total aid net disbursements, 
% GDP 116 4.3 3.4 0.02 15.80 
Total EDA aid, % GDP 106 3.6 2.9 0.09 16.8 
Infant mortality 128 106.6 33.3 49.5 191.5 
Civil Liberties 127 2.9 1.2 1 6 
Years as an independent 128 31.4 19.6 0 95.5 
country 
Trade 119 60.8 28.4 14.8 149.3 
Political rights 127 2.7 1.5 1 6.8 
Military expenditures 114 13.7 11.8 2.9 62.3 
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Figure 4.1: Scatterplot of aid against perceived corruption 
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4.5 Evidence on Bilateral Aggregate Total Aid Flows 
4.5.1 Estimation Technique 
We have data for 32 sub-Saharan countries for the period 1982-1997. As 
we divide the sample period into four four-year periods, each country has four 
observations, data permitting, and our data set consists of panel data. We 
explicitly take into account the panel nature of the data set. By doing so it is 
possible to account for unobserved country heterogeneity, i. e., heterogeneity of 
countries that is not fully captured by the explanatory variables. 
We estimate a fixed effects (FE) model. FE models may be estimated by 
pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) on the deviations from the group means 
(i. e., on time-demeaned data) - this estimator is called the within-group (WG) 
estimator. Note that any potential correlation of the explanatory variables with 
the time-invariant individual country effects is avoided by wiping them out of 
the equation to be estimated. One disadvantage is that the coefficients of time- 
invariant variables cannot be estimated. 
D117 
RE models may be estimated by Generalised Least Squares (GLS). The 
GLS estimator is simply the pooled OLS estimator of the quasi-demeaned data. 
The GLS estimator takes into account the variation within, as well as between 
countries, therefore, exploring the cross-sectional and time-series dimensions of 
the data. Its efficiency, however, holds only if the countries' unobserved 
heterogeneity is uncorrelated with their observed characteristics. 
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Our choice between the RE and FE models is based on the Hausman 
test. 142 All the regressions presented reject the hypothesis that the coefficients 
estimated by GLS and WG do not systematically differ from each other 
(Hausman specification test). Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the 
individual country effects can be treated as random effects and that the 
coefficients of the GLS estimator are free from unobserved heterogeneity bias. 
Note also, that when estimating the FE model, we find that the correlation 
between estimates of the unobserved time-invariant country effects and the 
fitted values are typically quite high. This seems to indicate that there may well 
be correlation between the unobserved effect and the explanatory variables, and 
that estimating a FE model is appropriate. 
4.5.2 Results 
We begin with several regressions explaining bilateral aid flows. The 
dependent variable is the log of DAC bilateral aid commitments as per cent of 
GDP and our main explanatory variable of interest is perceived corruption. We 
use two specifications - in the first one, we include indicators of recipient need 
and governance; in the second specification, we add indicators of strategic 
interests. 
Table 4.4 reports our results for the whole sample. Column [1] shows 
the results of our base specification and column [2] shows the results of the full 
142 Note that some authors, such as Lloyd, Morrissey and Osei (2001), prefer to consider the 
Hausman test as a test for efficiency against consistency. Briefly, this is because the WG 
estimator may be used to estimate a RE model as well as a FE model, even though it is a 
consistent but inefficient estimator of the RE model, whereas GLS is both a consistent and 
efficient estimator of the RE model. 
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model. Note that, following the literature, we are assuming that the corruption 
measure has cardinal meaning, so that we refer to the magnitude of coefficient 
estimates in the discussion of results, rather than to simply their sign and 
significance. Section 4.5.4 contains a sensitivity analysis that explicitly 
considers the corruption measure as ordinal. 
Perceived corruption has a significant negative impact on aid flows -a 
one point increase in corruption, say from Zimbabwe's average of six points to 
Sudan's average of seven points, decreases aid commitments as per cent of GDP 
by 14% to 15%. Ceteris Paribus, a country that is relatively corrupt (one 
standard deviation above the mean) receives 23 to 25% less aid as per cent of 
GDP. 
The coefficient on the population variable indicates evidence of a strong 
population bias -a country that is relatively smaller (one standard deviation 
below the mean) receives 223 to 372% more aid as per cent of GDP. The result 
of a population bias is consistent with Trumbull and Wall (1994) and Dowling 
and Hiemenz (1985), among others. One of the explanations advanced for the 
population bias is that smaller countries tend to receive proportionately more 
aid, as donors want to "show the flag" widely [Knack (200 1)]. 
Our measure of recipient need, GDP per capita, is not significant in 
either specification. In the full specification, our measure for economic policies, 
openness, is weakly significant, with more open countries receiving more aid. A 
relatively more open country (one standard deviation above the mean) receives 
12% more aid as per cent of GDP. In the full specification there is a slight 
evidence of discrimination against non-democratic countries -a strongly 
'151 
democratic country receives 57% more aid than a strongly autocratic country. 
Being relatively democratic (one standard deviation above the mean) implies 
receiving 15% more aid as per cent of GDP. Respect for human rights is only 
significant in explaining aid receipts in the base specification, where an 
improvement of one point in the Political Terror Scale leads to 16% more aid. 
A country relatively more respectful of human rights (one standard deviation 
above the mean) receives 15% more aid as per cent of GDP. 
In terms of donor strategic interests, the variable arms imports as per 
cent of total imports behaves in the opposite way as expected. Arms imports 
significantly reduce the amount of aid receipts -a country with 10% more arms 
imports receives 3% less aid. This significant negative correlation is robust to 
using military expenditure (as per cent of central government expenditure) 
instead. It is generally argued that donors tend to favour countries with large 
military establishments, thereby enabling them to act as surrogates for the donor 
within their specific region. However, in the sub-Saharan African context, a 
substantial military might raise concerns about civil wars or guerrilla warfare. 
In that case, it is plausible that donors might not want to reward bellicose 
countries. Another explanation is that the share of government expenditures 
spent on military purposes may be viewed as an indicator for good governance, 
rather than for donor strategic interests - recipients with lower military 
expenditures (the minimum above what is necessary to fulfil the reasonable 
security interests of a country) have better governance [Neumayer (2003b)]. In 
this case, then one would expect that countries with smaller militarv 
expenditures would receive more foreign aid. 
'752 
Of the variables on voting pattern in the UN General Assembly, only 
voting with Japan is significant. UN voting similarity to Japan leads to 
increases in aid commitments. Alesina and Dollar (2000) also find that for the 
period 1970-1995, the variable "Japan UN friend" has a significant positive 
coefficient with values similar to the one we obtain. In terms of other results in 
the literature, Alesina and Dollar (2000) find the coefficient on "US U`N friend"' 
to be significant (and positive) only when they omit their dummies on whether 
the recipient is Israel or Egypt. Alesina and Weder (2002) find that neither 
"Japan UN friend" nor "US U`N friend" are significant. 
Appendix 4. C (Table 4. C. 1) provides the results for the sample 
excluding outliers. Neither the significance nor the sign of the coefficient on the 
corruption variable is affected by the exclusion of outliers. Columns [F] and 
[2'] show the results excluding the outliers for logged aid as per cent of GDP. 
Removing the outliers for logged aid as per cent of GDP slightly increases the 
magnitude of the coefficient on perceived corruption. The remainder of the 
results stays more or less unchanged, except that for [I'] respect for human 
rights is no longer significant and for [2] openness is no longer significant. For 
the remainder of the chapter we omit the regression results excluding outliers, as 
these do not essentially affect the coefficient on the corruption variable and the 
results on the remaining variables are substantially unaffected. Note that there 
are no outliers for aid as per cent of GDP- 
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Table 4.4: Bilateral Aggregate Aid Commitments as per cent of GDP 
_Dependent 
variable: Log (DAC bilateral aid commitments, per centof GDP) 
P] [2] 
Log(Population) 
-1.857*** -3.123*** [0.362] [0.484] 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.472 -0.44 [0.469] [0.391] 
Openness 0.264 0.292* 
[0.174] [0.162] 
Democracy 0.048** 0.057*** 
[0.023] [0.019] 
Human Rights 0.161 * 0.087 
[0.082] [0.072] 
Corruption -0.139*** -0.149*** 
[0.046] [0.038] 
Arms imports 
-0.003*** 
[0.001] 
Friend of US -0.008 
[0.011] 
Friend of Japan 0.103*** 
[0.022] 
Friend of UK -0.044 
[0.026] 
Friend of France 0.007 
[0.020] 
Constant 7.960** 4.419 
[3.292] [3.495] 
Observations 99 97 
Countries 28 28 
R20.434 0.658 
Hausman Test (D-value) 0.001 0.000 
White heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Country specific dummies included 
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4.5.3 Robustness Checks 
Dependent variable 
Our results on the impact of perceived corruption on the receipts of 
bilateral aggregate aid provide strong consistent evidence that, in aggregate, 
donors tend to reward countries perceived as less corrupt with more aid. Given 
that our results differ from the literature, we are interested in checking whether 
they are robust to several sensitivity checks. 
Our first sensitivity check regards testing whether our results are affected 
by using aid per capita instead of aid as per cent of GDP. Although expressing 
the aid variable in per capita terms is conceptually inappropriate (as was 
discussed in Section 4.4), it has been used in the literature. Therefore, to 
compare our results to those in other studies, and in particular to those in 
Alesina and Weder (2002), we estimate our model of aid receipts using aid per 
capita. 
143,144 Table 4.5 reports the results obtained when (log of) ODA 
commitments per capita is the dependent variable. Neither the significance nor 
the sign of the coefficient on the perceived corruption variable is affected by 
using aid per capita instead of aid as per cent of GDP. Using aid per capita 
slightly increases the magnitude of the coefficient on perceived corruption. The 
143 Note that, given we define the old dependent variable (aid/GDP) in logarithmic form, and we 
have population and GDP per capita in logarithmic form as regressors, when we define the new 
dependent variable (aid per capita) in logarithmic forin, if we were using annual data, only the 
coefficient on GDP per capita would change under the new specification. The coefficients on the 
other regressors would remain unaffected. However, as we are considering period averages, this 
does not happen when we redefine the dependent variable, and all the estimated coefficients are 
different. Please refer to Appendix 4.13 for ftirther details. 
144 When the dependent variable is defined as aid per capita, including population as an 
explanatory variable allows for verifying the existence of a population bias. Studies as early as 
those of Isenman (1976) show that less populous countries tend to receive more aid per capita. 
Reasons for this bias include that donors might not want to concentrate aid in a group of few 
ý, erý' populous countries. 
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remainder of the results stays more or less unchanged, except that for the full 
specification [2] openness is no longer significant and UN voting similarity with 
the UK leads to smaller receipts of aid. The coefficient on our variable for -UK 
UN friend" is not straightforward to justify. One possible explanation is that aid 
is being used as a means to achieve economic and political access in politically 
hostile countries, e. g., the UK securing orders for domestic manufacturers in 
certain sub-Saharan African countries that are not politically aligned with the 
UK. Instead of regarding a negative coefficient on the UN friend variable for 
the UK as the imposition of a penalty or a punishment on their "friends", it 
could be interpreted as meaning that UK "friends" do not need any rewards, but 
those hostile to them (i. e., those recipients that vote less in accordance to them 
in the UN) do. 
145 
Although using aid per capita instead of aid as per cent of GDP broadly 
did not alter our results, we present results on further sensitivity checks using 
aid as per cent of GDP rather than aid per capita, as the former is the more 
correct measure of aid to use when studying aid receipts. 146 
Our second sensitivity check regards different data for bilateral 
aggregate aid flows. In the first instance, we check whether our results are 
robust to using OECD data on net disbursements, rather than commitments. 
Commitments measure donors' intentions, whereas disbursements represent the 
realisation of donors' intentions and the implementation of policies. As would 
145 Just as it is Plausible one might make less of an effort when having old friends for dinner 
compared with having new acquaintances round whom one wants to impress and wants to 
become friends with. Of course this means one is not interested in friendship per se, but rather 
on what benefits one may derive from them. 
146 Note that the results from the sensitivity checks are also robust to using aid per capita. 
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be expected, the two are highly correlated. As we are modelling aid receipts, it 
is appropriate to compare results using aid commitments with those for aid 
disbursements, as variables which capture the recipients' behaviour (such as, but 
not only, corruption) could have different effects on the different aid flows 
(especially if aid disbursements are more responsive to these behaviours). 
Table 4.6 reports the results obtained using (log of) net ODA 
disbursements as per cent of GDP as the dependent variable. Using net 
disbursements does not affect our main result on perceived corruption. The 
coefficients on the other variables are mainly unaffected. 
Net ODA disbursements measure the disbursements of grants and highly 
concessional loans (loans with a grant element 147 of at least 25%) minus 
amortization. Chang et al. (1998) argue that net ODA is not an appropriate 
measure of aid flows. They provide several reasons why net ODA does not 
represent the true value of resource transfer from donor to recipient. Two of the 
reasons are that net ODA includes the full face value of grants and highly 
concessional loans without distinguishing between the two (even though 
concessional loans entail repayments); and net ODA ignores loans with low 
concessionality even though they have a certain, even if low, grant element. ' 48 
Given the shortcomings of net ODA, Chang et al. (1998) develop a new 
data set of aid flows, which they call Effective Development Assistance (EDA). 
This data set is based on the World Bank's Debtor Reporting System, which 
attempts to correct most of the methodological shortcomings of the ODA 
measure. Technical assistance is excluded from EDA, as it is usually tied (i. e.. 
"' That is, the subsidy implicitly included in the loan, relative to the loans* face value. 
148 Refer to Chang et al. (1998) for the complete list of reasons. 
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the donors require that goods and services are bought from the donor countries) 
and Chang et al. (1998) are unable to precisely estimate its grant equivalence. 
In principle, EDA provides a better measure of aid than ODA, although they are 
highly correlated, as Chang et al. (1998) note. 149 We check whether our results 
are robust to using EDA as opposed to ODA data. 
Our results are also robust to using (log of) EDA as per cent of GDP as 
the dependent variable. As can be seen from Table 4.7, the correlation with 
perceived corruption is maintained when using this measure of aid flows. The 
coefficients on the other variables are broadly consistent with our results using 
ODA commitments. One exception is worth noting. In the full specification 
there is evidence that UN voting similarity with the US actually decreases EDA 
aid received. One possible explanation is that aid is being used as a means to 
achieve economic and political access in politically hostile countries, e. g., the 
US securing orders for Boeing in certain African countries that are not 
politically aligned with the US. Instead of regarding a negative coefficient on 
the UN friend variable for the US as the imposition of a penalty or a punishment 
on their friends, it could be interpreted as meaning that US friends do not need 
any rewards, but those hostile to them (i. e., those recipients that vote less in 
accordance to them in the UN) do. 
Our third sensitivity check involves using multilateral and total aid flows 
as the dependent variable. We use data on ODA commitments, net ODA 
disbursements and EDA. Table 4.8 reports the coefficient and standard error of 
the corruption variable in the regressions with multilateral and total aid as the 
"9 On a nominal basis, the sample correlation coefficient is 0.89, and in three-year moving 
averaoes, the sample correlation coefficient is 0.93. 
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dependent variable. The numbers of countries and observations, as well as the 
R2 and Hausman Test (p-value) are also reported. Perceived corruption is 
always negatively correlated with aid flows. We, therefore, conclude that our 
results are robust to using different aid flows. 
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Table 4.5: Bilateral Aggregate Aid Commitments per capita 
Dependent variable: Log(DAC bilateral aid commitments per capita) 
I P] [2] 
Log(Population) -1.852*** -3.259*** 
[0.379] [0.499] 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.319 0.349 
[0.518] [0.419] 
Openness 0.28 0.271 
[0.191] [0.179] 
Democracy 0.050* 0.060*** 
[0.025] [0.021] 
Human Rights 0.185** 0.1 
[0.086] [0.077] 
Corruption -0.140*** -0.159*** 
[0.050] [0.043] 
Arms imports -0.003*** 
[0.001] 
Friend of US -0.011 
[0.010] 
Friend of Japan 0.115*** 
[0.024] 
Friend of UK -0.054* 
[0.028] 
Friend of France 0.017 
[0.020] 
Constant 4.745 0.552 
[3.634] [3.730] 
Observations 99 97 
Countries 28 28 
R20.455 0.677 
Hausman Test (D-value) 0.006 0.000 
White beteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Country specific dummies Included 
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Table 4.6: Bilateral Aggregate Net ODA Disbursements 
Dependent variable: Log(DAC bilateral aid net disbursements, per cent of GDP) 
[11 [2] 
Log(Population) -1.155*** -2.255*** 
[0.378] [0.465] 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.386 -0.367 
[0.473] [0.437] 
Openness 0.19 0.234 
[0.166] [0.163] 
Democracy 0.042* 0.050*** 
[0.021] [0.018] 
Human Rights 0.096 0.033 
[0.079] [0.071] 
Corruption -0.128** -0.135*** 
[0.050] [0.044] 
An-ns imports -0.002** 
[0.001] 
Friend of US -0.012 
[0.012] 
Friend of Japan 0.087*** 
[0.023] 
Friend of UK -0.023 
[0.027] 
Friend of France 0.004 
[0.020] 
Constant 5.999* 2.461 
[3.500] [4.014] 
Observations 99 97 
Countries 28 28 
R2 0.273 0.524 
Hausman Test (r)-value) 0.007 0.037 
White heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Country specific dummies included 
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Table 4.7: Aggregate Bilateral Effective Development Assistance 
Dependent variable: Log(Bilateral EDA, per cent of GDP) 
P] [2] 
Log(Population) -0.621 -1.422** 
[0.385] [0.642] 
Log(GDP per capita) -1.026** -1.028*** 
[0.422] [0.373] 
Openness 0.142 0.258 
[0.172] [0.184] 
Democracy 0.039* 0.045** 
[0.021] [0.018] 
Human Rights 0.103 0.06 
[0.092] [0.086] 
Corruption -0.150*** -0.150*** 
[0.052] [0.049] 
Arms imports -0.001 
[0.001] 
Friend of US -0.029** 
[0.013] 
Friend of Japan 0.053** 
[0.025] 
Friend of UK 0.021 
[0.033] 
Friend of France 0.018 
[0.018] 
Constant 6.448 1.317 
[3.3 77] [3.580] 
Observations 98 96 
Countries 27 27 
R20.28 0.453 
Hausman Test fi)-value) 0.003 0.000 
White heteroskedasti city corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at I% 
Country specific dummies included 
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Table 4.8: Multilateral and Total Aid Flows 
[1] [2] 
Log(Multilateral ODA commitments/GDP) -0.149 -0.136** 
[0.060] [0.060] 
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.003 0.041 
R2 0.201 0.427 
Observations 99 97 
Countries 28 28 
Log(Multilateral ODA net disbursements/GDP) -0.187*** -0.196*** 
[0.054] [0.055] 
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.004 0.022 
R2 0.183 0.34 
Observations 99 97 
Countries 28 28 
Log(Multi lateral EDA disbursements/GDP) -0.168** -0.232*** 
[0.077] [0.083] 
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.002 0.004 
R2 0.243 0.42 
Observations 95 94 
Countries 27 27 
Log(Total ODA commitments/GDP) -0.133*** -0.134*** 
[0.043] [0.040] 
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.402 0.633 
Observations 99 97 
Countries 28 28 
Log(Total ODA net disbursements/GDP) -0.136*** -0.146*** 
[0.043] [0.036] 
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.001 0.008 
R2 0.258 0.507 
Observations 99 97 
Countries 28 28 
Log(Total EDA disbursements/GDP) -0.183*** -0.191*** 
[0.053] [0.046] 
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.006 0.009 
R2 0.359 0.54 
Observations 98 96 
Countries 27 27 
White heteroskedasti city corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Country specific dummies included 
Coefficient of corruption variable reported. Controls: [ I] population, income. openness, 
democracy, human rights, corruption; [2] as above and including military imports, LYN voting 
similarity with the US. Japan, UK and France. 
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Explanatory variables 
We also perform sensitivity checks on several of the explanatory 
variables - our results remain robust. Table 4.9 reports the results on the 
perceived corruption coefficient from changing the model specification, both by 
adding extra explanatory variables and by replacing some of the explanatory 
variables originally used. Although, for the sake of brevity we only include the 
results on the coefficient on the perceived corruption variable, we briefly discuss 
how the results of other explanatory variables are affected. 
We use infant mortality as a further indicator of poverty, in addition to 
initial income. Infant mortality is insignificant, without affecting any other 
coefficient. We also include a measure of respect for civil liberties in addition 
to the measure of respect for human rights. Although there is some overlap 
between the concepts of human rights and civil rights, it is often argued that the 
political terror scales have a "much clearerfocus on what constitutes arguably 
the very core of human rights" [Neumayer (2003b)]. The civil liberties index 
from Freedom House is based on expert surveys assessing the extent to which a 
country effectively provides for civil liberties, measured on aI (best) to 7 
(worst) scale. We reverse the scale so that I =worst and 7=best. Civil liberties is 
marginally significant (countries with greater respect for civil liberties receive 
more aid), without affecting any other coefficient. 
As in fixed effects models the coefficients of time-invariant variables 
cannot be estimated, our variable that measures the number of years a country 
has been a colony since 1900 is dropped. In order to keep some measure of 
colonial heritage, we create a variable that measures the number of years a 
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country has been independent since 1900. 
insignificant in explaining aid receipts, 
coefficients. 
150 
We find that colonial heritage is 
without affecting the other 
As well as including further explanatory variables in our specifications3 
we replace some of the existing explanatory variables. We replace the Sachs 
and Warner index of openness with trade (sum of exports and imports) as per 
cent of GDP. We find that a greater openness to trade is significant and has the 
expected (positive) sign. In the full specification, respect for human rights 
becomes significant, and arms imports looses significance. We replace Polity 
IV's measure of democracy with a measure of political rights from Freedom 
House. The political rights index, as the civil liberties one, is based on expert 
surveys. We also reverse the scale so that it measures the extent to which a 
country provides for political rights on aI (worst) to 7 (best) scale. Democracy 
as measured by political rights becomes insignificant in the full specification, 
and income per capita becomes significantly (negatively) correlated with aid. 
The only other coefficient affected is the respect for human rights in the basic 
specification (becomes insignificant). Using civil liberties instead of respect for 
human rights yields a significant coefficient without affecting the coefficients on 
any other variables. Finally, we use military expenditures as per cent of 
government expenditures instead of arms imports as per cent of total imports. 
All the coefficients are unaffected. 
150 This result could derive from the fact that, as all the countries in the sample except Liberia 
and Ethiopia were colonies, in the African context colonial heritage loses its importance in terms 
of aggregate receipts of aid. 
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Table 4.9: Sensitivity checks on explanatory variables 
-ndent variable: Lo 
Added Variables: 
DAC bilateral ODA commitments. 
Log (infant mortality) P] -0.138*** 
[0.048] 
[2] -0.151*** 
[0.040] 
Civil Liberties 
-0.157*** 
[0.051] 
[2] -0.159*** 
[0.043] 
Years as an independent country [I] n/a 
[2] -0.146*** 
[0.040] 
Replaced Variables: 
Trade as % GDP (instead of Sachs & 
Warner measure of openness) [1] -0.119*** 
[0.039] 
[2] -0.109*** 
[0.039] 
Political Rights (instead of Polity 
measure of democracy) [1] -0.124** 
[0.057] 
[2] -0.133*** 
[0.047] 
Civil Liberties (instead of Political 
Terror Scale measure of human 
rights) [1] -0.167*** 
[0.051] 
[2] -0.165*** 
[0.041] 
R2 
0.438 
0.659 
cent of GDP 
Hausman 
Test (p- 
value) 
0.000 
0.000 
0.48 0.002 
0.684 0.000 
0.662 0.000 
0.452 
0.629 
0.000 
0.001 
0.311 0.002 
0.596 0.003 
0.463 0.001 
0.681 0.000 
Observations 
(countries) 
99(28) 
97(28) 
99(28) 
97(28) 
97(28) 
108(30) 
106(30) 
102(28) 
100(28) 
99(28) 
97(28) 
Military expenditure (instead of 99(28) 
military imports) [1] -0.139*** 0.434 0.001 
[0.046] 
[2] -0.130*** 0.711 0.000 94(28) 
rO. 0351 
White heteroskedasti city corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at I% 
Country specific dummies included 
Coefficient of corruption variable reported. Controls of original specification: [ I] population, 
income, openness, democracy. human rights, corruption; [2] as above and including militan, 
imports, UN voting similarity with the US, Japan, UK and France. 
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4.5.4 Further Robustness Checks - The Ordinal Nature of the Corruption 
Measure 
Until now, we have treated the corruption index as if it were a cardinal 
variable. However, corruption indices are ordinal in nature,, as they measure 
subjective perceptions of corruption. We know that, for example, a corruption 
score of four is better than a corruption score of five, 15 1 but can we say that the 
difference between a score of four and five is the same as the difference between 
a score of one and two? If not, then it might not make sense to assume a one 
unit increase in the corruption index has a constant effect on aid receipts. 
Rather than using the corruption measure as a continuous variable, we 
explicitly take into account the ordinal nature of the corruption index. We 
reclassify the index into bands, and create dummy variables for each of the 
bands. We divide the corruption index into three bands (low, medium, high) 
and also into two bands (low, high). Note that we experimented with the six 
bands as created in Chapter 2.152,153 However, as the dummy variables 
corresponding to bands one and two were time-invariant, they were dropped (as 
in fixed effects models the coefficients of time-invariant variables cannot be 
estimated). This means that it is not possible to interpret the estimated 
'5' Note that we are referring to the rescaled corruption index, where higher values 
denote 
greater perceived corruption. 
er to 152 For more information on how the corruption index was reclassified Into 
bands please ref 
Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3. Note that originally seven bands were created, but as the first band had 
a very low frequency, bands I and 2 were merged. 
153 Note that, as referred to in Chapter 2. the ICRG corruption 
index is a discrete score, fi7om 
zero to six, with half digits. So this effectively gives the 
ICRG corruption index 13 possible 
outcomes. However, as we are using average annual scores of this corruption index. 
it can 
actually take on a xvider range of values. It is for these reasons that we create 
bands as opposed 
to using the original scores. 
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coefficients on the dummy variables corresponding to the other bands, as there 
is more than one excluded, or base, band. 
Some summary statistics are given in the table below for the corruption 
index reclassified into three and two bands. 
Table 4.10: Summary Statistics on Perceived Corruption Bands 
Dummy Band Interval Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
c_band_31 Band 1 [0,3.3] 126 0.20 0.40 01 
c_band_32 Band 2 (3.3,6.7] 126 0.63 0.49 01 
c_band_33 Band 3 (6.7,10] 126 0.17 0.38 01 
c-band_21 Band 1 [0,5] 126 0.55 0.50 0 
c band 22 Band 2 (5,101 126 0.45 0.50 01 
Table 4.11 presents the results for when the corruption index is 
reclassified into three bands. The dummy variable corresponding to the most 
corrupt band (band 3) is the excluded dummy. We can see that all of the 
dummy variables defining the different perceived corruption bands are 
significant, and also that they are jointly significant. The difference between 
recipient countries with perceived corruption in band I and band 3 is quite 
substantial. A country with a perceived corruption score in band I receives 
about 38.7% more aid as per cent of GDP than a country with a perceived 
corruption score in band 3. A country with a perceived corruption score in band 
2 receives about 28% more aid as per cent of GDP than a country with a 
perceived corruption score in band 3, and about 10.7% less aid than a country 
with a perceived corruption score in band 1. The results 
for the other 
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explanatory variables are broadly similar to those obtained when the corruption 
measure was used as a continuous variable. 
Table 4.12 presents the results for when the corruption index is 
reclassified into two bands. As before, the dummy variable corresponding to the 
most corrupt band (band 2) is the excluded dummy. The dummy variable 
defining perceived corruption band I is significant. The difference between 
recipient countries with perceived corruption in band I and band 2 is quite large. 
A country with a perceived corruption score in band I receives about 22.5% 
more aid as per cent of GDP than a country with a perceived corruption score in 
band 2. The results for the other explanatory variables are broadly similar to 
those obtained when the corruption measure was used as a continuous variable. 
These results are robust to using aid disbursements instead of aid commitments. 
This additional sensitivity test of reclassifying the corruption measure 
into bands and using these bands instead of the continuous index shows that 
there is a correlation between perceived corruption and the aid as per cent of 
GDP that recipient countries receive - countries perceived to be more corrupt 
receive less aid. 
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Table 4.11: Bilateral Aggregate Aid Commitments as per cent of GDP and 
Perceived Corruption in Three Bands 
Dependent variable: Log(DAC bilateral aid commitments, per cent of GDP) 
P] [2] 
Log(Population) -1.813*** -2.769*** 
[0.377] [0.542] 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.568 -0.553 
[0.499] [0.396] 
Openness 0.300* 0.375** 
[0.179] [0.173] 
Democracy 0.043* 0.051** 
[0.023] [0.019] 
Human Rights 0.141 0.083 
[0.090] [0-083] 
Corruption Dummy for Band 1 0.487** 0.387** 
[0.193] [0.174] 
Corruption Dummy for Band 2 0.314* 0.280* 
[0.166] [0.144] 
Anns imports -0-003*** 
[0.001] 
Friend of US -0.008 
[0.012] 
Friend of Japan 0.087*** 
[0.021] 
Friend of UK -0.035 
[0.028] 
Friend of France -0.004 
[0.022] 
Constant 7.579** 5.11 
[3.492] [3.611] 
Observations 99 97 
Countries 28 28 
R20.416 0.623 
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.018 0.003 
F-Test for ioint sienificance of corruption dummies (p-value) 0.042 0.039 
White heteroskedasti city corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Country specific dummies included 
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Table 4.12: Bilateral Aggregate Aid Commitments as per cent of GDP and 
Perceived Corruption in Two Bands 
Dependent variable: Log(DAC bilateral aid commitments, per cent of GDP) 
P] [2] 
Log(Population) -1.899*** -3.187*** 
[0.394] [0.541] 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.481 -0.416 
[0.466] [0.397] 
Openness 0.358* 0.432** 
[0.180] [0.171] 
Democracy 0.053** 0.062*** 
[0.024] [0.0 19] 
Human Rights 0.183** 0.119 
[0.086] [0.077] 
Corruption Dummy for Band 1 0.213** 0.225*** 
[0.093] [0.076] 
Arms imports -0.002*** 
[0.001] 
Friend of US -0.009 
[0.012] 
Friend of Japan 0.098*** 
[0.021] 
Friend of UK -0.03 
[0.026] 
Friend of France 0.003 
[0.022] 
Constant 7.125 3.18 
[3.336] [3.606] 
Observations 99 97 
Countries 28 28 
R20.395 0.617 
Hausman Test (r)-value) 0.002 0.000 
White heteroskedasti city corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Country specific dummies included 
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4.5.5 The Enclogeneity Problem: Does More Aid Really Go To Less 
Corrupt Countries? 
While corruption may be an important consideration in aid receipts, the 
amount of aid received by a country can also impact its level of corruption. 
Theory cannot unambiguously determine what the impact of aid will be on the 
quality of governance. On the one hand, aid could be associated with improved 
governance. For example, foreign aid can be used to improve training and 
increase salaries for public employees. Increased salaries can be used to attract 
more competent public officials, and to reduce the demand for bribes [Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001)]. Aid sometimes finances programmes intended 
to strengthen the legal and justice system and other responsibilities of the public 
sector. 1 
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On the other hand, aid may worsen governance in the recipient countries. 
Foreign aid can weaken the state bureaucracies of recipient govermnents. For 
example, often the most skilled civil servants are hired by donor organisations, 
which pay salaries many times greater than those offered by the recipient 
country's government, thereby stealing scarce talent from the civil service 
[World Bank (I 998c), Brautigam (2000)]. 
More importantly, foreign aid represents a potential source of rents, with 
adverse effects on the incidence of corruption. Moreover, as rents available to 
those controlling the government increase, the resources devoted to obtaining 
political influence increase - as the returns to acquiring political connections 
"' Sweden's aid agency dedicated huge resources over 15 years to building Tanzania's auditing 
capacity. However, this had no impact on public sector accountability as the Auditor General's 
office fails to use auditing firms to audit government expenditures [Brautigam (2000)]. 
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and lobbying skills increase, talent is increasingly reallocated from productive to 
redistributive activities [Knack (2001)]. 
The empirical findings to date on the impact of aid on corruption have 
also been ambiguous. Alesina and Weder (2002) find weak evidence that aid 
causes perceived corruption to increase. Knack (2001) finds that higher aid 
levels erode bureaucratic quality and the rule of law, but that aid levels are not 
significantly related to perceived corruption. Tavares (2003) finds strong 
support for the argument that aid decreases perceived corruption. Svensson 
(2000) finds that foreign aid and windfalls are, on average, associated with 
higher perceived corruption in countries more likely to suffer from competing 
social groups. 
In Chapter 2, using the same set of countries and the same time period as 
in this chapter, we investigated empirically whether total aid (that is, both 
bilateral and multilateral aggregate aid) impacts on the levels of perceived 
corruption. 1 55 Using instrumental variable estimation on a pooled model, we 
found that aid flows reduce perceived corruption. However, that result was not 
robust to using instrumental variables estimation on a random effects model, 156 
155 Note that our choice of explanatory variables for both Chapter 2 and this chapter followed 
two literatures that have evolved separately. Therefore, the set of explanatory variables used in 
Chapter 2 mostly differs from that used in this chapter, although some of the explanatory 
variables used are the same. These are income per capita and a measure of democracy. 
Although the specifications in both Chapter 2 and this chapter include a measure of openness to 
trade, in the former imports and exports as a proportion of GDP is used, whereas here the Sachs- 
Warner index of openness is used (as we are more interested in an indicator of policy stance 
rather than openness strictly defined). Note also that Chapter 2 used annual, rather than period 
data. 
156 Note that in Chapter 2a random effects, rather than a fixed effects, model was estimated. All 
the regressions failed to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by GLS and WG 
estimator did not systematically differ from each other (Hausman specification test). So. unlike 
in the case of the regressions in this chapter. it could be assumed that the individual country 
effects could be treated as random effects and that the coefficients of the GLS estimator were 
free from unobserved heterogeneity bias. Note that the choice between the random and fixed 
Footnote continues on next page. 
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or indeed to a series of robustness checks, including using lagged aid in place of 
the contemporaneous aid variable. So we were unable to find strong empirical 
evidence of the causal effect of aid on levels of perceived corruption. 
In the context of this chapter, by estimating a fixed effects model, we 
eliminate any country-specific characteristics that do not change over time. By 
eliminating the influence of the unobserved heterogeneity, we attenuate the 
problem of the potential endogeneity between aid and perceived corruption. 
Attempts to tackle the direction of causation using instrumental variable 
estimation, or two-stage least squares, on pooled data have typically used a 
measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation as instrument [Svensson (2000)]. 
The variables used to measure ethnic diversity are typically measures of the 
probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not 
belong to the same ethnolinguistic group, which are time-invariant, and, 
therefore, would not be useful in a fixed effects context. 
As the problem of potential endogeneity of perceived corruption clearly 
needs to be addressed, we adopt the approach of using lagged values. 157 
Therefore, in order to control for the possibility of endogeneity bias, we use the 
perceived corruption variable lagged for one period instead of contemporaneous 
corruption. Insofar as lagged values of perceived corruption are predetermined 
with respect to current aid receipts, we should be able to address the causality 
effects models represents a trade-off between bias and precision. Essentially, the fixed effects 
specification eliminates any time-invariant unobserved country-specific characteristics. If these 
unobserved effects are correlated with the other explanatory variables, then the results fi7om 
estimating a fixed effects model will be biased by not taking them into account, but will be 
consistent. Estimating a random effects model will produce inconsistent estimates. On the other 
hand, if the unobserved effects are uncorrelated . vith the other explanatory variables. then 
estimating a random effects specification will result in more efficient estimates. 
157 This approach has been used, for example. by Morrissey et al. (2006), and Gupta et al. 
(2003). 
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issue. So we control for the possibility of endogeneity bias, by using the 
perceived corruption variable lagged for one period, as the current period aid 
receipts will not influence the level of previous period perceived corruption. 
Table 4.13 presents the results obtained when perceived corruption is 
lagged for one period. Note that due to the lack of availability of the corruption 
measure for years earlier than 1982, we effectively loose one period of data by 
virtue of lagging this variable. The results show that perceived corruption 
lagged for one period is insignificant in specification [1] and only weakly 
significant in specification [2]. Estimates for the other variables are. not 
substantially altered, except for democracy which is no longer significant, and 
openness is significant in specification [1], not [2] as before. So there seems to 
be weak evidence of a causal effect of perceived corruption on aid receipts. 
However, when we use aid disbursements rather than aid commitments, the 
coefficient on lagged perceived corruption is insignificant. 
It is useful to think about Potential endogeneity problems with the rest of 
our explanatory variables. A recipient country's population can reasonably be 
regarded as exogenous. However, the other explanatory variables (income, 
openness, UN voting similarity, democracy, respect for human rights, and arms 
imports) are all potentially endogenous. If one of the aims of aid transfers is to 
raise the income of recipient countries (by fostering growth and, therefore, 
increased income levels), then it is reasonable to assume that there might be a 
problem of causality. Aid flows may provide a source of funding for the 
purchase of arms, so that arms imports may increase with aid receipts. One 
interpretation of LN voting similarity is that aid "buys" political support in the 
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UN in favour of the donor (Alesina and Dollar 2000), so that aid may cause UN 
support. Similarly, it is possible that aid causes political reform, fostering 
greater democracy and respect for human rights, and that aid causes economic 
reform in the form of greater trade liberalisation. 
Therefore, in order to avoid problems of potential enclogeneity with these 
variables, we also use period lagged values for these variables. On the basis that 
current period aid flows are not detenninants of past period values of perceived 
corruption levels, income, openness, UN voting similarity, democracy, respect 
for human rights or arms imports, we are able to address potential enclogeneity 
problems. Table 4.14 presents the results obtained when most of the 
explanatory variables are lagged for one period. Both the base and the full 
specification perform quite badly overall, with population being the only 
significant variable. The same results are obtained when aid disbursements 
instead of aid commitments are used. There is no evidence that perceived 
corruption impacts aid receipts. These results suggest that caution should be 
exercised when stating that perceived corruption has a causal effect on aid 
receipts. 
We also experimented with exploring whether a recipient country that 
experienced a ýsignificant' change in the corruption measure from one period to 
the next received more aid (in the case of perceived corruption decreasing) or 
less aid (in the case of perceived corruption increasing) than a recipient that 
experienced no change in perceived corruption. A 'significant' change is 
defined as a movement from a perceived corruption band either into a band 
denoting lower perceived corruption or into a band denoting higher perceived t-- 
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corruption. The results obtained were insignificant for both aid commitments 
and aid disbursements. This lack of significance was maintained regardless of 
the number of bands the corruption index was classified into (we experimented 
with two to seven bands). 
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Table 4.13: Bilateral Aggregate Aid Commitments as per cent of GDP and 
Lagged Perceived Corruption 
Dependent variable: Log(DAC bilateral aid commitments, per cent of GDP) 
P] [2] 
Log(Population) -3.064*** -1.905* 
[0.469] [0.981] 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.241 -0.417 
[0.544] [0.571] 
Openness 0.498** 0.333 
[0.238] [0.212] 
Democracy 0.049 0.042 
[0.030] [0.028] 
Human Rights 0.209** 0.115 
[0.101] [0.094] 
Corruption, lagged I period -0.045 -0.115* 
[0.047] [0.059] 
Arms imports -0.002** 
[0.001] 
Friend of US -0.002 
[0.010] 
Friend of Japan 0.182** 
[0.076] 
Friend of UK -0.043 
[0.027] 
Friend of France -0.053 
[0.038] 
Constant 8.236** -1.368 
[4.038] [6.769] 
Observations 76 76 
Countries 28 28 
R20.575 0.678 
Hausman Test (t)-value) 0.000 0.004 
White heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Country specific dummies included 
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Table 4.14: Bilateral Aggregate Aid Commitments as per cent of GDP and 
Lagged Perceived Corruption, with most explanatory variables also lagged 
Dependent variable: Log(DAC bilateral aid commitments, per cent of GDP) 
P] [2] 
Log(Population) -2.150*** -3.05 1 *** 
[0.563] [0.941] 
Log(GDP per capita), lagged I period -0.344 -0.095 
[0.821] [0.851] 
Openness, lagged I period -0.114 0.009 
[0.206] [0.245] 
Democracy, lagged I period -0.026 -0.022 
[0.035] [0.036] 
Human Rights, lagged I period 0.034 0.058 
[0.108] [0.117] 
Corruption, lagged I period -0.067 -0.044 
[0.067] [0.073] 
Arms imports, lagged I period -0.002 
[0.002] 
Friend of US, lagged I period -0.005 
[0.037] 
Friend of Japan, lagged I period 0.032 
[0.056] 
Friend of UK, lagged I period -0.014 
[0.097] 
Friend of France, lagged I period 0.031 
[0.101] 
Constant 8.122 4.114 
[5.956] [9.980] 
Observations 81 78 
Countries 28 28 
R20.366 0.451 
Hausman Test (D-value) 0.000 0.000 
White heteroskedasti city corrected standard errors M parenthesis. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at I% 
Country specific dummies included 
279 
4.6 Revisiting the Results of Alesina and Weder (2002) 
4.6.1 The Old Data Set 
In the previous section we showed that, in sub-Saharan Africa, countries 
perceived as more corrupt receive less aid (without taking into account 
endogeneity issues - there is a correlation, though no causal effect). As noted in 
the literature review, very few studies have studied the impact of corruption on 
aid allocation or receipts. These studies, which look at all aid recipients, fail to 
find any consistent and significant evidence to support the hypothesis that there 
is even a correlation between aid receipts and the recipients' perceived 
corruption. Given that sub-Saharan Africa is both among the most corrupt 
regions and is the largest aid recipient region in the world [receiving about 30% 
of all aid, OECD (2005a)], we find this result quite puzzling. 
We revisit the results obtained by Alesina and Weder (2002, henceforth 
AW). This is the study closest in spirit to ours 158 and the authors have also 
kindly supplied us with a copy of their data set. AW provide answers to three 
different questions: First, do less corrupt goverments receive more aid or debt 
relief, in aggregate? Second, do donors differ in their discrimination against 
corruption? Third, does foreign aid reduce or foster corruption? We are 
interested in the first part of the first question. Moreover, we are interested in 
the answer for the sub-Saharan African region. 
AW use data on total ODA flows. ' 59 The AW data set consists of 180 
countries over the period 1975-1994, giving them potentially 720 observations. 
158 In the sense that AW are specifically concerned with whether corrupt governments receive 
more aid, as opposed to considering corruption as part of the \N ider issue of good governance. 
159Refer to Appendix 4. E for the description and sources of variables used by AW. 
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However, the data set is greatly reduced by the availability of data on the 
corruption variable. In order to increase the number of observations, AW use 
the long-run average of the ICRG corruption measure, giving them 424 
observations. Data availability on the remaining explanatory variables further 
reduces the sample size to 270 observations. We are interested in whether our 
results for sub-Saharan Africa are robust to using the data set and specification 
of AW. We are also interested in identifying which regions might be driving 
their result of no correlation between perceived corruption and aid flows. 
We add six dummy variables to the AW data set, one for each main 
region of the world, except for Western Europe and North America. ' 60 We then 
attempt to replicate Table 3, column [1] (time period 1975-1994) of AW (p. 
1132). We are unable to exactly replicate the AW results. Our regression 
includes 270 observations, whereas AW use 269. Most of the coefficients are 
marginally different. The coefficient on the dummy for Israel, however, is 
found to be significant by AW but not by ourselves. Closer inspection of the 
data set reveals that there is only one observation for Israel, namely, for the 
period 1990-1994. 
Along with the data set, AW provided us with some examples of the 
regressions used for the tables in their paper. We note that, in their replication 
of Table 3, column [3] (time period 1990-1994) the results obtained were not 
identical to those reported in the published paper. 
' 61 Therefore, we are not 
160 Namely, East Asia & Pacific; East Europe & Central Asia; Middle East & North Africa; 
South Asia; sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America & Caribbean. 
16 1 For example, the coefficient on corruption is 0.05. compared with -0.05 
in the published 
paper. However, it is still insignificant. 
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overly concerned with the discrepancies we find. 162 We report our results 
(denoted by Q), as well as AWs, in Table 4.15.163 Note that in the previous 
section we transfon-ned the ICRG corruption index, so that 0-least corrupt and 
I 0-most corrupt. ' 64 However, AW use the original coding of the ICRG 
corruption variable, where 0-most corrupt and 6-least corrupt. All the results 
reported in this section follow the original coding. To make these results 
comparable to our main results, we need to multiply these results by -3/5 
(although given the ordinal nature of the corruption index, the only real validity 
of the coefficient is its sign and significance, not its magnitude). 
We run separate regressions for each of the regions, except East Europe 
& Central Asia and West Europe, which have too few observations, and North 
America, which has no observations. There is only evidence of a significant 
impact of perceived corruption on aid receipts for Latin America & Caribbean, 
where perceived corruption reduces aid receipts. Surprisingly, there is no 
evidence that donors in aggregate systematically give more aid to governments 
in sub-Saharan Africa that are perceived as less corrupt. The results for the 
regional estimates are reported in Table 4.16. 
162 AW provided their data set in a format not used by us (EViews). We transferred the data into 
Excel and subsequently into Stata. Given the vast amount of data, we were concerned that we 
had inadvertently made a mistake in transferring some of the data and in compiling it in useable 
form. We, therefore, conducted the exercise of transferring the data a second time. The results 
were identical. 
163 In order to explore the possibility of non-linearity in the effect of perceived corruption on aid, 
we also include the term "corruption squared" in the main regression (i. e., Table 4.15). The 
coefficient is not significant. We also note that the average level of perceived corruption is 2.88 
for the whole sample and 2.74 for sub-Saharan Africa, which means that our results for sub- 
Saharan Africa are not driven by considering mostly high corruption countries. 
'64This transformation was originafly carried out in Chapter 2 to increase comparability with 
other studies, which perform similar transformations. 
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As mentioned above, AW use the long-run average of the ICRG 
corruption measure. In order to test whether averaging the corruption measure 
is driving the results, 165 we repeat our analysis using the actual measure of 
corruption. Results are reported in Table 4.17. As would be expected, the 
number of observations reduces considerably. The result on Latin America is 
maintained, and aid flows to sub-Saharan Africa become significantly correlated 
with perceived corruption - perceived corruption reduces aid receipts. In the 
remainder of the regions aid flows are unresponsive to perceived corruption. 
In order to increase the number of observations, we fill in the missing 
values of perceived corruption for the earlier years by replacing them with the 
value of the following period. We feel this provides a better indication of the 
potential trend in perceived corruption than simply replacing all observations by 
their 20-year period average. ' 66 The results are similar to those obtained under 
no manipulation of the corruption measure, and are reported in Table 4.18. 
In addition to estimating regional regressions, we estimate the model for 
all countries, including interaction terms between perceived corruption and the 
different regions. We estimate the regressions for the long-run average of 
perceived corruption, actual values of perceived corruption and interpolated 
values of perceived corruption. Our results are reported in Table 4.19. For all 
three cases, the joint hypothesis that the coefficients on all interaction tenns are 
zero is rejected by a wide margin. There is evidence of a significant impact of 
perceived corruption on aid receipts for three regions, namely, East Asia & 
16' The ICRG is only available from 1982. 
166 We do, however. favour using the actual values of the corruption variable. even if this 
decreases the sample size. 
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Pacific, Middle East & North Africa and South Asia. For all cases, govemments 
perceived as more corrupt are punished with lower aid flows. For the 
interpolated values of perceived corruption in colunm [c], there is also evidence 
of a weak significant impact of perceived corruption on aid flows for West 
Europe (the base region) - countries perceived as more corrupt receive more aid. 
However, there is no evidence that perceived corruption has an impact on aid 
receipts of sub-Saharan African countries. 
In sum, using the AW data set, we fail to find consistent evidence of a 
correlation between perceived corruption and aid receipts. This is true of both 
total and regional aid receipts, including for the region of sub-Saharan Africa, 
which is our main interest. 
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Table 4.15: OLS regressions of five-year averages for 1975-1994 
Dependent variable: Log of aid per capita 
AW Q 
Constant 14.58*** 17.57*** 
[5.731 [6.48] 
Log(initial income per capita) -0.56*** -0.56*** 
[-4.99] [-5.271 
Log(population) -0.62*** -0.61 *** 
[-13.44] [-13.47] 
Openness 0.53*** 0.57*** 
[3.24] [3.43] 
Political rights -0.03 -0.04 
[-0.85] [-0.90] 
Years as a colony 0.01*** 
0.0 1 *** 
[2.851 [3.251 
Friend of US 
0.01 0.02 
[0.70] [1.57] 
Friend of Japan 
0.01 -0.01 
[0.38] [-0.37] 
Egypt 2.18*** 
[9.771 [9.75] 
Israel 2.69** 
0.79 
[2.18] [0.49] 
Corruption' -0.02 -0.05 [-0.39] [-0.86] 
Time dummies yes 
yes 
Observations 
269 270 
Adjusted R20.65 - 
0.65 
Robust t statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant 
at 1% 
AW-Results of Alesina and Weder (2002); 
Q-our results. 
a- long-run average of perceived corruption 
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Table 4.16: Regional OLS regressions of five-year averages for 1975-1994 (a) 
DeDendent variable: Lop- of aid mr cai)ita 
East Asia Middle Latin sub- 
& Pacific East & America & Saharan 
North Caribbean Aftica 
Africa 
Constant 24.83** 66.85*** 27.51 10.43*** 
[2.18] [5.76] [5.69] [3.21] 
Log(initial income -1.04 -1.46* -1.76*** -0.30*** 
per capita) 
[1.42] [1.93] [9.87] [2.67] 
Log(population) -0.46** -1.49*** -0.57*** -0.70*** 
[2.87] [6.50] [6.97] [7.93] 
Openness 0.61 0.53 0.75** -0.08 
[1.16] [0.95] [2.41] [0.41] 
Political rights -0.18 -0.45 -0.13** 0.05 
[0.91] [1.58] [2.17] [0.691 
Years as a colony 0.00 0.02** 0.00 0.01 * 
[0.25] [2.521 [0.71] [1.75] 
Friend of US 0.33** 0.16 0.00 -0.01 
[2.20] [1.721 [0.07] [0.22] 
Friend of Japan -0.13 -0.34*** -0.03 0.07* 
[0.94] [3.07] [0.50] [1.68] 
Egypt - 2.52*** 
- [4.64] 
I srael - -16.67* 
- [2.06] - 
Corruption' -0.13 -0.28 0.24*** 
0.10 
[0.47] [0.92] [2.99] [1.41] 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Observations 28 32 82 105 
Adjusted R20.78 0.87 0.83 
0.69 
Robust absolute t statistics in brackets 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1% 
a- long-run average of perceived corruption 
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Table 4.17: Regional OLS regressions of five-year averages for 1975-1994 (b) 
Dependent variable: Loe of aid Der caDita. 
All East Asia Middle Latin sub-Saharan 
& Pacific East & America & Affica 
North Caribbean 
Africa 
Constant 20.99*** 27.22*** 77.87*** 29.32*** 9.16* 
[5.56] [4.90] [5.30] [4.92] [1.89] 
Log(initial income -0.69*** -0.51*** -2.50** -1.73*** -0.35** 
per capita) 
[5.80] [3.45] [2.27] [9.04] [2.57] 
Log(population) -0.60*** -0.49*** -1.54*** -0.57*** -0.72*** [14.50] [6.07] [4.65] [6.27] [6.20] 
Openness 0.50*** -0.27 0.37 0.85** -0.15 [2.86] [1.70] [0.47] [2.64] [0.76] 
Political rights -0.05 -0.47*** -0.25 -0.20*** 0.03 
[0.99] [6.22] [0.76] [2.85] [0.36] 
Years as a colony 0.0 1 *** 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
[2.03] [0.25] [1.43] [0.22] [0.70] 
Friend of US 0.03 -0.12** 0.19 0.01 -0.04 
[1.36] [2.23] [1.44] [0.45] [1.41] 
Friend of Japan -0.05 -0.10* -0.38** -0.05 0.10* 
[0.95] [2.01] [2.89] [0.67] [1.86] 
Egypt 2.02*** - 2.34** - - 
[10.92] - [2.80] - - 
Israel -0.18 - -17.70 - - 
[0.08] - [1.51] - - 
Corruption b 0.01 -0.17 -0.11 0.17** 0.14* 
[0.18] [1.64] [0.25] [2.37] [1.83] 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes Yes 
Observations 193 21 24 61 69 
Adjusted R2 0.66 0.92 0.85 0.83 0.67 
Robust absolute t statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
b- actual values of perceived corruption 
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Table 4.18: Regional OLS regressions of five-year averages for 1975-1994 (c) 
DeDendent vanable: Lov- of aid per capita 
All East Asia Middle Latin sub-Saharan 
& Pacific East & America & Affica 
North Caribbean 
Africa 
Constant 17.72*** 25.03** 66.11 *** 27.64*** 10.14*** 
[6.51] [2.26] [5.89] [5.59] [3.18] 
Log(initial income -0.56*** -1.28** -1.44* -1.71*** -0.29** 
per capita) 
[5.36] [2.17] [2.00] [9.82] [2.62] 
Log(population) -0.61*** -0.45** -1.50*** -0.58*** -0.70*** 
[13.47] [2.90] [6.42] [7.21] [7.95] 
Openness 0.57*** 0.75 0.50 0.75** -0.10 
[3.46] [1.57] [0.84] [2.47] [0.57] 
Political rights -0.04 -0.12 -0.41 -0.14** 0.04 
[0.9 1] [0.55] [1.41] [2.21] [0.61] 
Years as a colony 0.01*** 0.02 0.02** 0.00 0.00 
[3.24] [1.39] [2.28] [0.46] [1.57] 
Friend of US 0.02 0.35** 0.16 0.00 -0.01 
[1.62] [2.38] [1.71] [0.14] [0.30] 
Friend of Japan -0.01 -0.13 -0.33** -0.03 0.07* 
[0.41] [0.97] [2.83] [0.50] [1.78] 
Egypt 2.20*** - 2.55*** 
[9.70] - [3.95] 
Israel 0.69 - - 16.75 
[0.43] - [1.98] 
Corruption' -0.05 0.11 -0.20 0.20** 0.10* 
[1.06] [0.64] [0.60] [2.58] [1.71] 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 270 ') 8 32 82 105 
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.78 0.87 0.83 0.69 
Robust absolute t statistics in brackets 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
c- missing values of perceived corruption for one year assumed to take on the same value as the 
year immediately following. 
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Table 4.19: OLS regressions of five-year averages for 1975-1994 with 
interactions 
DeDendent variable: Log of aid per capita 
[a] [b] [c] 
Constant 19.292*** 23.033*** 19.008*** 
[5.73] [5.65] [5.56] 
Log(initial income per capita) -0.756*** -0.865*** -0.717*** 
[5.94] [6.12] [5.61] 
Log(population) -0.692*** -0.673*** -0.684*** 
[14.48] [13.14] [14.32] 
Openness 0.429*** 0.368** 0.455*** 
[2.81] [2.31] [2.92] 
Political rights -0.048 -0.066 -0.047 
[1-07] [1.15] [0.99] 
Years as a colony 0.007** 0.005 0.007** 
[2.47] [1.42] [2.44] 
Friend of US 0.026* 0.032 0.027* 
Friend of Japan -0.001 -0.039 -0.002 
[0-03] [0.79] [0.05] 
Egypt 1.738*** 1.73*** 1.84*** 
[6.51] [7.89] [6.82] 
Israel -0.437 -1.073 -0.304 
[0.27] [0.43] [0.19] 
Corruption -0.157 -0.041 -0.162* 
[1.41] [0.47] [1.69] 
Corruption x East Asia & Pacific 0.212** 0.193** 0.192** 
[2.45] [2.25] [2.48] 
Corruption x East Europe & Central Asia 0.224* 0.137 0.179 
[1.72] [0.96] [1.45] 
Corruption x Middle East & North Africa 0.455*** 0.272*** 0.392*** 
[4.29] [3.06] [4.07] 
Corruption x South Asia 0.464*** 0.287** 0.415*** 
[3.38] [2.40] [3.27] 
Corruption x sub-Saharan Africa 0.079 -0.017 0.069 
[0.73] [0.20] [0.72] 
Corruption x Latin America & Caribbean 0.137* 0.049 0.108 
[1.70] [0.64] [1.51] 
Time dummies yes Yes yes 
Observations 270 193 270 
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.68 0.67 
F-test for interactions 7.798 4.764 6.982 
Prob>D 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust absolute t statistics in brackets 
* significant at 101o. ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
[a] - long-run average of perceived corruption ; [b] - actual values of perceived corruption -, [c] 
- missing values of perceived corruption for one year assumed to take on the same ý, alue as the 
year immediately following. 
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4.6.2 The Updated Data Set 
it is worth noting that for 1990-1994, almost half the countries for sub- 
Saharan Africa are excluded from the regressions. This is Primarily due to lack 
of data on income per capita and population. ' 67 Therefore, we perform one final 
test on the results for sub-Saharan Africa. We collect data for the same time 
periods as AW, from the same (updated) sources for the countries of sub- 
Saharan Africa. The only source that is different is the one for UN voting 
similarity, as we could not access the original source. Instead, we use Gartzke 
(2006). Also, data for the openness variable was updated by Easterly, Levine 
and Roodman (2004). Table 4.20 reports the variables used and their sources 
(both for AW and ours, which we denote by 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the differences between the AW data set and ours. 
Our data does not match up exactly with AW's - there are inevitably data 
revisions, where values change, new data become available, and some values are 
reclassified as missing. 
The data for UN voting similarity appears to have the most discrepancies 
- in particular, our values are systematically lower than AW's. As noted above, 
we use a different data source than AW, which would account for the 
differences. There are two main reasons for the differences. ' 68 Firstly, in the 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research data set (# 5512) 
used by AW, there is a substantial number of discrepancies in the codes 
assigned to nations listed as voting in UN roll calls. The coding scheme is based 
167 Furthermore, we encountered some errors in the data set. For example, the number of years 
as a colony since 1900 for Somalia is reported as 122 
168 We thank Eric Gartzke for his help in explaining these differences. 
290 
on the country codes assigned to countries in the Correlates of War project. 
However, codes assigned to countries are often changed from year to year. 
Moreover, many of the changes in the country codes are either not documented 
or incorrectly documented. Gartzke (2006) uses the Voeten (2006) data set, 
which attempts to correct for these changes in coding. 
Secondly, there are different ways to think about the proportion of 
possible agreements among the countries, i. e., the number of times countries A 
and B voted in the same way. The common methodology is to use the number 
of votes in the year to calculate the proportion of possible agreements. This 
could be problematic in cases where members join part-way through a year, or 
where they are not participating during the whole year for some reason. For 
example, suppose that there are ten votes in a given year. Suppose country A 
voted the ten times but country B only voted three times in that year. Suppose 
also that country B always voted in the same way as country A. If the 
proportion of possible agreements among the countries is taken as ten, then 
countries A and B have a 30% voting similarity. However, if the proportion of 
possible agreements among the countries is taken as three, then countries A and 
B have a 100% voting similarity. Gartzke (2006) uses the number of votes cast 
by members to determine the proportion of possible agreements among the 
countries, so it changes for every dyad (pairing Of two voting countries). This 
tends to make the score higher on average, although the two calculations are 
strongly correlated. Table 4.21 shows that the AW data and ours are highly 
correlated. 
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Finally, Table 4.22 reports the results obtained by using the updated data 
set. The AW result on perceived corruption does not hold when we use the 
updated data set. In aggregate, donors reward recipients in sub-Saharan Africa 
that are perceived as less corrupt with greater aid flows. This result is robust to 
using actual and interpolated values of perceived corruption instead of average 
values. As in Section 4.5, we perform two additional sensitivity tests. We 
experiment with using corruption bands rather than the continuous corruption 
index. This does not alter the result that countries perceived as more corrupt 
receive less aid. However,, when we address the issue of potential endogeneity 
(of both the corruption variable and the other explanatory variables except 
population and years as a colony), we find no consistent evidence that perceived 
corruption has a causal impact on aid receipts. 
consistent with those from Section 4.5 
The results are, therefore, 
2912- 
Table 4.20: Description and sources ot'updated data set 
Variable / Description Source - ANN' Source - 
Aid per capita World Bank (I 998b? ) World Bank (2005a) 
Official development assistaiwe 
(constant S 19 8 7/ ) 
Years as a colony Alesina and Dollar CIA (2005) 
Number of years as a colony of any (2000), CIA (1996) 
colonizer since 1900 
CORFJCRG Knack and Keefer (1995) Knack and Keefer (1998) 
Corruption index fi7om ICRG, 1982- 
1995: 6 (lowest corruption), 0 
(highest corruption) 
Democracy 
Political Rights, 
(democratic), 
v, ovemment) 
recoded as: 7 
1 (autocratic 
Gastil (1990) Freedom House (2005) 
FRDXY, X AlesMa and Dollar (2000) Gartzke (2006) 
Percentage of times in which the Original source: Inter- 
recipient has voted in the U`N as University Consortium for 
xxx Political and Social 
Research (data set # 5512) 
Income Heston and Summers Heston, Summers and 
Real GDP per capita, beginning of (1991) Aten (2002) 
period 
Openness 
Proportion of 
country is open 
years in which the 
Sachs and Wamer (1995) Sachs and Warner (1995) 
and updates from 
Easterly, Levine and 
Roodman (2004) 
Population World Bank (I 998b? ) World Bank (2005a) 
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of AW and Q variables 
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Political Rights 
Table 4.21: Correlations between AW and Q variables 
Log(aid per capita) 0.9707 
Log(initial income per capita) 0.8435 
Log(population) 0.9991 
Openness 0.9026 
Political rights 0.9608 
Years as a colony 0.8957 
Friend of US 0.9278 
Friend of Japan 0.9569 
CorrUDtion 0.9963 
Note: Correlations are for the sample included in AW regressions. 
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Table 4.22: OLS regressions of five-year averages for 1975-1994 using updated 
data set for sub-Saharan Africa 
Dependent variable: Log of aid per capita 
[a] [b] [c] 
Constant 1.901 3.879 2.022 
[0.34] [0.55] [0.36] 
Log(initial income per capita) -0.187*** -0.236*** -0.176*** 
[2.69] [2.67] [2.68] 
Log(population) -0.691 *** -0.725*** -0.683*** 
[7.85] [5.82] [7.79] 
Openness -0.135 -0.231 -0.156 
[0.78] [1.16] [0.94] 
Political rights 0.044 0.034 0.033 
[0.68] [0.42] [0.54] 
Years as a colony -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
[0.61] [0.53] [0.45] 
Friend of US -0.042*** -0.035** -0.041 *** 
[3.37] [2.33] [3.39] 
Friend of Japan 0.166** 0.15 1* 0.163** 
[2.54] [1.90] [2.52] 
Corruption 0.16** 0.172** 0.135** 
[2.47] [2.33] [2.48] 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 108 76 108 
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.65 0.65 
Robust absolute t statistics in brackets 
significant at 10%; significant at 5%; significant at I% 
a- long-run average of perceived corruption 
b- actual values of perceived corruption 
c- missing values of perceived corruption for one year assumed to take on the same value as 
the 
year immediately following. 
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4.7 Sectoral Aid 
In this section, we examine sectoral aggregate bilateral aid receipts from 
DAC donors. Due to the nature of the data, it is not possible to conduct this 
analysis for the same time period as for total bilateral aid. As discussed in 
Section 4.4, the source for data on aid by sector and by recipient is the CRS. 
whereas DAC data provide statistics on aid by sector or on aid by recipient. but 
not for both dimensions. In order to verify the completeness of the CRS data , it 
is essential to examine the coverage ratio. which measures the 
comprehensiveness of aid activity data, that is, the extent to which the CRS data 
are complete. The coverage ratio is calculated by comparing the aid flows 
reported in CRS to those reported in DAC. It essentially indicates the extent to 
which the data can be exploited in analytical work. High coverage permits an 
in-depth analysis. Low coverage means that the data, though descriptive, may 
not present a balanced picture of DAC members' aid. 
Coverage ratios may be calculated for sector or recipient. A coverage of 
100% for a certain sector (country) means that 100% of the aid flows to that 
sector (country) has been recorded. If we are interested in aid to sector X in 
country Y, as long as the coverage ratio for either that sector or that country is 
100%, we can confidently use the data. Coverage ratios vary over time. 
Unfortunately, the years prior to 1999 do not always have full coverage. 
Our strategy for collecting data on sectoral data for our sample of 32 
sub-Saharan countries is the following. Firstly. , ve select all sectors that have 
100% coverage. Secondly. we select all contiguous years 
for each sector. 
Thirdly, we select those sectors that have data for the same years 
(bearing in 
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mind that we are primarily interested in those sectors that represent basic and 
essential needs, such as education and health). 161 Using this strategy yields data 
for our 32 sub-Saharan African countries for 1993 and 1994 for the following 
sectors: Basic Education; Secondary Education; Post-Secondary Education: 
Basic Health; Population Programmes; Banking & Financial Services; 
Multisector; and General Budget Support. We use the two-year average of the 
sectoral aid variables, so that we have a cross-section of 32 countries for one 
period. Table 4.23 provides descriptive statistics on the variables used in this 
section. 
In terms of our theoretical framework, of the sectors with available data, 
basic education and basic health are the ones we can more easily assume that 
donors consider to be basic necessities for the recipients. Indeed, these are 
contemplated by the UN Millennium Development Goals, 170 making them good 
candidates for corruption inelastic sectors. Having adequate basic health and 
education are likely to be pre-conditions for economic growth and development. 
Whilst it is important for a country's population to have adequate levels of 
secondary and post-secondary education, they are unlikely to be considered by 
donors as important as primary education. As such, it is possible that donors' 
demand for projects in these sectors is corruption unit-elastic, or even, elastic. 
Aid to population programmes covers aid to "all actii, ities in the field of 
reproductive health, family planning and research into population 
169 Using the strategy of selecting countries with 100% coverage ratio yields a significantly 
lower number of countries. 
"' Basic education is contemplated by Goal 2, which is to achieve primary education. 
Basic 
health is related to Goals 4,5 and 6 (reduce child mortality, improve matemal 
health and combat 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, respective 
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programmes 1) [OECD (2005b)]. Although there is some relation between 
reproductive health, family planning, contraception and combating sexually 
transmitted diseases, it is not very clear-cut. So, we do not assume that donors 
consider population programmes to be essential projects/sectors for the 
recipients. Also, we assume that the remaining three sectors do not constitute 
core goals of the donors. 
In sum, given the predictions of the model outlined in Section 4.3, we 
would broadly expect the following: ' 
71 
a) More corrupt countries receive more aid for basic health and education; 
b) More corrupt countries might receive less aid for secondary education and 
post-secondary education, and 
c) More corrupt countries receive less aid for population programmes, banking 
& financial services, multisector and general budget support. 
Not all countries receive aid for every sector, and the number of 
countries that receive no aid for a specific sector varies across sectors. 
Multisector aid is the only type of sectoral aid for which all countries receive 
strictly positive aid flows. For the rest of the sectors we consider, this varies 
from one country not receiving aid for post-secondary education, through to I 
countries not receiving aid for secondary education. Given that not all countries 
receive aid for every sector, we estimate tobit models in which the dependent 
17 1 Note that, given the limitations of the theoretical model, already 
discussed in Section 4.33, we 
are not able to empirically test its predictions. The theory can only give a 
broad indication of 
what we might expect to occur in terms of sectoral aid receipts. 
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variable is the amount of aid (scaled by GDP) received by each sector. 
172,173 
We 
use the same model specifications as for aggregate total aid. Our results are 
reported in Tables 4.24 to 4.26. 
Our results for sectoral aid are quite weak. With the exception of 
multisector aid, there seems to be no evidence that perceived corruption is a 
significant factor in sectoral aid receipts. 174 While this result on multisector aid 
is robust to taking into account the ordinal nature of the corruption measure, it is 
not robust to endogeneity issues. 
It should be noted that although the Chi-Squared statistic, which 
indicates whether the explanatory variables reliably predict the dependent 
variable, mostly indicates that our group of explanatory variables shows a 
statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable for those 
sectors, this result is not maintained when the dependent variable is sectoral aid 
as a proportion of total aid. 175 In addition, quite a few of the variables are 
insignificant. This suggests that caution should be exercised in interpreting the 
... When the number of "zeros" is not very large, estimating tobit models produces results quite 
similar to standard ordinary least squares. We run an OLS regression for multisector, as all 
countries receive aid. "' In order not to lose the zero observations when making the logarithmic transformation, we 
add $1 to the sectoral aid for each country. As sectoral aid as per cent of GDP produces very 
small numbers (between an average of 0.0008% for post-secondary education and 0.329% for 
general budget support), the logarithmic transformation yields negative numbers. In order to 
avoid this, we scale sectoral aid by $1 million of GDP, instead. For example, take aid for basic 
education - as per cent of GDP, average aid for basic education is 0.053%, and in terms of per Vmillion of GDP it is $530 for each $1 million of GDP. These figures are equivalent. This 
transformation allows for the distinction between zero and strictly positive sectoral aid without 
affecting the results. 174 Although the coefficient on perceived corruption is significant when the dependent variable is 
(109 of) sectoral aid scaled by GDP for basic education, post-secondary education and 
population programmes, it loses its significance when we experiment with sectoral aid as a 
proportion of total aid as the dependent variable. Only the perceived corruption coefficient for 
multisector aid remains significant. 
175 When the dependent variable is sectoral aid as a proportion of total aid, the base specification 
is only adequate at the 10% level for basic education, and is inadequate for all other sectors 
except population programme and multisector. The full specification is inadequate for secondary 
education and general budget support. 
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results. It should be noted that we also estimated a probit model, in order to 
check whether the results would be different to those obtained from estimating a 
tobit model. This could occur, for example, if the impact of a recipient's 
perceived level of corruption on whether that country received aid for a 
particular sector was different to the impact of perceived corruption on the level 
of aid received (given that a country was deemed eligible for receiving aid) for 
that sector. Because the tobit model imposes the constraint that the explanatory 
variables determine aid eligibility and the amount of aid received with the same 
sign, our finding of the absence of a significant effect of perceived corruption on 
sectoral aid receipts could be due to perceived corruption positively impacting 
on the eligibility of receiving aid but negatively impacting on the levels of aid 
receipts, once a country has been deemed eligible. Estimates obtained from 
estimating a probit model indicate that the results are broadly similar to those 
obtained from the tobit model, and so the tobit model seems appropriate. 
'1101 
Table 4.23: Descriptive Statistics for 1993-1994 period 
Variable 
_Obs 
Mean Std. Dev. Nlin Max 
DAC aid for basic education, per cent 
of GDP 32 0.053 0.090 0 0.3039 
DAC aid for secondary education, per 
cent of GDP 32 0.012 0.026 0 0.1177 
DAC aid for post-secondary education, 
per cent of GDP 32 0.008 0.013 0 0.0527 
DAC aid for basic health, per cent of 
GDP 32 0.043 0.047 0 0.2042 
DAC aid for population programmes, 
per cent of GDP 32 0.080 0.123 0 0.5919 
DAC aid for banking and financial 
services, per cent of GDP 32 0.056 0.101 0 0.5059 
DAC aid multisector purposes, per cent 
of GDP 32 0.152 0.178 0 0.6390 
DAC aid for general budget support, 
per cent of GDP 32 0.329 0.488 0 1.9455 
Proportion of DAC aid for basic 
education, % 32 2.46 4.24 0 20.58 
Proportion of DAC aid for secondary 
education, % 32 0.67 1.46 0 7.24 
Proportion of DAC aid for post- 
secondary education, % 32 0.46 0.74 0 3.21 
Proportion of DAC aid for basic health, 
% 32 2.02 1.95 0 9.51 
Proportion of DAC aid for population 
programmes, %. 32 3.33 3.26 0 11.92 
Proportion of DAC aid for banking and 
financial services, %. 32 3.14 5.62 0 30.21 
Proportion of DAC aid multisector 
purposes, % 32 5.99 4.10 0 16.15 
Proportion of DAC aid for general 
budget support, % 32 9.70 11.69 0 42.63 
Population 32 16.3 20.8 1.1 106.5 
GDP per capita 30 1852.1 1979.3 497.6 9093.1 
Openness 32 0.25 0.44 0 1 
Democracy 29 3.56 2.89 0.50 9.50 
Human rights 32 2.78 1.20 1 5 
Corruption 32 5.29 2.03 1.67 10 
Arms imports 32 1.88 6.22 0 35.10 
US-UN_friend 32 59.47 13.74 45.77 100 
JAPAN_UN_ friend 32 92.68 2.65 85.69 100 
UK-UN_ friend 32 79.76 6.97 69.94 100 
FRANCE 
- 
UN 
- 
friend 32 83.11 5.84 74.46 100 
Years as a colony 32 58.16 19.41 0 90 
Illiteracy rate of 15-24 year-olds, % 27 31.45 20-94 4.60 
81.25 
Net enrolment in prirnarý, education, % 24 59.62 23.94 22.55 
99.90 
Immunization, measles (% children 
under 12 months) 30 56.48 17.14 19 
93 
Physicians (per 1,000 people) 30 0.12 0.13 
0.02 0.62 
Net enrolment in secondary education, 
0 52 42 25.98 10.20 91.10 0 . 
Gross enrolment in tertiary education, 
0 31 3.22 3.25 0,40 16.5 0 0 
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Table 4.25: Tobit estimates for sectoral. aid (part 2) 
Dependent variable: Log(l+ DAC sectoral aid, scaled by GDP), average 1993-1994 
Banking & Banking & General General 
Financial Financial Budget Budget 
Services Services Support Support 
[11 [2] P] [2] 
Log(Population) -0.354 0.012 0.115 -0.298 
[0.655] [0.538] [0.803] [0.933] 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.816 0.367 -2.682 -1.959 
[1.154] [0.889] [1.639] [1.6451 
Openness 1.833 0.922 -1.386 -2.784 
[1.493] [1.086] [1.977] [2.774] 
Democracy -0.11 0.133 -0.846** -0.732** 
[0.177] [0.132] [0.402] [0.3681 
Human Rights 0.286 -0.098 2.502** 2.258* 
[0.948] [0.738] [1.040] [1.250] 
Corruption -0.391 -0.309 -0.138 -0.154 
[0.509] [0.303] [0.684] [0.940] 
Arms imports -2.044** -2.483* 
[1.0401 [1.485] 
Friend of US -0.366** -0.094 
[0.148] [0.361] 
Friend of Japan -0.491 -1.081 
[0.923] [1.766] 
Friend of UK 2.216*** 1.294 
[0.6681 [1.614] 
Friend of France -1.386** -0.915 
[0.606] [2.175] 
Years as a colony 0.05 -0.063 
[0.045] [0.066] 
Constant 12.206 7.639 19.554* 100.206 
[9.630] [75.888] [11.698] [163.6181 
Observations 27 27 27 27 
Uncensored 23 23 18 18 
Left-Censored 4 4 9 9 
Log-likelihood value -59.543 -47.525 -56.412 -54.623 
Chi-Squared 9.645 47.256 23.654 30.405 
Prob> D 0.14 0.000 0.001 0.002 
White heteroskedasti city corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4.26: OLS estimates for sectoral aid (Multisector) 
Dependent variable: Log(DAC sectoral aid scaled by GDP), average 1993-1994 
Multisector Multisector 
[1] [2] 
Log(Population) -0.702*** -0.732*** 
[0.137] [0.161] 
Log(GDP per capita) -1.652*** -1.467*** 
[0.206] [0.252] 
Openness -0.158 -0.205 
[0.216] [0.309] 
Democracy -0.108*** -0.087* 
[0.037] [0.049] 
Human Rights 0.261 * 0.164 
[0.144] [0.183] 
Corruption -0.317*** -0.433*** 
[0.071] [0.125] 
Arms imports -0.079 
[0.175] 
Friend of US -0.001 
[0.041] 
Friend of Japan -0.094 
[0.232] 
Friend of UK 0.165 
(0.279] 
Friend of France -0.099 
[0.303] 
Years as a colony -0.015 
[0.010] 
Constant 12-125*** 16.559 
[1.885] [18.625] 
Observations 27 27 
Adjusted R-squared 0.818 0.785 
F-test 36.584 38.599 
Prob>n 0.000 0.000 
White heteroskedasti city corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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We consider the possibility that the specifications used to explain total 
aid receipts may not be entirely appropriate in the context of sectoral aid 
receipts. As such, we consider additional sector-specific explanatory variables, 
as reported in Table 4.27. 
Table 4.27: Sector-specific explanatory variables 
Sector Additional independent Source 
variable 
Basic Education Net enrolment in primary World Bank (2005a) 
education, % 
Illiteracy rate of 15-24 year- World Bank (2005a) 
olds, % 
Basic Health Immunization, measles (% of World Bank (2005a) 
children under 12 months) 
Physicians (per 1,000 people) World Bank (2005a) 
Secondary Education Net enrolment in secondary World Bank (2005a) 
education, % 
Post-Secondary Education Gross enrolment in tertiary World Bank (2005a) 
education, % 
Tables 4.28 to 4.30 report the results of estimating tobit models for basic 
education, basic health and secondary education, respectively and Table 4.31 
reports OLS estimates for post-secondary education. ' 
76,177 Our previous results 
still stand - perceived corruption does not appear to be a significant 
factor in aid 
receipts across sectors. 
178 
"' There are no left-censored observations in the regression of post-secondary education aid. 
177 Note that we are unable to estimate the complete specification for all cases due to lack of 
sufficient observations. 
178 The only exceptions are basic and post-secondary education. However. the results 
for the 
latter are not very robust, as in the complete specification the F-statistic is quite 
lo-ýNr and has a p- 
value of 0.112. In addition, in both cases the coefficient on perceived corruption 
loses its 
significance when we experiment with sectoral aid as a proportion of total aid as the 
dependent 
N/ariable. 
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Aid receipts across sectors in the recipient country appear to show no 
signs of donor paternalism (in aggregate). It is important to note that our 
analysis on the impact of perceived corruption in sectoral aid receipts suffers 
from several non-negligible drawbacks. 
The first significant drawback regards the availability of data. Due to 
data constraints, we are only able to examine sectoral aid receipts for the period 
1993-1994. Data on sectoral. aid suffers from the problem of adequate coverage, 
that is, not all sectoral data is correctly reported. If a longer time-series were 
available, the results could be different. 
The second drawback is related to the first - the lack of a significant 
number of observations combined with the number of explanatory variables 
reduces the degrees of freedom in estimating the regressions, impacting the 
quality of the estimates. 
The third drawback relates to the lack of data for corruption in specific 
sectors. By using the same measure of corruption, we are assuming that 
corruption (and perceptions of corruption) across sectors does not vary. It is 
highly unlikely that this is the case. Some types of government expenditure 
provide more lucrative opportunities, that is, there are items on which it is easier 
to levy large bribes. Krueger (1974), among others, has stressed that it is the 
existence of rents that motivates rent-seeking behaviour. Consequently. large 
bribes will be available on items produced by firms operating in markets with a 
low degree of competition. Specialised high-technology goods. whose value is 
difficult to monitor and that tend to be produced by a limited number of 
oligopolistic firms, are particularly susceptible to corruption [Shleifer and 
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Vishny (1993)]. We might, therefore, expect that it will be easier to collect 
bribes on large infrastructure projects, highly sophisticated defence or medical 
equipment than on textbooks, teachers' or doctors' and nurses' salaries [Mauro 
(1998)]. On the other hand, sometimes donors' aid to a specific sector/project is 
"tied", i. e., where procurement of goods or services is limited to the donor 
country. If the project is to build a school and a firm from the donor country is 
carrying out the project, then there is probably less scope for corrupt 
activities. 
179,180 Therefore, our results on the impact of perceived corruption on 
sectoral aid have to be taken very cautiously. 
"' Note that if certain raw materials need to be sourced locally, then the local suppliers might 
demand bribes. 
180 Even if firms from donor countries might be less likely to offer bribes than national firms, 
tied aid is generally viewed as a condition that reduces the effectiveness of aid. The 
Commission for Africa (2005) estimates that tied aid to Africa effectiNelý reduces the value of 
aid by as much as 33 0%. 
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Table 4.28: Tobit estimates for Aid for Basic Education 
Dependent variable: Log(l+ DAC sectoral aid, scaled by GDP), average 1993-1994 
[1] 
Log(Population) 4.062*** 
[1.418] 
Log(GDP per capita) 1.419 
[1.440] 
Openness 6.848** 
[2.846] 
Democracy 0.007 
[0.224] 
Human Rights 
-0.166 
[0-646] 
Corruption 
-1.629*** 
[0.475] 
Illiteracy rate, 15-24 year-olds 0.264*** 
[0.060] 
Net enrolment in primary education 0.207*** 
[0.067] 
Constant -5.807 
[3.133]* 
Observations 20 
Uncensored 15 
Left-Censored 5 
Log-likelihood value -37.219 Chi-Squared 41.032 
Prob> p 0.000 
Chi-Squared for sector-specific explanatory variables 24.915 
Prob>p 0.000 
White heteroskedasti city corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4.29: Tobit estimates for Aid for Basic Health 
Dependent variable: Log(l+ DAC sectoral aid, scaled by GDP), average 1993-1994 
P] [2] 
Log(Population) 
-0.059 -0.023 
[0.261] [0.249] 
Log(GDP per capita) -2.026*** -2.238*** 
[0.565] [0.633] 
Openness 
-0.727 -0.214 
[1.296] [1.160] 
Democracy 0.028 -0.022 
[0.105] [0.098] 
Human Rights 0.68 0.579 
[0.594] [0.591] 
Corruption 0.004 0.234 
[0.296] [0.387] 
immunization, measles 0.007 -0.028 
[0.019] [0.023] 
Physicians 
-6.776** -7.324** 
[2.788] [3-198] 
Arms imports 
-0.105 
[0.319] 
Friend of US 0.115* 
[0.066] 
Friend of Japan 0.062 
[0.392] 
Friend of UK 0.687 
[0.503] 
Friend of France -1.210** 
[0.497] 
Years as a colony 0.077** 
[0.030] 
Constant 1.201 48.957 
[0.901] [32.526] 
Observations 26 26 
Uncensored 24 24 
Left-Censored 2 2 
Log-likelihood value -44.087 -38.664 
Chi-Squared 57.882 276.256 
Prob> p 0.000 0.000 
Chi-Squared for sector-specific explanatory variables 6.718 7.389 
Prob>p 0.035 0.025 
White heteroskedasti city corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 4.30: Tobit estimates for Aid for Secondary Education 
Dependent variable: Log(l + DAC sectoral aid, scaled by GDP), average 1993-1994 
Log(Population) 0.105 
[0-905] 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.49 
[1.266] 
Openness -1.387 
[1.978] 
Democracy -0.843*** 
[0.276] 
Human Rights 2.686*** 
[0.855] 
Corruption 0.476 
[0.566] 
Net enrolment in secondary education 0 
[0.030] 
Constant -9.423 
[13.057] 
Observations 19 
Uncensored 12 
Left-Censored 7 
Log-likelihood value -30.994 
Chi-Squared 26.227 
Prob> p 0.000 
White heterosk; dasticity corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4.3 1: OLS estimates for Aid for Post-Secondary Education 
Dependent variable: Log( AC sectoral aid scaled by GDP), average 1993-1994 
[1] [2] 
Log(Population) 0.155 -0-196 
[0.400] [0.517] 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.178 -0.257 
[0.658] [0.793] 
Openness -1.813** -1.065 
[0.754] [1.051] 
Democracy 0.085 0.024 
[0.087] [0.104] 
Human Rights 0.209 0.024 
[0.460] [0.679] 
Corruption -0.469* -0.594* 
[0.233] [0.309] 
Gross enrohnent in tertiary education -0.217 -0.018 
[0.210] [0.254] 
Arms imports -0.032 
[0.403] 
Friend of US -0.172 
[0.164] 
Friend of Japan -0.649 
[0.634] 
Friend of UK 0.964 
[0.854] 
Friend of France -0.339 
[0.716] 
Years as a colony -0.017 
[0.020] 
Constant 22.799 
[50.183] 
Observations 26 26 
Adjusted R-squared 0.185 0.14 
F-statistic 3.142 2.045 
Prob> p 0.0237 0.1126 
White heteroskedasti city corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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4.8 Concluding Remarks 
Our main starting point is the puzzling result found by some studies 
[Alesina and Weder (2002), Svensson (2000), Neumayer (2003b, 2003d)] that 
countries perceived as less corrupt do not necessarily receive more aid. Firstly, 
we use a simple theoretical set-up to attempt to explain this (lack of) relationship 
between corruption and aid. By applying standard demand theory concepts to a 
donor's choice of how much aid to give to recipient countries, we interpret aid 
as a donor's expenditure on government projects in recipient countries. The 
price of each project is affected by corruption in the recipient goverment, so 
that corruption acts as a tax. Depending on the donor's price elasticity of 
demand for projects in the recipient country, more corrupt governments can 
receive more, less or the same aid flows as less corrupt governments. 
Unfortunately, the focus on price elasticities is too limited for empirical 
application, so that we are unable to test the predictions of the model 
empirically. 
Secondly, motivated by this theoretical framework, we model aid 
receipts (which are inherently based on donors' aid allocation decisions) in sub- 
Saharan African countries. We study empirically whether, in the specific case 
of sub-Saharan Africa, countries perceived to be more corrupt receive less aid 
from aggregate bilateral donors. We initially find evidence that in sub-Saharan 
Africa governments that are perceived as less corrupt receive more foreIgn aid. 
Our initial results are robust to several sensitivity checks. These include scaling 
aid receipts by population rather than by GDP, using aid disbursements rather 
than aid commitments, and using aggregate total aid. More importantly, our 
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initial results are robust to taking into account the ordinal nature of our measure 
of corruption. However, our results are not robust to endogeneity issues. This 
suggests that caution should be exercised when interpreting our initial results. as 
we cannot state that perceived corruption has a causal effect on aid receipts. 
In addition to robustness checks using our data set and estimation 
technique, we revisit the results of Alesina and Weder (2002). We update their 
data set for sub-Saharan Africa. We find evidence that donors in aggregate 
reward governments that are perceived as less corrupt with greater aid flows. 
As was the case with our main results, this correlation is robust to taking into 
account the ordinal nature of the corruption measure, but it is not robust to 
endogeneity issues. 
Finally, we present some preliminary evidence on aid receipts across 
sectors. Due to data availability and other limitations, we are unable to draw 
strong conclusions from the results, but there seems to be little evidence of the 
impact of perceived corruption across sectors. 
One interesting question that we have not addressed is whether there are 
significant differences in the behaviours of different donors. That is, are some 
donors more responsive to the levels of perceived corruption in recipient 
countries? Given that, using a model of aid receipts, we were not able to 
determine the causal effect of perceived corruption on aid, it would 
be 
interesting to determine whether studying aid allocation (i. e., donors' essentiallý' 
bilateral aid decisions) would enable identifying the causal impact of perceived 
corruption on aid. 
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Another related question that arises from this study is whether donors 
should change the way aid is delivered to different countries. In particular. 
should countries with stronger governance have a greater say in designing aid 
programmes and have greater freedom regarding how aid funds are used? 
Donors should create strong incentives for recipient countries to strengthen 
institutions and policies. They could do so by rewarding stronger governance 
with greater national policy ownership, more flexible, larger and longer terin aid 
commitments. 
This would mark a departure from traditional conditionality where 
countries are pushed into reforms, as resources are made available upon the 
(promise of) implementation of a set of policies the donor agrees upon. It is 
broadly consensual in the literature that traditional conditionality has not been 
effective. 1 81 In particular, the overarching conclusion is that conditionality helps 
when it supports governments already strongly committed to reform, but that it 
has little effect in encouraging reform if countries fail to display an initial 
tendency to do so. Contrary to the mainstream literature, Morrissey (2002, 
2004) suggests that conditionality has had some effect on policies. Morrissey 
argues that donors have influenced the direction but not the pace of reforms - 
the effects tend "to become apparent slowly ". Another problem has been the 
enforcement of conditionality. For example, as The Economist 
182 reported, 
"Over the past ftiv years Kenya has performed a curious mating ritual 
with its aid donors. The steps are the following. One, Ketýva wins its 
yearly pledges of foreign aid Two, the government 
begins to 
"' See for example, World Bank (I 998a, 2005c), Easterly (200 1). Collier 
(1997). 
182 Economist (1995), "Stop, go", Vol. 336, No. 7928, pp. 37-37. 
, 16 
misbehave, backtracking on economic re rm and behaving in an 
authoritarian manner. Three, a new meeting of donor countries looms 
with exasperated foreign governments preparing their sharp rebukes. 
Four, Kenya pulls a placatory rabbit out of the hat. Five, the donors are 
mollified and the aid is pledged The whole dance then starts again. - 
The concept of changing donor aid strategies along the lines of giving 
countries with good governance greater ownership of how aid moneys are spent 
has already begun to be applied by some donors. For example, the Netherlands 
and the UK Department for International Development have recently favoured 
sector-wide approaches. The sector-wide approach is defined as "a process in 
whichfundingfor the sector, whether internal orftom donors, supports a single 
policy and expenditure programme, under government leadership, and adopting 
common approaches across the sector" [Sector Wide Approach Support Group 
(2004)]. The sector-wide approach aims to stimulate recipient goven-tments to 
take the leadership in strategy formulation and policy implementation. It is 
generally accompanied by efforts to strengthen government procedures for 
disbursement and accountability. 
More recently, the US has introduced the Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA). The MCA provides development assistance to countries that 
have demonstrated commitment to "ruling justly, investing in people, and 
promoting economic fteedom. " The Millennium Challenge 
Corporation ývas 
established in January 2004 to run the MCA. Initial funding 
for 2004 was US 
$1 billion. increasing to US $1.5 billion in 2005 and US $31 billion in 2006, with 
the aim of growing to US $5 billion per year. 
3 17 
A country's performance is measured by 16 policy indicators drawn 
from publicly available sources. 183 To qualify, a country must score above the 
median on half the indicators in each of the three categories and it must score 
above the median on perceived corruption [Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(2004)]. Although there are concems about the quality of the data and whether 
the selection process is biased against the poorest countries because of their 
poverty creating difficulties in scoring well on some indicators, the indicators 
used have a clear advantage - they are public. This depoliticizes the selection 
process and makes it harder (though not impossible) for lobbying to bias 
selection. 
Importantly, the MCA has a policy of country ownership, where 
countries have the lead in proposing how funds should be used. Countries are 
asked to propose programmes that promote overall economic growth and that 
significantly reduce poverty [Millennium Challenge Corporation (2006)]. 184 
There is no stated preference over sectors. Since its establishment in 2004, the 
MCA has given more than US $1.5 billion to eight countries, namely, 
Madagascar, Honduras, Cape Verde, Nicaragua, Georgia, Benin, Vanuatu and 
Armenia. 
Initiatives such as the MCA provide strong incentives and rewards for 
countries that are serious about combating corruption. They give eligible 
183 The indicators are: Ruling Justly (6) - Control of corruption, Rule of 
law: Government 
effectiveness, Voice and accountability, Political rights, Civil liberties; Lnvesting in People (4) - 
Public expenditure on health, Immunization (DPT3 and Measles), Public expenditure on primarý 
education, Primary education completion rate; Promoting Economic Freedom (6) - Cost of 
starting a business, Inflation, Fiscal policy. Days to start a business, Trade policy. Regulatory 
quality rating. 
114 Note that the Millennium Challenge Corporation "does not take itfior granted that programs 
that stimulate growth will invariably reduce poverty" [Millennium Challenge 
Corporation 
(2006)]. 
i18 
countries a leading role in determining the best uses for aid flows. In addition. 
ineligible countries are encouraged to reform so as to qualify for aid in the 
future. We believe these initiatives are a step in the right direction and that this 
is a fruitful area for future research. 
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Appendix 4. A 
The sample for the main results 
We collect data for 32 sub-Saharan African countries from 1982 to 1997. 
We then divide the cross-country sample into four periods, by calculating four- 
year averages of the variables, 185 so that periods 1-4 correspond to averages of 
the years 1982-1985,1986-1989,1990-1993 and 1994-1997, respectively. 186 
Thus, each country has four observations, data permitting. There are, however, 
a few important exceptions. Namibia has no observations for our measure of 
corruption for periods I and 2. In addition, South Africa was only added to the 
DAC list of aid recipients in 1991, so it is never included in the sample for 
periods I and 2. 
We are also concerned with the potential impact of outliers on our 
results. We adopt the Hadi (1992) method for identifying and eliminating 
outliers. 1 87 The relationship between aid as per cent of GDP and perceived 
corruption is our primary interest, although, for statistical reasons, we use 
logged aid as per cent of GDP as the dependent variable in our regressions. 
Therefore, we identify outliers for both logged aid as per cent of GDP and aid as 
per cent of GDP. The outliers for logged aid as per cent of GDP are Nigeria for 
period 4 and South Africa for periods 3 and 4. There are no outliers for aid as 
per cent of GDP. These outliers for logged aid as per cent of GDP are identified 
185 Except for income per capita, where the value at the beginning of the period is used. 186 Averages instead of individual years are taken in order to eliminate short-tenn variations. 187 The Hadi method measures the distance of data points from the main body of data and then 
iteratively reduces the sample to exclude distant data points. 
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by triangles in Figure 4. A. I. Figure 4. A. 2 illustrates there are no outliers for aid 
as per cent of GDP. 
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Figure 4. A. 1: Identifying outliers for logged aid as per cent of GDP 
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Appendix 4. B 
Table 4. B. 1: CRS sector classifications and definitions 
Sector Classification Definition 
1. ý)ULAAL I. I otal 
INFRASTRUCTURE & 
SERVICES 
i. i taucation, i otai includes general teaching and instruction at all levels; as . vell as construction specifically to improve or adapt educational 
establishments. Training in a particular field, such as 
agriculture, is reported against the sector concerned. 
I. La) Education, Level Includes education sector policy and research, as \vell as Unspecified buildings and teacher training when level of education 
unspecified. 
1. I. b) Basic Education Includes primary, basic life skills for youth and adults and 
early childhood education. 
1. I. c) Secondary Education Includes vocational training. 
1. I. d) Post-Secondary Includes higher education and advanced technical and 
Education managerial training. 
1.2 Health, Total Covers assistance to hospitals, clinics, other medical and 
dental services, public health administration and medical 
insurance programmes. 
1.2. a) Health, General Includes health policy, medical education and research, 
laboratories, hospitals and specialised clinics, ambulances, 
dental services, mental health, rehabilitation, non-infectious 
disease control, drug and substance abuse control (excluding 
narcotics trafficking) 
1.2. b) Basic Health Basic health care provision, training of basic health personnel 
and development of basic health infrastructure. nutrition, 
infectious disease control, public health campaigns. 
1.3 Population Programmes Covers all activities in the field of reproductive health, family 
planning and research into population problems. 
1.4 Water Supply & Covers assistance given for water supply and use, sanitation 
Sanitation and water resources development (including rivers). 
1.5 Government & Civil Includes assistance to strengthen the administrative apparatus 
Society and government planning, and activities promoting good 
governance and strengthening civil society. 
1.6 Other Social Covers assistance to employment, housing, other social 
Infrastructure & Services services and cultural development. Includes also research when 
sector cannot be identified. 
1-6-a) Employment Employment policy and planning. labour law. labour unions, 
institution capacity building and advice; support programmes 
for unemployed; employment creation and income generation 
programmes; occupational safetv and health; combatinu child 
labour. 
1.6-b) Housing Housing sector policy. planning and programme aid, loxv-cost 
housing and slum clearance. 
1.6. c) Other Social Services Includes social legislation and administration; programmes 
for 
specific social groups. reconstruction assistance, police and 
customs; narcotics control*, statistical capacity building, culture 
and recreation. assistance to research and scientific institutes 
ILFCONOMIC II. Total 
i23 
Sector Ulassitication Definition 
fNFRASTRUCTURE 
ransport & Lstorage Covers road, rail, water and air transport and storage, whether 
or not related to transportation. 
11.2Communications Includes all communications (post and telecommunications. 
radio, television, print media). 
11.3 Energy Covers both the production and distribution of energ-,. 
Assistance towards the peaceful use of nuclear energý is 
reportable as ODA. This includes the construction and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors for civilian power 
supply, the development or 
11.4 Banking & Financial Covers assistance to finance and banking in both formal and 
Services informal sectors. 
11.5 Business & Other Includes business development and activities aimed at 
Services improving the business climate; privatisation. 
III. PRODUCTION III. Total 
_SECTORS 1.1 Agriculture - Forestry Including agricultural sector policy, agricultural development 
Fishing, Total and inputs, crops and livestock production, agricultural credit, 
co-operatives and research. 
111. La) Agriculture Including agricultural sector policy, agricultural development 
and inputs, crops and livestock production, agricultural credit, 
co-operatives and research. 
Ill. Lb) Forestry Includes forestry policy, planning and programmes, fuelwood 
and charcoal projects, forestry education, research and 
development. 
111. Lc) Fishing Includes fisheries policy, planning and programmes as well as 
fisheries research and education. 
111.2 Industry - Mining - Covers assistance to manufacturing industries of all kinds, 
Construction, Total technological research and development, extractive industries, 
and construction when sector cannot be identified. 
111.2. a) Industry Industrial policy, small business and craft development; all 
types of manufacturing, including agro-processing, chemicals 
and fertilisers, gas liquefaction and petroleum refining, fuel 
wood production, textiles and leather. 
111.2. b) Mining Includes mining and minerals policy and programmes, 
geology, and extraction of metals, minerals and fuels. 
111.2-c) Construction Construction sector policy and planning; excluding 
construction activities within specific sectors (e. g., hospital or 
school construction). 
111.3 Trade & Tourism Covers trade and export promotion; hotels and other tourist 
facilities. 
111.3 
- a) Trade 
Trade policy and planning; domestic marketing, trade, service 
industries, patents and trademarks, ýN'holesale and retail trade 
and export promotion. 
111.3-b) Tourism Tourism policy and administrative management. 
IV. MULTISECTOR IV. Total 
IV. 1 General Environment Covers activities concerned ýý-ith conservation, protection or 
Protection amelioration of the physical environment without sector 
allocation. 
IV. 2 Women In Covers activities concerned with advancement of women in 
Development development without sector allocation. 
IV-3 Other Multisector Covers urban and rural development projects and other 
multisector activities 
-1 -) 
3-4 
Sector Classification Definition 
V. TOTAL SECTOR Sum of amounts on lines 100,200,300 and 400. 
ALLOCABLE 
(1+11+111+IV) 
V1. COMMODITY AID This main heading includes contributions for general 
GENERAL PROG. ASS. development purposes without sector allocation, ýN'ith or 
without restrictions on the specific use of the funds (and 
irrespective of any control by the donor of the use of 
counterpart funds). 
VI. I Structural Adjustment Non-sector allocable programme assistance whose provision is 
(with IBRD/IMF) explicitly linked to agreed policy packages, in particular those 
implementing recommendations made by the World Bank and 
the IMF. 
VI. 2 Food Aid excluding Supplies and transport of food, cash for food, and intermediate 
Relief Food Aid products (fertilisers, seeds etc. ) provided as part of a food aid 
programme. 
VI. 3 Other General Includes import, budget and balance-of-payments support. 
Programme & Commodity 
Ass. 
VI I. ACTION This main heading groups all actions relating to debt 
RELATING TO DEBT (forgiveness, swaps, buy-backs, rescheduling, refinancing). 
VIII. EMERGENCY This main heading groups emergency and distress relief in 
ASSISTANCE cash or in kind, emergency food aid, humanitarian aid 
including aid to refugees, and assistance for disaster 
preparedness. 
VI 11.1 Relief Food Aid Food aid for population groups affected by emergency 
situations. 
VI 11.2 Non-Food All emergency, distress relief and humanitarian aid except 
Emergency and Distress food aid. 
Relief 
VI 11.3 Reconstruction relief 
IX. ADMINISTRATIVE Administrative costs as defined in paragraphs 1.26 to 1.30. 
COSTS OF DONORS 
X. SUPPORT TO NGO'S This main heading refers to official funds paid over to national 
and international non-governmental organisations for use at the 
latters' discretion. 
X1. Amounts should be reported under this heading only for forms 
UNALLOCATED/UNSPE of aid which cannot be assigned to another part of the table, 
CIFIED and also, in the case of project or sector assistance, to record 
contributions for which sectoral destination remains to be 
specified. 
XILTOTAL 
Table reproduced from OECD (2005b). 
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Appendix 4. C 
Table 4. C. 1: Bilateral Aggregate Aid Commitments as per cent of GDP - 
Excluding outliers 
Dependent variable: Log(DAC bilateral aid commitments, per cent of GDP) 
1111 [2] 
Outliers removed Log(aidGDP) Log(aidlGDP) 
Log(Population) -1.743*** -2.773*** 
[0.372] [0.452] 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.331 -0.392 
[0.471] [0.408] 
Openness 0.208 0.213 
[0.170] [0.162] 
Democracy 0.048** 0.055*** 
[0.020] [0.018] 
Human Rights 0.109 0.038 
[0.071] [0.068] 
Corruption -0.145*** -0.156*** 
[0.047] [0.040] 
Arms imports -0.003*** 
[0.001] 
Friend of US -0.004 
[0.011] 
Friend of Japan 0.100*** 
[0.022] 
Friend of UK -0.058 
[0.035] 
Friend of France 0.003 
[0.020] 
Constant 6.932** 5.071 
[3.353] [3.681] 
Observations 97 95 
Countries 27 27 
R2 0.403 0.639 
Hausman Test (D-value) 0.011 0.000 
White heteroskedasti city corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Countrýv specific dw-nmies included 
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Appendix 4. D 
Relationship between estimated coefficients when the dependent variable is 
In(aid per capita) and when it is ln(aid/GDP) 
Consider the following equation to be estimated (for simplicity, we exclude 
country and time subscripts, a constant, and include only corruption as an 
additional regressor): 
In aid -] =A In[ population] + 82 In [ GDP per capita + 83Corruption +c 
[ 
population 
Using the properties of the logarithm, we obtain: 
In [ aid ]- In [ population ] =AIn [ population ] +, 82 In [ GDP per capita ] 
P3 Corruption +- 
Rearranging terms we obtain: 
In[aid] = (A+ 1) In [ population ] +, 82 In [ GDP per capita ]+ #3 Corruption +c 
Subtracting In[ GDP per capita x population] from each side, we obtain: 
In [aid] -In[ GDP per capita x population]= (A +I) In[ population]+ 
, 62 In [ GDP per capita ] +, 83Corruption - In[ GDP per capita x population] +, E 
Using the properties of the logarithm and rearranging terms, we obtain: 
id In 
[2ý-] 
=(A +])In[ population] +, 82 In [ GDP per capita In [ GDP per capita GDP 
ln[population]+ACorruption +E 
Rearranging further, we obtain: 
id In =A In[ population]+ (#2 -1) In[ GDP per capita] +fi3Corruption+c GDP 
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aid So, estimating a model with In as the dependent variable vields 
I 
population 
] 
the same coefficients for all explanatory variables except In [ GDP per capita ]. 
as estimating a model with In 
aid 
when In[population] and 
[ 
GDP 
]' 
In [ GDP per capita ] are included as regressors. In addition, the estimated 
coefficient of In [ GDP per capita ] when In 
aid is the dependent variable is 
[ 
GDP 
] 
equal to the estimated coefficient of when In 
aid is the dependent 
[ 
population 
] 
variable minus 1. This holds for estimating the models using annual data. 
Now consider period data (in particular, four-year periods). For period j, the 
variables are defined as follows: 
4 
aidi 
In aid In j, populationi 
population 4 
4 
aidi I 
aid GDPper capitai x populationi In -= In GDP 4 
4 
1 populationi 
In[ population] = in '=' 4 
'I -) 
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4 
1 GDPper capita, 
In[ GDPper capita] = In 4 
Because the data is now averaged, rather than annual data, we cannot use the 
properties of the logarithms as before. This means that the estimated 
coefficients will not be the same when we estimated a model with In 
aid or 
I 
GDP 
] 
with In 
aid as the dependent variable. 
[ 
population 
] 
329 
Appendix 4. E 
Table 4. E. 1: AW description of data and sources 
Variable Description Source 
Aid per capita Official development assistance World Bank (I 998b? ) 
(constant $1987) 
Years as a colony Number of years as a colony of any Alesina and Dollar (2000). 
colonizer since 1900 CIA (1996) 
CORRBI Business International (BI) corruption BI, now Economist 
indicator average 1980-1993, collected Intelligence Unit 
by Mauro (1995): 10 (lowest 
corruption), 0 (highest corruption) 
CORRICRG Corruption index from ICRG, 1982- Knack and Keefer (1995) 
1995: 6 (lowest corruption), 0 (highest 
corruption) 
CORRIMD Corruption Index from World Institute for Management 
Competitiveness Yearbook, 1996 Development, IMD 
(original name: improper practices such 
as bribing and corruption): 10 (lowest 
corruption), 0 (highest corruption) 
CORRS&P Losses and costs of corruption, fi7om Standard and Poor's 
Standard and Poors (1997), redefmed 
to: 10 (lowest corruption), 0 (highest 
corruption) 
CORRTI Corruption index from Transparency Transparency International 
International, survey 1997: 10 (lowest 
corruption), 0 (highest corruption) 
CORRWDRI Level of corruption index, from Survey Brunetti et al. (1998) 
of World Development Report 1997, 
plus five additional surveys: 6 (lowest 
corruption), I (highest corruption) 
CORRWDR2 Corruption as a business obstacle, from Brunetti et al. (1998) 
Survey of World Development Report 
1997, plus five additional surveys: 6 
(lowest corruption), I (highest 
corrUDtion) 
Democracy Political Rights, recoded as: 7 Gastil (1990) 
(democratic), I (autocratic govemment) 
FRDXXX Percentage of times in which the Alesina and Dollar (2000) 
recipient has voted in the UN as XXX 
Income Real GDP per capita, beginning of Heston and Summers (1991) 
Deriod 
Openness Proportion of years in which the Sachs and 'A'amer(1995) 
country is open 
Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
We study three topics on corruption that are of particular relevance to 
sub-Saharan Africa. Although the three issues can be considered independently 
of one another, it is possible to draw some links between them. This chapter 
reflects on the links between the previous chapters, as well as on the limitations 
of those chapters. We also summarise our scholarly contributions, as well as 
some policy and future research implications. 
Chapter 2 addresses the first question, which regards the determinant 
factors of corruption. In particular, we try to ascertain whether corruption in 
sub-Saharan Africa is "destiny" or policy driven. Guided by results from the 
theoretical and empirical literature,, we estimate several models in order to 
assess the contribution of a number of factors to a country's level of perceived 
corruption. We include variables measuring long-predetermined historical and 
cultural characteristics, as well as variables measuring economic development, 
democracy and political stability, and variables capturing public policy stances, 
as well as the relative importance of aid flows. Our findings suggest that long- 
predetermined historical and cultural characteristics are important and it is not 
just Policy that matters. 
Chapter 3 addresses the second question, which focuses on a much less 
studied aspect of corruption, namely, the supply of bribes. In particular. Nve 
look 
at government procurement contracts and investigate whether allocative 
efficiency is maintained in the presence of corrupt officials. 
We also assume the 
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winning firm may be audited and fined if it offered bribes. We find that. unless 
the government official is known with certainty to be honest. bribery Nvill always 
take place. The only exceptions are when there is either a fixed fine that is 
sufficiently large or if a firm's expected punishment is more than proportional to 
its gain. In addition, as long as bribery occurs, there will penerally be no r_- .1 
welfare efficiency. 
Chapter 4 addresses the final question, which is whether more corrupt 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa receive less aid from bilateral donors in 
aggregate. Although we find that countries perceived to be more corrupt tend to C) 
receive less aid, we are unable to establish a causal impact of percei-,., ed 
corruption on aid receipts. Motivated by the focus of the UN Millennium 
Development Goals on specific sectors, such as health and education, we also 
present some preliminary evidence on aid receipts across sectors. We find little 
evidence that sectoral aid is affected by levels of perceived corruption. 
The brief summary above highlights that the most obvious links are 
between Chapters 2 and 4. Indeed, whilst Chapter 2 examines the impact of aid 
flows (among other factors) on a country's level of perceived corruptioný 
Chapter 4 looks at whether countries perceived to be more corrupt recei\, e more 
aid. In both cases, we are guided by the two separate literatures in choosing our 
set of explanatory variables. Aid and corruption are not exogenously 
determined, but there is a causal relationship between the two variables. 
In both 
cases, we attempt to estimate causal effects. We use Instrumental variables in 
Chapter 2, though not in Chapter 4, as Nve find no instruments suitable 
for FE 
models (the potential instrument, ethno-linguistlc 
fractlonalisation, ývas time- 
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invariant). So instead in Chapter 4 we use lagged values. In Chapter 2 \, N, e also 
check the robustness of our IV results using the approach of lagged values. In 
Chapter 2 we do not find a robust empirical relationship between aid receipts 
and a country's level of perceived corruption. In Chapter 4. although we find a 
correlation between a recipient country's perceived corruption and the aid it 
receives, we find no evidence that this is a causal effect. Although Nve take into 
account the endogeneity of aid and perceived corruption, the empirical models 
that we estimate in each chapter are not derived from theoretical economic 
models that seek to establish the underlying structural and behavloural 
relationship between aid and corruption. 
However,, there are also links between Chapters 2 and 3, and between 
Chapters 3 and 4. Consider the links between Chapters 2 and 3, in particular in 
terms of the implications for firms' behaviour of observing high IevcIs of 
corruption, as measured by subjective indices. In Chapter 3. firms do not know 
with certainty whether the goverment official that will be evaluating their bids 
is corrupt or not - finns have beliefs regarding the corruptibility of the official. 
In principle, one could assume that the firms' beliefs as to the corruptibility of 
the government official may be proxied by indices of perceived corruption. 
That is, if a country is perceived to be corrupt. as measured by indices such as 
the ICRG corruption index that we used in Chapters 2 and 4. then we would 
expect these indices to reflect firms' beliefs regarding the corruption of officials. 
In particular, if country A is scored as more corrupt than country 
B. then Firms 
could form beliefs that it is more likely for officials in countrv 
A to be more 
corrupt than those in country B. 
However, there are two important caveats concerning how well indices 
of perceived corruption may serve as a proxy for firms' beliefs of officials' 
con-uptibility. The first one is that, unless a country is scored by a subjective 
corruption index as being 'squeaky clean', a reliance on these indices to form 
beliefs about officials' corruptibility means that firms will always offer 
bribes. 188 Countries are not typically perceived as being completely incorrupt 
(or indeed, incorruptible), so that bribery would potentially almost alwaYs take 
place. 189 The second is that these subjective indices of corruption might not 
necessarily represent firms' uncertainty regarding whether a certain government 
official is corrupt. Suppose that a country is scored as being highly corrupt. In 
this case, you could expect that it is more probable to encounter a corrupt 
official, and that firms may have less uncertainty about an official's 
corruptibility. Conversely, firms may believe that officials are more likely to be 
honest in a country that is scored as not very corrupt. However, indices of 
corruption may not accurately reflect firms' uncertainty about officials. There 
may be a proportion of officials who are corrupt and others who are honest,, but 
firms may know which is which. This might happen if firms routinely deal with 
the same set of government officials, and have built relationships, or even if 
certain officials have strong reputations of either being honest or dishonest. 
Only if there is high political tumover would one expect the corruption index to 
1 8' Note that unless the government official is known with certaint-', to 
be honest, in Chapter 3 
the only exceptions for bribing to take place are when there 
is either a fixed fine that is 
sufficiently large (i. e., when the expected value of the fixed fine 
is greater than the payoff to the 
firm with the greatest capacity to bribe) or if a firm's expected punishment is more 
than 
proportional to its gain. '8' Note that some countries are given the score of no perceived corruption - 
for example, in our 
sample South Africa is scored as having no perceived corruption 
from 1982 to 1986. 
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reflect uncertainty, particu. arly in countries where more senior civil servants 
change when there is a change in the political party in power. 
Consider the links between Chapters 3 and 4. All the sub-Saharan 
African countries in our sample receive aid from bilateral donors in aggregate, 
even if all countries do not receive aid from all bilateral donors. 190 it is 
reasonable to assume that foreign aid will finance projects that the recipient 
country might not otherwise have had funds to finance. 191 So aid flows allow 
for the commissioning of more government projects. Suppose that foreign aid 
flows enable spending on an infrastructure project, say building a road. The 
model in Chapter 3 predicts that, unless the government official is known with 
certainty to be honest, firms will always offer bribes. The only exceptions for 
bribing to take place are when there is either a fixed fine that is sufficiently large 
or if a firm's expected punishment is more than proportional to its gain. If we 
assume that domestic firms compete for the project, then we can think that in 
sub-Saharan Africa it is unlikely that the political will and muscle exists to 
implement inspections on national firms, or that, even if firms are found to have 
been corrupt, that penalties will be imposed. If we assume that foreign firms 
compete for the project, say because aid is tied, so that procurement of goods or 
services is limited to the donor country, it is conceivable that those firms could 
face a more binding constraint in terms of being audited, and of having penalties 
190 For example, Portugal tends to give aid primarily to its former colonies, such as Angola and 
Mozambique. In contrast, the US gives aid to a wide variety of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. '9' Note that it is also possible that a recipient country's government would have undertaken a 
donor-financed project in the absence of that financing, and that donor funds simply 
finance, at 
the margin, something else that may be undesirable (there may be a problem of 
fungibility). 
However, for our purposes, even if the switching of funds does occur. , Nre can assume that 
another project will be financed, even if it is a more undesirable project (such as one N%. 
hl*ch is 
undertaken simply because it is a project on which corrupt goNernments maý 
find it easier to 
collect bribes. ) 
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irnposed if they were found to have offered bribes. This could be due, for 
exarnple, because the donor country may be a signatory of the OECD Anti- 
B6bery Convention. ' 
92,193 In either case, the fines (and monitoring) would have 
to be set at a level that effectively deterred bribe giving. In the absence of such 
fines, this would mean that, by virtue of the existence of the supply of bribes (by 
firms that offer bribes), not only would there be no allocative efficiency. more 
corrupt acts would also take place. This would occur independently of whether 
countries perceived to be more corrupt received less aid. At best, donors can 
only rely on indices of perceived corruption. However, these indices focus on 
the demand for bribes, that is, of the willingness/propensity of government 
officials to demand bribes. These indices may not fully capture the true extent 
of corruption in this scenario where officials engage in 'passive' corruption. So 
by taking into account the fact that it takes two to enter into a corrupt deal, and 
that it is extremely difficult to measure supply of bribes, we can see that the 
subjective indices of corruption may not be the most relevant factor in 
determining whether more corrupt countries receive less aid. 
It is important to cast a critical eye over the work that has been carried 
out in this thesis. As such, it is important to highlight some limitations of the 
different chapters, and to consider avenues of future research. 
192 It should be noted that surveys carried out by Transparencý, International 
(1999,2002. ) 
present a dismal picture of firins' awareness of the OECD Anti-Briben 
Convention - in 1999 
(\N, hen the Convention was implemented) only 6% were familiar with the 
Convention. and three 
years on, in 2002, this had only increased to 7%. Indeed, as David 
Nussbaum, Chief Executive 
of Transparency International stated, "It is hypocritical that OECD-based companies continue 
lo 
bribe across the globe, ii, hile their governments pay lip-service to el? 
forcing the laiv. " 
191, It is important to note that we are not advocating that aid should 
be tied. Rather, ý% hat is 
important is to ensure that effective monitoring and penalty mechanisms are in 
place. 
I 
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The empirical chapters, namely 2 and 4, bring to the fore some non- 
negligible limitations in terms of the data available for measuring corruption. 
Firstly, we rely on subjective indices of perceived corruption. Although the 
existence of such measures in relation to a concept such as corruption that is 
inherently difficult to measure is a step in the right direction, it is nonetheless 
important to acknowledge the limitations of such measures. Important 
limitations are that these are measures based on perceptions of corruption; that 
they are subject to measurement errors; they do not distinguish bet,, veen 
different types of corrupt acts; and they may reflect ideological biases of the 
institution compiling the scores. So caution must be exercised when interpreting 
results obtained when using these subjective measures, and it is important not to 
misuse such governance indicators. 
Secondly, another related and important limitation in those chapters is 
that we are not able to check whether the results obtained are robust to using 
different measures of perceived corruption. Although other indices of perceived 
corruption are available, they suffer from the limitations of poor coverage of 
African countries within the time period we consider, and more importantly. 
they are not comparable over time. Therefore, we are unable to use any 
alternative measures of perceived corruption. 
Thirdly, although the early 1990s marked the awakening of 
Policyrnakers to the problems of corruption, it was not until the mid to 
late 
1990s that awareness of corruption truly increased and became a more Integral 
component of the policy agenda. Because the latestycar included 
in our sample 
Is 1997, we cannot fully capture this reversal of policy priorities. 
This is 
arguably more of a problem in Chapter 4. as having data on perce'ved 
corruption since 1997 could permit determining whether this shift in a\Narciiess 
by donor countries was truly translated into recipient countries' aid receipts 
being significantly related to their level of perceived corruption. It should be 
noted, however, that data on the ICRG corruption index which we used tv 
available for more recent years than 1997. In fact, it is available until the 
current year - unfortunately, due to financial constraints, we were unable to 
obtain such updated data. 
In terms of Chapter 2, it is also important to acknowledge the 
existence of some counter-intuitive results, and how these may be related to 
limitations with some of variables used. The most relevant example (and 
perhaps our most puzzling result) is that although former British colonies tend to 
be perceived as less corrupt, countries with a common law system are perceived 
as more corrupt than those with a civil law system, ceferis paribus. It is 
important to note that drawing a distinction between the highly correlated 
common law and British heritage variables involves considering the "divergent" 
cases, in which a country has just a common law system but no British heritage 
or in which a country has just British heritage but no common law system. 'A"e 
use these variations to attempt to distinguish between the effects of being a 
former British colony and having a common law legal system. and find that 
countries with both common law and British heritage probably have lo\N, er 
perceived corruption and that those with only a common laxv have lugher 
perceived corruption. Although our results suggest that a countrv's political and 
cultural setting may significantly condition the way that institutions work. it is 
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irnportant to emphasize their fragility, as they depend on a small number of 
"divergent" cases - only three in our sample of 32 countries. This suggests that 
a more refined study of how certain aspects of legal practice relate to corruption 
in government is needed. It also suggests that, although our choice of estimating 
a random effects model was justified on the basis of the Hausman specification 
test, if we had estimated a fixed effects model then those variables that are 
effectively proxies for a small number of countries (for example, "Just Common 
Law" and "No Colonial Heritage") would have been eliminated by virtue of 
being time-invariant. 
Our findings in Chapter 2 suggest why fighting corruption in sub- 
Saharan Africa has been so difficult - long-predetermined historical and cultural 
characteristics appear to be important, and it is not just policy that matters in 
determining a country's level of perceived corruption. In light of these results, a 
question related to whether corruption is "destiny" or policy driven arises. That 
is, given that governments cannot change their countries' "destiny", should Nve 
be focusing our attention towards what those governments can do to influence 
levels of corruption? Put differently, the really interesting question becomes 
whether countries can, through sound policies, reverse high levels of corruption, 
and, specifically, what policies should be pursued in order to do so. In that case, 
it would be appropriate to focus on changes in corruption. it would 
be 
interesting to determine empirically what factors are important in Improving or 
deteriorating levels of perceived corruption. including potentially the speed Nvith 
which such factors influence changing perceptions of corruption. 
The ablllt\, to 
empirically establish such results could have a positive impact on 
the 
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policymaking arena. Such results could serve as a guide for policyrnakers, as 
they would be able to devote resources to corruption-reducing policies. of 
course, it is important to bear in Mind that the limitations of the corruption 
indicators mean that results would be indicative rather than definitive. In any 
case, this seems like a fruitful area for future research. 
One of the limitations of Chapter 2 is that that chapter looks primarily at 
correlations between several factors and corruption. In particular, it studies 
aggregate and macro-level determinants of corruption. A focus on aggregate 
determinants sheds little light on the relationship between corruption and 
individual agents - agents facing similar institutions and policies may still 
exhibit different levels of corruption. So whilst informative, aggregate 
determinants of corruption can-not adequately explain variations of corruption 
within a country. It would probably be more appropriate to have a theoretical 
model that explicitly modelled corruption at the micro-level, in tenns of 
officials' behaviours and incentives in engaging in corrupt activities. One 
drawback with this approach, however, would be the need for micro-level data 
in order to empirically test any predictions from the model. In any case, such a 
theoretical framework would allow for more robust links between different 
Policy variables and corruption. 
The most obvious limitation of Chapter 3 is that the theoretical model 
is 
not empirically tested. Unfortunately, there are no data sets that could be used 
to test the predictions of the model, as we require data on 
bribe payments by 
firms in order to win government contracts. In addition, Nve would need 
data not 
only on the incidence of bribe giving, but also on the amount of 
the bribes. 
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Although some data exist on bribe payments (Transparency International's 
Bribe Payers Index (for the years Of 1999,2002,2006); 194 and the 'World Bank's 
Business Environment Survey (for 2000)), these are indicators based on 
perceptions of the extent to which bribing takes place. Whilst the Business 
Environment Survey does provide data by country in which the bribing takes 
place (albeit with a very low coverage of only 15 sub-Saharan African 
countries), the Bribe Payers Index does not - so there is no information 
available in terms of the country where the bribing is taking place. In any case. 
these indicators do not provide information on bribery in government contracts,, 
rendering them even more inappropriate for our purposes. 
In terms of limitations regarding the theoretical model, one criticism is 
that the model should allow for different estimates of the probability that a 
govemment official is corrupt. For example, some firms may bid for projects 
more frequently than others, and may, therefore, encounter the same pool of 
officials more often. 
Another possible improvement/extension to the model would be to alter 
the assumption that the government official is either honest or dishonest, as this 
may be too restrictive. Indeed, it may be reasonable to assume instead that there 
are threshold effects, which take into account how bribe levels may affect the 
propensity of officials to be corrupt. For example, some officials may have a 
reservation bribe, akin to a reservation wage, so that they only engage in corrupt 
"' Note that while the Bribe Payers Indices for 1999 and 2002 are comparable. these are not 
comparable with the one for 2006. This is because they are based on a different methodolog'N 
and different survey questions. For example, in 1999 and 2002 business execuMes Were 
questioned on their propensity to offer bribes to officials in 15 emerging market economies on]%. 
whereas in 2006, business executives were questioned on the extent to ývhich firms that did 
business in their country (125 countries were considered, not Just emerging economies) bribed or 
made undocumented payments in general and not just to foreign officials. 
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acts at levels above their reservation bribe. In addition, officials may also have 
rnaximum bribe levels. This may occur, for example, if officials are 'semi- 
honest', that is, they might believe that they are entitled to receive gifts from the 
bidding firms, just as long as these gifts are below a certain level and cannot be 
considerable substantial. Another example is if the official is deterred from 
accepting bribes greater than a certain level due to increasing expected penalties. 
The existence of such threshold effects would introduce yet another source of 
uncertainty for the bidding firms. 
A related criticism is that in the model in Chapter 3 we have abstracted 
from the official's decision to be corrupt. We have assumed that this is given 
exogenously. However, it would be interesting to ascertain how the results 
would change if the official's corruptibility was determined endogenously in the 
model, particularly in light of the possible extension described in the paragraph 
above. 
In terms of Chapter 4, one of the limitations is that the simple theoretical 
model that was used to motivate the analysis was not empirically tested. This 
was due to the fact that the focus on the donor's price elasticity of demand for 
projects in the recipient country was too limited for empirical application. 
Underlying the aid receipts that Chapter 4 models are aid allocations 
by 
bilateral donors. Another limitation of that chapter is that, by focusing on 
aggregate aid flows, we are not able to distinguish between 
different donors, 
and, therefore, potential significant differences in the behaviour of 
different 
donors cannot be uncovered. This would. therefore. entail 
looking at ho", aid is 
allocated. 
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This, in turn, highlights a related limitation. That is. that a potentially 
more interesting question could be how aid should be allocated. Should aid be 
allocated so that both poverty and corruption reduction of the recipient countries 
be used as the main criteria of donors? Should promoting growth and 
governance be the new benchmark for aid effectiveness? If the international 
community is serious about curbing corruption, then donors may indeed want to 
allocate aid not only in a 'poverty-efficient', but also in a 'corruption-efficient' 
way. It would be interesting to investigate whether it would be feasible, and if 
so, optimal to have poverty- and corruption-efficient aid allocations. 
It should be highlighted, however, that there is no clear evidence of how 
aid flows affect corruption. Indeed, the empirical findings on the impact of aid 
on corruption have been ambiguous. There is evidence that aid causes perceived 
corruption to increase [Alesina and Weder (2002), Svensson (2000)], that aid 
decreases perceived corruption [Tavares (2003)], and that aid is not significantly 
related to perceived corruption [Knack (2001), Chapter 2]. This suggests that It 
would be important to examine in greater depth the mechanisms through which 
aid flows may affect a country's level of corruption. For example, 
does aid 
impact on corruption directly (due to a potential source of rents), or via an 
impact on growth? 
Recent empirical evidence on aid effectiveness 
has also been mixed. 
There is evidence that aid works better in countries with good policies. 
For 
example, Bumside and Dollar (2000) and Collier and 
Dollar (2002) show that 
aid has a greater impact on growth in countries with stronger 
policies and 
institutions. Easterly. Levine and Roodman (2004) question the robustness 
of 
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these results. They update and expand the data set used by Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) and no longer find that aid promotes greater groNAih in good policy 
environments. Hansen and Tarp (2001), using essentially the same data for the 
same sample as Burnside and Dollar (2000) but with different specifications and 
estimators, find that aid has a positive effect on growth and that this result is not 
conditional on policy. Overall, there seems to be more evidence to suggest that 
aids works in countries irrespective of the policy regime. As a comprehensive 
review of the literature on aid effectiveness is beyond the scope of this study, 
see Addison, Mavrotas and McGillvray (2005), and references therein. for a 
review of relevant papers on the aid effectiveness debate. 
Another criticism of Chapter 4 is that we did not explore x\ hether the 
type or composition of aid receipts is related to levels of perceived corruption. 
That is, we did not investigate the potential difference between aid loans and aid 
grants, and how these may be related to perceived levels of corruption. It is 
possible that donors may reward less corrupt countries xvith more grants (as 
these entail no future repayment burdens), even if in terms of the total of aid 
they may not discriminate between a recipient's level of perceived corruption. 
Notwithstanding the limitations that we have identified for each chapter, 
we believe that we have made some important contributions to the 
literature. 
Previous cross-national studies on the causes of corruption primarily 
fail 
to directly address critical issues of simultaneous causation. 
Those -studies that 
attempt to address endogeneity issues do so through instrumental variabIcs. 
but 
typically fail to find good instruments. Previous studies also often rely on 
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single-year data. By doing so, those studies forego the advantages of using 
panel data, such as controlling for unit heterogeneity. Furthermore, most studies 
use measures of corruption that have a very low (and sometimes no) coverage of 
sub-Saharan African countries. The few studies that distinguish between levels 
of perceived corruption in Africa and elsewhere tend to do so using a dummy 
variable for the whole of Africa, ignoring the differences between North and 
sub-Saharan Africa, and indeed between countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In 
addition, previous studies fail to take into account the ordinal nature of 
corruption indices, and do not check whether their results obtained when 
treating these indices as quantitative are robust. Failure to explicitly 
aQknowledge the nature and limitations of corruption indicators based on 
perceptions can only serve to weaken the rigour and credibility of studies which 
use these indicators. Some of the previous studies suffer from all the above 
shortcomings. We improve on the existing empirical literature by performing 
several robustness checks to our results. These include considering several 
specifications, tackling endogeneity issues using instrumental variables and the 
approach of lagged values. We also make an important contribution by 
verifying that our results are robust to taking into account the ordinal nature of 
corruption measures. 
In terms of our model of the supply of bribes, we contribute towards this 
often ignored strand of the literature on corruption. We make an important 
contribution in terms of assessing allocative efficiency in the presence of 
cOrruption. Previous studies have assumed that firms competing for goverriment 
contracts are either able to carry out the project at the same quality, or that the 
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10 1 west cost firm is always the highest quality one. In these cases, bribing entails 
no loss of efficiency, and bribes merely represent a redistribution of 1xealth from 
the finns to the government official. As we assume that quality is increasin(-, in 
cost, the optimal firm is not the one with the lowest cost. We find that, as Iong 
as bribery occurs, there will generally be no welfare efficiencN. This is 
particularly relevant for sub-Saharan African countries, where infrastructures are 
badly underdeveloped and where a lack of resources for adequate maintenance 
means quality makes a difference. 
We also make an important contribution in terms of the penalties that 
might be effective in deterring firms from offering bribes in govemnient 
procurement contracts. In addition, we are able to link some of the predictions 
of our model to specific policy implications. For example. the World Bank's 
initiative of blacklisting firms that offer bribes to public officials in the 
procurement process or contract execution in World Bank-financed projects is 
akin to a high value fixed fine, as the fixed fine can be interpreted as the present 
value of all future World Bank-financed contracts. To date, the World Bank has 
blacklisted over 350 firms. The names of these corrupt firms are made publicly 
available at the World Bank's website. This "naming and shaming" policy has 
been considered a very significant deterrent for corruption. As 
Daniel 
Kaufmann, Director of Global Programmes at the World Bank Institute puts it, 
-ýIfter we have announced the list publicly', other organisations will not we 
these firms. " This contrasts sharply with other major 
development 
organisations, such as the Asian Development Bank. which 
do not publish their 
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internal lists of corrupt contractors, making it more likely that these companies 
get new business. 
We also make a contribution in terms of the different types of 
transparencies that are important. Our finding that firms offer higher bribes 
when they have information about their rivals leads to the conclusion that 
transparency in terms of firms' capacity to bribe does not decrease the incidence 
of corrupt dealings. Although this means that the corporate sector needs to 
protect commercially sensitive information (in our model, firms' cost structures, 
as these have a direct mapping onto how much firms can afford to offer as a 
bribe), firms should be open to other types of disclosure. For example, 
companies should disclose whether they have a code of conduct containing 
specific rules designed to combat bribery, what the contents of the code are, and 
evaluations of internal controls and its perfonnance in imPlementing the code. 
Unfortunately, publishing a code is not enough. After all, Enron had a code. As 
voluntary codes and guidelines have the risk of non-compliance, enforced 
legislation is preferable. However, given the lack of legislation or weak 
enforcement in many countries, voluntary programmes are essential. 
Another example is the "Publish What You Pay'" campaign launched in 
June 2002 by the international financier and philanthropist George Soros and a 
number of non-governmental organisations. 195 "Publish What You Paý- calls 
for full transparency from foreign oil companies in terms of payments thcy 
make to govemments, including royalty. sign-on bonus and tax payments. 
rom BP. Although -Publish What You Pay" had an initial positive response f 
For more details, see http: /, "NN, \N, \N. publishNN, hat\ oupaý. org. 
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other oil companies have resisted disclosing information. MoreoN er. BP has yet 
to publish the information about the taxes and levies it pays to the Angolan 
government. 
We also show that in order to completely deter one of the parties of a 
corrupt deal (i. e., the bribe-giver), there needs to be an effective way of 
enforcing penalties to firms that offer bribes to win public contracts. The 
starting point is to have a sufficiently high (and credible) probability of an 
external inspection to the winning firm. In many cases, there is still a heavv 
reliance on whistle-bi owing, and this in itself is not sufficient. ' 96 In addition, 
there needs to be a credible commitment for imposing the fine. As John 
Githongo, from TI-Kenya, puts it: "Until people are brought before the courts, 
the OECD Convention will not make a difference to the developing world " 
[Transparency International (2002)]. As it currently stands, most signatories' 
legislation has such serious loopholes and their governments such weak 
monitoring and enforcement plans, that it is still highly unlikely that businesses 
will be punished for corruption. 
The few studies that look at the empirical relationship between 
corruption and aid fail to find any evidence that countries perceived to be less 
corrupt receive more aid. However, no attempt is made to provide a plausible 
explanation of why this might be the case. By applying standard concepts in 
demand theory, we provide a simple framework that seeks to explain hoxv 
1% For example, the World Bank's Department of Institutional Integrity encourages the reporting 
of allegations of fraud and corruption In Bank-financed projects via Its website or a 
free phone 
number. Unfortunately, there is still a lack of effectiN e whistle-blower protection. 
Often 
Nvh istle- blowers' disclosures are seen, at best, as disloyalty to the emploý , 
er and colleagues and. 
at N\ orst. as an attack upon them. Many suffer disciplinan, action or dismissal. 
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corruption might affect aid flows. We interpret corruption as a tax. which 
increases the price of a project, say, building a school, in the recipient country. 
Aid is, therefore, defined as the expenditure on projects in the recipient country, 
and the effect of corruption on aid is given by whether demand is elastic. 
Although this framework is extremely simple, and has limitations which prevent 
it from being empirically tested, we believe it provides a starting point for 
explaining how corruption may impact on aid flows. We improve on the 
existing empirical literature by tackling endogeneity issues using the approach 
of lagged values. We also make an important contribution by verifying that our 
results are robust to taking into account the ordinal nature of the corruption 
measure we use. 
Corruption is not an African disease, as many countries, both developing 
and developed, suffer from problems of corruption and few countries have 
escaped unscathed from scandals of kickbacks, payoffs and bribery. However, 
sub-Saharan Africa is riddled with many other problems, from extreme poverty, 
through alarming health conditions, to weak institutions and disrespect of human 
rights. All these factors contribute to making the task of taming corruption a 
particularly large and urgent one in sub-Saharan Africa. Unfortunately, there 
is 
no magic bullet to cure corruption. The fight against corruption requires a 
long- 
term commitment. We believe we have made a contribution to a 
better 
understanding of some of the problems of corruption in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
349 
References 
Abrams, Burton A. and Kenneth A. Lewis (1993), "Human Rights and the Distribution of US Foreign Aid", Public Choice, Vol. 77, No. 4 (December). pp. 815-821. 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J. A. Robinson (2001), "The colonial origins of 
comparative development: an empirical investigation American Economic 
Review, Vol. 91, pp. 1369-1401. 
Addison, T., G. Mavrotas and M. McGillivray (2005), "Development Assistance 
and Development Finance: Evidence and Global Policy Agendas", Journal of 
International Development, Vol. 17, pp. 819-836. 
Ades, A. and R. Di Tella (1999), "Rents, Competition and Corruption", 
American Economic Review, 89(4), pp. 982-93. 
Alcala, Francisco and Antonio Ciccone (2004), "Trade and Productivity", 
Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, Vol. 119, No. 2, pp. 613-46. 
Alesina, A. and D. Dollar (2000), "Who gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? " 
Journal ofEconomic Growth, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 33-63. 
Alesina, A. and B. Weder (2002), "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less 
Foreign Aid? " American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 4 (September), 
pp. 1126-113 7. 
Alesina, A., E. Spolaore and R. Wacziarg (2000), "Economic Integrations and 
Political Disintegration", American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 5 
(December), pp. 1276-1296. 
Andreoni, James and Lise Vesterlund (2001), "W%ich is the Fair Sex? Gender 
Differences in Altruism", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, No. I 
(February), pp. 293-312. 
Apodaca, Clair and Michael Stohl (1999), "United States Human Rights Policy 
and Foreign Assistance"". International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1, 
pp. 185-198. 
Baltagi, Badi H. (1995), Econometric Analysis of Panel Da John Wiley & 
Sons, Chichester. 
Bardhan, Pranab (1997), "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues", 
Journal ofEconomic Literature, 35, pp. 1320-1346. 
Bates, RobeM Affica Research Program data sets, Harvard University (available 
at http: //www. gov. harvard. edu/research/rbates). 
350 
Bayart, Jean-Frangois (1993), a: The Politics of the Belly. Longman, London. 
Blackden, C. M. and C. Bhanu (1999). "Gender, Growth and Poverty Reduction: 
Special Programme of Assistance for Africa, 1998 Status Report on Poverty in 
sub-Saharan Affica", World Bank Technical Paper 428, Washington D. C.: 
World Bank. 
Beck, P. I and M. W. Maher (1986), "A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in 
Thin Markets", Economics Letters, 20, pp. 1-5. 
Becker, Gary S. (1968), "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach", 
Journal q Political Economy, 76(2), March/April, pp. 169-217. )f 
Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and the 
Compensation of Enforcers", Journal ofLegal Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 1- 19. 
Bentham, Jeremy (1962), "Principles of Penal Law", in: John Bowring (ed. ), 
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 1, Russell & Russell. 
Bernheim, B. Douglas and Michael D. Whinston (1986). "Menu Auctions, 
Resource Allocation and Economic Influence, " Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 
10 1 (1), pp. 1-3 1. 
Berthelemy, Jean-Claude and Ariane Tichit (2004), "Bilateral Donors' Aid 
Allocation Decisions -A Three-dimensional Panel Analysis", International 
Review ofEconomics and Finance, 13, pp. 253-274. 
Besley, Timothy and John Maclaren (1993), "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of 
Wage Incentives", Economic Journal, Vol. 103, No. 416, pp. 119-14 1. 
Boschini, A. and A. Olofsgard (2001), "Foreign Aid: An Instrument for Fighting 
Poverty or Communism? ", World Bank, mimeo (available at 
http: //www. worldbank. org/wbi/B-SPAN/sub_instrumental. htm). 
Bound, John, David Jaeger and Regina Baker (1995), "Problems with 
Instrumental Variables Estimation When the Correlation Between the 
Instruments and the Endogenous Explanatory Variable is Weak", Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, Vol. 90, pp. 443-450. 
Boycko, Maxim, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1995), Privatizinp, Russi 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Bratton, Michael and Nicholas van de Walle (1994), "Neopatrimonial Regimes 
and Political Transitions in Aftica", World Politics. Vol. 46, No. 4 (July), pp. 
453-489. 
351 
Bratton, Michael and Nicholas van de Walle (1997), nents in Affica: Reizime Transitions in Compprntivi- Perspgctive, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Brautigam, Deborah (2000), Aid Denendenrp and Governance-, Stockholm: 
Alm. qvist & Wiksell International. 
Brunetti, Aymo, Gregory Kisunko and Beatrice Weder (1998), "How Firms in 
72 Countries Rate Their Institutional Environment", WWZ Discussion Paper 
No. 9811, Basel. 
Bulir, Ales and A. Javier Hamann (2003), "Aid Volatility: An Empirical 
Assessmenf'. IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 64-89. 
Burnside, Craig and David Dollar (2000). "Aid, Policies and Growth", 
American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (September), pp. 847-868. 
Carleton, David and Michael Stohl (1987). "The Role of Human Rights in US 
Foreign Policy Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal", American 
Journal ofPolitical Science, Vol. 3 1, No. 4, pp. 1002-1018. 
Chang, C. C., E. Femandez-Arias and L. Serven (1998), "Measuring Aid Flows: 
A New Approach", Mimeo, Washington, D. C.: World Bank. 
CIA (1996), World Factbook, Washington, D. C.: Central Intelligence Unit. 
CIA (2005), World Factbook, Washington, D. C.: Central Intelligence Unit. 
Cingranelli, David L. and Thomas E. Pasquarello (1985), "Human Rights 
Practices and the Distribution of US Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries", 
American Journal ofPolitical Science, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 539-563. 
Clark, Derek I and Christian Riis (2000). "'Allocation Efficiency in a 
Competitive Bribery Game, "' Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organisation, Vol. 42, pp. 109-124. 
Collier, Paul (1997), "The Failure of Conditionality", in Catherine Gwyn and 
Joan Nelson (eds. ), Perspectives on Aid and Development, Washington, D. C.: 
Overseas Development Council. 
Collier, Paul and David Dollar (2002), "Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction", 
European Economic Review, Vol. 46, No. 8, pp. 1475-1500. 
Commission for Aftica (2005), Our Common Interest: Report of the 
Lica, 
Commission for Africa: London. 
Coolidge, J. and Susan Rose-Ackerman (2000), "Kleptocracy and Reform in 
African Regimes: Theory and Examples", in: Hope and Chikulo (eds. ), 
352 
relopment in Africa: Lessons from Countrv Case-Studies St. 
martin's Press, New York. 
David, R. and I Brierly (1985), ns in the World Today 
edition. Stevens and Sons, London. 
della Porta, Donatella and Alberto Vannucci (1997), "'The 'Perverse Effects' of Political Corruption", ' Political Studies, 45, pp. 516-538. 
Dodson, D. L. and S. J. Carroll 0 99 1), Reshaping-the Agenda: Women in State 
Legislatures, Centre for American Women and Politics, Rutgers University 
Press, New Brunswick. 
Dollar, D., R. Fisman and R. Gatti (200 1), "Are Women Really the 'Fairer' Sex? 
Corruption and Women in Government", Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organisation, Vol. 46, pp. 423-429. 
Dowling, J. M. and U. Hiemenz (1985), "Biases in the Allocation of Foreign 
Aid: Some New Evidence", World Development, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 535-541. 
Eagly, A. H. and M. Crowley (1986), "Gender and Helping Behaviour: A Meta- 
Analytic Review of the Social Psychological Literature", Psychological 
Bulletin, Vol. 100, pp. 283-308. 
Easterly, William (2001), The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' 
Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Easterly, W. and R. Levine (1997), "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and 
Ethnic Divisions", Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 112(4), pp. 1203-1250. 
Easterly, W. and R. Levine (2003), "Tropics, germs, and crops: how 
endowments influence economic development", Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Vol. 50, pp. 3-39. 
Easterly, W., R. Levine and D. Roodman (2004), "Aid, Policies, and Growth: 
Comment", American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 3 (June), pp. 774-780. 
Eckel, C. C. and P. J Grossman (1998), "Are women less selfish than men? 
Evidence from dictator experiments", Economic Journal, Vol. 108, pp. 726- 
735. 
Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (2003)1) "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil 
War", American Political Science Review, Vol. 97 No. 1, pp-75-90. 
Flatters, Frank and W. Bentley MacLeod (1995), "Administrative Corruption 
and Taxation", International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 2, pp. 3 97-417. 
353 
Frankel, J., Romer, D., (1999), "Does trade cause growth? " American Economic 
Review, Vol. 8% No. 3, pp. 379-399. 
Freedom House (2005), Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political 
Liberties, New York: Freedom House (available at 
http: //www. freedomhouse. org). 
Frey, B. and F. Schneider (1986), "Competing Models of International Lending 
Activities", Journal ofDevelopment Economics, pp. 225-245. 
Gallup, J. L., J. D. Sachs and A. D. Mellinger (1999), "Geography and 
Economic Development", International Regional Science Review, Vol. 22, No. 
2 (August), pp. 179-232. 
Gartzke, Erik, (2006), The Affinity of Nations Index, 1946-2002, Version 4.0, 
Columbia University (http: //www. columbia. edu/-eg589/datasets). 
Gastil, John (1990), Freedom in the world: Political rights and civil liberties 
1988-89, Washington, DC: Freedom House. 
Gates, Scott and Anke Hoeffler (2004), "Global Aid Allocation: Are Nordic 
Donors Different? " Centre for the Study of African Economies (Oxford), CSAE 
VvTS/2004-34. 
Gerring, John and Strom Thacker (2004), "Political Institutions and 
Governance: The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism", British Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 295-330. 
Gerring, John and Strom Thacker (2005), "Do Neoliberal Policies Deter 
Political Corruption? " International Organisation, Vol. 59, pp. 233-254. 
Gibney, Mark (2005), Political Terror Scales Data set, Ashville: University of 
North Carolina. 
Glover, Saundra H., Minnette A. Burnpus, John E. Logan, and James R. Ciesla 
(1997), "Reexamining the Influence of Individual Values on Ethical Decision- 
making", Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 16(12/13), pp. 1319-29. 
Glynn, P., S. J. Kobrin and A Naim (1997), "The Globalisation of Corruption, " 
in Kimberly Ann Elliot (ed. ), Corruption and The Global Economy., Washington 
D. C., Institute for International Economics, pp. 7-27. 
Goertzel, T. G. (1983), "That Gender Gap: Sex, Family Income, and Political 
Opinions in the Early 1980's 19, Journal of Political and Military Sociology. II 
pp. 209-22. 
354 
Gould, D. (1980), Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third 
World: The Case of Zaire, New York: Pergamon Press. 
Greene, William H. (2000). Econometric Anqlv--iq 4 th Edition. Prentice Hall. 
New Jersey. 
Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (1994), "Protection for Sale, " 
American Economic Review, 84(4), pp. 833-850. 
Gupta, Sanjeev, Benedict Clements, Alexander Pivovarsky, and Erewin R. 
Tiongson (2003), "Foreign Aid and Revenue Response: Does the Composition 
of Aid Matter? ". International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/03/176, 
September. 
Gurr, T. R., K. Jaggers and M. G. Marshall (2003), Polity IV Project - Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions 1800-2003, University of Maryland 
(available at http: //www. cidcm. umd. edu/inscr/Polity). 
Hadi, Ali S. (1992), "Identifying Multiple Outliers in Multivariate Data". 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, Vol. 54, pp. 761-77 1. 
Hall, Robert E., and Charles Jones (1999), "Why Do Some Countries Produce 
So Much More Output per Worker than Others? " Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 114, No. 1, pp. 83-116. 
Hansen, H. and F. Tarp (2001), "Aid and Growth Regressions", Journal of 
Development Economics, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp. 547-570. 
Heston,, Alan and Robert Summers (1991), Penn World Table Version 5.6, 
Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania. 
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten (2002), Penn World Table 
Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Hope, Kempe Ronald and Bornwell C. Chikulo (ed. ) (2000), Corruption and 
Development in Africa: Lessons From CountLy-Case Studies, Macmillan. 
Howell, L. D. (ed. ) (2001), The Handbook of CountEy and Political Rlsk 
Ana-lysis, East Syracuse, N. Y.: PRS Group. 
Hsiao, Cheng (1986), Analysis of Panel Data, Cambridge University Press. 
Huntington, S. P. (1968), Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University 
Press. 
Inter-Parliamentary Union (2005). Women -in 
Parliaments: 1945-200,5. Inter- 
Parliamentary Union, Geneva. 
355 
Isenman, Paul, (1976), "Biases in Aid Allocations Against Poorer and Larger 
Countries", World Development, Vol. 4, No. 8, pp. 631-64 1. 
Johnston, Michael (1996), "The Search for Definitions: The Vitality Of Politics 
and the Issue of Corruption", International Social Science Journal, 149, pp- 
639-58. 
Kaufmann, Daniel (1998), "Challenges in the Next Stage of Anti -corruption", in 
F. Heimann and N. Boswell (eds. ), New Perspectives on Combating Corruption, 
Washington, D. C.: Transparency International and World Bank. 
Kaufmann, D. and A. Kraay (2002), "Growth Without Governance". Economia, 
Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 169-229. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2003), "Governance Matters III: 
Governance Indicators for 1996-2002", World Bank Policy Research Paper 
3106, World Bank. 
Kaufmann, D.,, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2004), "Governance Matters III: 
Governance Indicators for 1996-2002",, World Bank Economic Review, 18, 
pp. 253-287, World Bank. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2005), "Governance Matters IV: 
Governance Indicators for 1996-2004", World Bank Policy Research Paper 
3630, World Bank. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2006), "Governance Matters V: 
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996-2005", World Bank 
Policy Research Paper 4012, World Bank. 
Kaufinann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2007), "Governance Matters VI: 
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996-2006". World Bank 
Policy Research Paper 4280, World Bank. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobaton (1999a), "Aggregating 
Governance Indicators", World Bank Policy Research Paper 2195, World Bank. 
Kaufinann, D., A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobaton (1999b), "Governance Matters", 
World Bank Policy Research Paper 2196, World Bank. 
Keefer, Philip and Stephen Knack (1995), "Institutions and 
Performance: Cross 
Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures"", Economics and 
Politics, 7 (3), November, pp. 207-227. 
S-3: FILE OF INTERNATIONAL Keefer, Philip and Stephen Knack (1998). IRI ) 
COUNTRY RISK GUIDE (ICRG) DATA [Computer file]. 3rd Edition. College 
)56 
Park, Maryland: IRIS [producer], East Syracuse, New York: The PRS Group, 
Inc. [distributor]. 
Khan, A. (1994), The Political EconoMy of oil, Oxford University Press. 
Klitgaard, R. (1988), Controlliniz Commtion, Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Klitgaard, R. (1990), Tropical Ganjzsters, New York, Basic Books. 
Knack, Stephen (20QI), "Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: 
Cross-Country Empirical Tests", Southern Economic Journal, 68(2), pp. 310- 
329. 
Krueger, Anne 0. (1974), "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking 
Society", American Economic Review, Vol. 64, No. 3 (June), pp. 291-303. 
Kunicova, Jana (2006), "Are Presidential Systems More Susceptible to Political 
Corruption? ", Mimeo, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 
California Institute of Technology. 
Kunicova, Jana and Susan Rose-Ackerman (2005), "Electoral Rules and 
Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption", British Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 3 5, pp. 5 73 -606. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny (1997a), "Trust 
in Large Organisations", American Economic Association Papers and 
Proceedings, 87(2), pp. 333-338. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny (1997b), "Legal 
Detenninants of External Finance", Journal ofFinance, 52(3), pp. 1131-1150. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny (1999), "The 
Quality of Govern-rnent", Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, 15(l), 
April, pp. 222-279. 
Lambsdorff, J. G. (1998), "An Empirical Investigation of Bribery in 
International Trade, " European Journal of Development Research, 10(l), pp. 
40-59. 
Lamsbdorff, Johan G. (2005), "Detennining Trends for Perceived Levels of 
Corruption", Discussion Paper 38-05, Universitat Passau. 
Lamsbdorff, Johan G. (2006), "Consequences and Causes of Corruption: What 
do we know from a cross-section of countries"". in: Susan 
Rose-Ackerrnan 
(ed. ), Handbook of Economic Cgrration, Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar 
(forthcoming). 
357 
Learner, Edward E. (1983), "Let's Take the Con Out of Econometrics", 
American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 1, March, pp. 31-43. 
Learner, Edward E. (1985), "Sensitivity Analysis Would Help", American 
Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 3, June, pp. 308-313. 
Lederman, D., N. Loayza and R. Reis Soares (2005), "Accountability and 
Corruption: Political Institutions Matter", Economics and Politics, Vol. 17, No. 
1, pp. 1-35. 
Leff, N. H. (1964), "Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption", 
American Behavioural Scientist, 8(3), November, pp. 8-14. 
Leiken,, R. S. (1997), "Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic", Foreign 
Policy, 105, pp. 55-76. 
Leite, C. and J. Weidmann (1999), "Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural 
Resources, Corruption and Economic Growth", International Monetary Fund 
Working Paper 99/85, July. 
Levine, Ross and David Renelt (1992), "A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross- 
Country Growth Regressions", American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 4. pp. 
942-963. 
Lien, Donald H. D. (1986), "A Note on Competitive Bribery Games", 
Economics Letters, 22, pp. 337-41. 
Lien, Donald H. D. (1987), "Asymmetric Information in Competitive Bribery 
Games", Economics Letters, 23, pp. 153-156. 
Lien, Donald H. D. (1990), "Corruption and Allocation Efficiency", Journal of 
Development Economics, 33, pp. 153-64. 
Lindauer, David L., Oey Astra Meesook, and Parita Suebsaeng (1998), 
"Goverment Wage Policy in Africa: Some Findings and Policy Issues". The 
World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 1-2 5. 
Lipset, S. M. and G. S. Lenz (2000), "Corruption, Culture and Markets-. in: L. 
E. Harrison and S. P. Huntington (eds. ), Culture Matters: How Values Shape 
Human Projuxess, New York: Basic Books, pp. 112-124. 
Lloyd, T., 0. Morrissey and R. Osei (2001), "Problems with Pooling in Panel 
Data Analysis for Developing Countries: The Case of Aid and Trade 
Relationships", University of Nottingham CREDIT Research Paper 01/14. 
Lora, Eduardo (2002), "Comment on: Growth Wihout Governance". Econoniia,, 
Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 216-222. 
158 
Lui, Francis T. (1985), "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery". Journal of 
Political Economy, 93(4), pp. 760-8 1. 
Maizels, A. and M. K. Nissanke (1984), "Motivations for Aid to Developing 
Countries", World Development, Vol. 12, No. 9, pp. 879-900. 
Mauro, Paolo (1995), "Corruption and Growth", Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 110(3), August, pp. 681-712. 
Mauro, Paolo (1998), "Corruption and the Composition of Government 
Expenditure", Journal ofPublic Economics, Vol. 69, pp. 263-279. 
McGillivray, Mark (2003a), "Modelling Aid Allocation: Issues, Approaches and 
Results", Journal ofEconomic Development, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 171-188. 
McGillivray, Mark (2003b), "Aid Effectiveness and Selectivity: Integrating 
Multiple Objectives into Aid Allocations", WIDER Discussion Paper 2003/7 1. 
McGillivray, Mark (2004), "Descriptive and Prescriptive Analyses of Aid 
Allocation: Approaches, Issues and Consequences", International Review of 
Economics and Finance, Vol. 13, pp. 275-292. 
McGillivray, Mark (2005), "What Determines African Bilateral Aid Receipts? ". 
Journal ofInternational Development, Vol. 17, pp. 1003-1018. 
McGillivray, Mark and Edward Oczwoski (199 1), "Modelling the Allocation of 
Australian Bilateral Aid: A Two-part Sample Selection Approach", Economic 
Record, 67(197), pp. 147-152, June. 
McGillivray, Mark and Edward Oczwoski (1992), "A Two-part Sample 
Selection Model of British Bilateral Aid Allocation", Applied Economics, 24, 
pp. 1311-19. 
McKinley, R. D. and R. Little (1977), "A Foreign Policy Model of US Bilateral 
Aid Allocation",, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 58-86. 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (2004), "Report on the Criteria and 
Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for 
Millennium Challenge Account Assistance in FY 2004", Washington DC. 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (2006), -Guidelines for Economic 
Analysis", Washington DC. 
Mookherjee, DiliP and 1. P. L. Png (1995). "Corruptible Law Enforcers: 
How 
Should They be Compensated? " Economic Journal, 105(428). pp. 14-5-59. 
Morrissey, Oliver (2002). "Recipient Governments' Willingness and Abilitv to 
Meet Aid Conditionality"", WIDER Discussion Paper 2002/105. 
359 
Morrissey, Oliver (2004), "Conditionality and Aid Effectiveness Re-evaluated". 
The World Economy, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 153-172. 
Morrissey, Oliver and Olaf Islei and Daniel M'Arnanja (2006), "Aid Loans 
Versus Aid Grants: Are the Effects Different? ", University of Nottingham 
CREDIT Research Paper 06/07. 
Murphy, Kevin and A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1991), "The Allocation of 
Talent: Implications for Growth", Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 106, 
No. 2 (May), pp. 503-530. 
Neumayer, Eric (2003a), "Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? 
A Quantitative Analysis of 21 Donor Countries", Social Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 84, No. 3, pp. 650-666. 
Neumayer, Eric (2003b), The Pattern of Aid Giving: The Impact of Good 
Governance on Development Assistance, Routledge. 
Neumayer, Eric (2003c), "Is Respect for Human Rights Rewarded? An Analysis 
of Total Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Flows", Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 
25, pp. 510-527. 
Neumayer, Eric (2003d), "The Determinants of Aid Allocation by Regional 
Development Banks and United Nations Agencies", International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 47, pp. 10 1- 122. 
Nickson, R. A. (1996), "Democratisation and Institutional Corruption in 
Paraguay", in Walter Little and Eduardo Posada-Carbo (eds. ), Political 
Corruption in Europe and Latin America, New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 267- 
266. 
OECD (2005a), International Development Statistics CD-Rom - Geographical 
Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients 1960-2003, Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
OECD (2005b), International Development Statistics CD-Rom - Creditor 
Reporting System Aid Activities 1973-2003, Paris: Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. 
OECD (2007),, "Donor Practices on Forward Planning of Aid Expenditures". 
Global Forum on Development, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development. 
Ones, Deniz S. and Chockalingarn Viswesvaran (1998). "Gender. Age. and 
Race 
Differences On Overt Integrity Tests: Results Across Four Large-scale Job 
Applicant Data Sets", Journal ofApplied Psýychology . 
83 0). pp. '35 -42. 
360 
Paldam, Martin (2001), "Corruption and Religion: Adding to the Economic 
Model", Kyklos, Vol. 54, No. 2/3, pp. 383-414. 
Paldam, Martin (2002). "The Big Pattern Of Corruption: Economics, Culture and 
the Seesaw Dynamics", European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 18, pp. 
215-240. 
Persson, T., G. Tabellini and F Trebbi (2003), "Electoral Rules and 
Competition", Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 1, No. 4. 
pp. 958-989. 
Pieth, Mark (1997), "International Cooperation to Combat Corruption", in 
Kimberly Ann Elliot (ed. ), Corruption and The Global Economy, Washington 
D. C., Institute for International Economics, pp. 119-3 1. 
Poe, Steven C. (1992), "Human Rights and Economic Aid Allocation under 
Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter", American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 
36, No. 1, pp. 147-167. 
Poe, Steven C. and Rangsima Sirirangsi (1994), "Human Rights and US 
Economic Aid During the Reagan Years", Social Science Quarterly. Vol. 75, 
No. 3, pp. 494-509. 
Poe, Steven. C., Suzanne Pilatovsky, Brian Miller and Ayo Ogundele (1994), 
"Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Revisited: The Latin American Region", 
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 16, pp. 539-558. 
Rauch, James E. and Peter B. Evans (2000), "Bureaucratic Structure and 
Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries", Journal of Public 
Economics, Vol. 75, No. 1, pp. 49-71. 
Reiss, Michelle C. and Kaushik Mitra (1998), "The Effects of Individual 
Difference Factors on the Acceptability of Ethical and Unethical Workplace 
Behaviors", Journal of Business Ethics, 17(14), pp. 15 81-93. 
Rigobon, Roberto and Dani Rodrik (2004), "Rule of Law, Democracy, 
Openness and Income: Estimating the Interrelationships", Mimeo, 
Harvard 
University. 
Robinson,, Enders A. (1985), Probabilily Thegaý_ýýýý, International 
Human Resources Development Corporation / D. Reidel Publishing Company. 
Rodrik, Dani,, Arvind Subramanian! ' and 
Francesco Trebbi (2004), -Institutions 
Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in 
Economic 
Development", Journal ofEconomic Growth, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 
131-165. 
Rose-Ackerman. Susan (1975), "The Economics of Corruption"". Journal Qf 
Public Economics. Vol. 4. pp. 187-203. 
3 )61 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1978), COrrUDtion: A Study in Political Economy, 
Academic Press, LondonNew York. 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1999), Corruption and Government: Causes. 
Consequences and Reform, Cambridge University Press. 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (2004), "Governance and Corruption", in B. Lomborg 
(ed. ), Global Crises., Global Solutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sachs, Jeffrey and Andrew Warner (1995), "Economic Reform and the Process 
of Global Integration", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1. pp. I- 
95. 
Sachs, Jeffrey, John W. McArthur, Guido Schmidt-Traub, Margaret Kruk, 
Chandrika, Bahadur, Michael Faye, and Gordon McCord, (2004), "Ending 
Africa's Poverty Trap", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1. 
Sandholtz,, Wayne and William Koetzle (2000), "Accounting for Corruption: 
Economic Structure, Democracy and Trade", International Studies Quarterly. 
Vol. 44, pp. 31-50. 
Schraeder, P. J., S. W. Hook and B. Taylor (1998),, "Clarifying the Foreign Aid 
Puzzle. A Comparison of American, Japanese, French and Swedish Aid Flows", 
World Politics, Vol. 50, pp. 294-323. 
Schwarz, Adam (1994), A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s, Boulder: 
Westview Press. 
Sector Wide Approach Support Group (2004), "The sector-wide approach: 
organising principle for bilateral development cooperation", Swiss Tropical 
Institute. 
Serra, Danila (2006). "Empirical Determinants of Corruption: A SensitvIty 
Analysis", Public Choice, Vol. 126, pp. 225-256. 
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny (1993), "Corruption", Quarterly 
Journal qf 
Economics, 108(3), August, pp. 599-617. 
SIPRI Yearbooks of World Armaments, Disarmament and International 
SecuritN- 
(1980-1999), Taylor and Francis, London. 
Staiger, Douglas and James Stock (1997), "Instrumental 
Variable Regression 
with Weak Instruments". Econometrica. Vol. 65. pp. 557-586. 
Svensson, Jakob (1999), "Aid, Growth and Democracy". Economics and 
Politics, Vol. 11, No. 3 (November), pp. 275-297. 
)62 
Svensson, Jakob (2000), "Foreign Aid and Rent- Seeking -. Journal of International Economics, Vol. 5 1, No. 2, pp. 43 7-46 1. 
Svensson, Jakob (2005), "Eight Questions about Corruption". Journal 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 19-42. 
Swamy, A., 0. Azfar, S. Knack and Y. Lee (2001). "Gender and Corruption". 
Journal o Development Economics, Vol. 64, pp. 25-55. Of 
Tanzi, Vito (1998),, "Corruption Around The World: Causes, Consequences, 
Scope and Cures", International Monetary Fund Working Paper 'ý\'P/98176. 
May. 
Tanzi,, Vito (2000), Policies, Institutions and the Dark Side of Economics. 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenharn. 
Tavares,, Jose (2003), "Does Foreign Aid Corrupt? " Economics Leffers, Vol. 79, 
pp. 99-106. 
Transparency International (1999), TI Press Release, "Bribe Payers index 1999", 
20/01/99. 
Transparency International (2002), TI Press Release, "Bribe Payers index 2002", 
14/05/02. 
Treisman, Daniel (2000), "The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National StudY-, 
Journal ofPublic Economics, 76(3), June, pp. 399-457. 
Trumbull,, William N. and Howard J. Wall (1994), "Estimating Aid-Allocation 
Criteria with Panel Data", Economic Journal, Vol. 104 (July).. pp. 876-882. 
U1 Haque, N. and R. Sahay (1996), -Do Goverment Wage Cuts Close Budget 
Deficits? Costs of Corruption", IMF Staff Papers 43(4). pp. 754-778. 
United Nations Development Programme (2003), Human Development Report 
2003, U-NDP and Oxford University Press: Nev,, York and Oxford. 
Van Rijckeghem, Caroline and Beatrice Weder (2001). -Bureaucratic 
Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Wages in the Civil Service Affect 
Corruption and by How Much? " Journal of Development Economics. Vol. 65, 
pp. 307-33 1. 
Vanhanen,, Tatu (2000). "A New Data set for Measuring Democracy. 1810- 
1998". Journal of Peace Research, Vol. '17, No. 2. pp. 25 1 -265. 
Voeten, Eric (2006), "Documenting Votes in the UN General Assembly %-1 . 0", 
George Washington University (available at http: //home. (-, NA-u. edu/-N, oeten). 
316 -3 
Wei, Shang-Jin (2001), "Natural Openness and Good Government", Centre for 
International Development at Harvard University Working Paper No-'61. 
White, Howard and Mark McGillivray (1993). "Explanatory Studies of Aid 
Allocation Among Developing Countries: A Critical Survey, )% Institute of Social 
Studies Working Paper No. 148, ISS, The Hague. 
White, Howard and Mark McGillivray (1995), "How Well is Aid Allocated? 
Descriptive Measures of Aid Allocation: A Survey of Methodology and 
Results". Development and Change, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 163-83. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2003), Introductory'Econometrics: A Modem Approach, 2 nd 
Edition, Cincinnati, OH: South-Westem. 
World Bank (1989), Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
World Bank (1998a), Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't and Why, 
Oxford University Press, New York. 
World Bank (I 998b), World Development Indicators on CD-Rom, Washington, 
D. C.: World Bank. 
World Bank (1998c), Annual World Bank Conference on Development 
Economics 1997, Washington, DC: World Bank. 
World Bank (2000), Can Africa Claim the 21 " Centujy? Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
World Bank (200 1), "Engendering Development Through Gender Equality in 
Rights Resources and Voice", World Bank Policy Research Project 21776. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
World Bank (2005a), World Development Indicators on CD-Rom. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
World Bank (2005b), World Aftica Database on CD-Rom, Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
World Bank (2005c), Review of World Bank Conditional ity, Washington. 
D. C.: 
World Bank. 
Wrong, Michela (2005), "When the Money Goes West". New Statesman. 14 
th 
March. 
Young, C. (1995), "The Heritage of Colonialism". in J. Harbeson and 
D. 
Rothchild (eds. ). Africa in Worlj PnI; tJrr-* Post-COld War ChallenLe,,. NA'est\ 
icxN- 
Press. 
364 
Lmwý-- ---- - Now 
